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# THE LOST DOMINION





# THE LOST DOMINION

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## PREFACE.

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MANY are the lost possessions of England. From some she has been driven in battle: others she has abandoned through negligence: others she has surrendered as useless and noxious: some have been bartered.

The case of India is up to the present the first and only example of the abandonment of a valuable possession on moral grounds.

Whether the future historian will attribute to the Imperial statesmen responsible the self-denial of Washington or the self-denial of Sulla will be for him to decide. It is by results that policies are judged. The future only can show whether this great abdication is not also a great refusal. But may the good prevail.

I am writing history and not polemics. I wish to explain the reasons for the fall of the British dominion in India. I do not, therefore, praise or blame individuals. Indeed, as far as possible, I abstain from even naming the chief actors in the drama. Nor do I censure or praise policies.

Given the conditions, the policy naturally follows. Nor am I writing to recommend or dissuade from any future policy. I am neither a politician nor a preacher. Nor am I called on to express dogmatically approbation or disapprobation of current views. I am not a moralist. Indeed, to my mind there is much to be said on both sides. The Imperialist is right, and so also is the Little Englander. There is not in my mind any absolute right or wrong. The question is *quamente*, and these men all had noble ideals.

One word of warning. I am not a realist. When, then, I use the expressions "India," "England," and the like, I do not thereby imply that I believe there is any such entity in *rerum natura* as, *e.g.*, India apart from the actual sub-continent and its various inhabitants. When, then, I say, "India did this or thought this," I am merely using a convenient abbreviation of the sentence, "At this time a good many of the actual inhabitants of India did or thought this." Where there is any chance of misunderstanding I have generally made the expression correspond to the thought.

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# THE LOST DOMINION.



## CHAPTER I.

### THE INDIAN EMPIRE.

It began in trade. Under the Tudors the wealth of England continually increased. That wealth was invested in manufactures, and it became more and more difficult to find markets. From much of the habitable world English trade was excluded. To much it was admitted only on sufferance, and after paying heavy brokerage to the middleman. As regards imports, winter-feeding of stock was unknown: cattle were killed off at Martinmas; their salted flesh was the food even of the better class for six months in the year. This nutriment was dry and unpalatable, and there was great demand for spices. But English commerce was cut off from direct communication with the spice-bearing lands. This trade was a monopoly, first of the Portuguese and then of the Dutch. The accidental capture of a carrack (a Portuguese East-



Indiaman) attracted the attention of England, up to that time rather turned westwards, to the East as a possible market for English manufactures, and as a source of supply for condiments. The Dutch presumed on their monopoly to raise the price of pepper to what the English consumer thought a preposterous figure, and accordingly some adventurous English merchants began to trade in Indian seas.

The trade was not altogether satisfactory. The East did not provide a very good market for English manufactures. On the contrary, Oriental manufactures threatened to compete with home manufactures. Oriental products had therefore to be paid for in specie, the export of which was technically illegal. The trade was therefore, at first, looked on with no very favourable eyes. At last, however, it dawned on the economists of the day that to send to India a shilling and to purchase with that coin a pound of pepper, which you can sell to the Spaniard for five shillings, does not really drain off the silver of the country. It soon became impossible to deny that the removal of the staple for Oriental wares from Lisbon and Amsterdam to London conferred on England many subsidiary benefits. The Indian trade, therefore, ere long became an object of solicitude to the Government.

In order to regulate the trade, that is to avoid cut-throat competition and speculation, to prevent

disorders in Indian seas, to ensure that the traders in those seas should conduct themselves according to the ordinary rules of commercial morality, and to put the whole trade under powerful guardianship, which could more easily protect the interests of individual traders, a trading company was formed under Royal Charter; and on the members of this Company was conferred, by executive decree, a monopoly of the trade with all countries between the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn.

This corporation was through the whole of the Stewart period in close connection with the Crown, and in the factious struggles at the end of that period its influence was thrown on the Tory side. Consequently when the Stewarts fell, the Company was menaced: its monopoly was disallowed; private enterprise in the East was encouraged. The results were so disastrous that the Company, purged of its Tory elements and strengthened by new blood and fresh capital, was reconstituted, and was now secured in its privileges by statute. The East India Company thus became the creature of Parliament.

For many years the Company did not trade exclusively with India, and indeed their activities were at first directed rather to the Spice Islands of the Far East. Here they came into conflict with the Dutch. The Dutch had by this time built up a considerable territorial empire in those remote regions. There was no very powerful

native government, and that the trader might be safe in his trading, it was necessary for him also to be a sovereign. The British had no such ambitions, and were unable or unwilling to obtain political control of these far dominions. Therefore, about the middle of the seventeenth century, they were finally driven from those markets. From Japan they were wholly excluded; in China they had a precarious footing; they knew nothing of Australia, and the whole western coast of America was subject to the actual or nominal superiority of Spain. These latter regions were also unattractive. Therefore the British were forced to concentrate on India, and a rough sort of compromise was entered into between them and the Dutch, whereby India was assigned as a sphere of influence to Britain, and the Islands to Holland. The Portuguese were by this time wholly negligible.

At this time India was still under the rule of the Moghuls, though that monarchy was now entering on its decline. It was still able to keep the peace, and its military and naval power was by no means to be disregarded. Dreams of conquest for a moment flitted before the eyes of one ambitious director of the Company, and some attempts were made to establish in India a territorial dominion on the model of the Dutch. These attempts were easily foiled by the generals of Aurangzeb. Thus the sole freehold possessions of the Company in the East remained the island of Bombay and its

dependencies, which original Portuguese conquests had passed to the British Crown as part of the dowry of the unfortunate wife of Charles the Second, and from the Crown had been transferred to the Company. For many years, therefore, the Company was contented to carry on its business, either in factories situated in some city of the Moghul Empire—for the Moghul system allowed a certain measure of self-government to such a settlement of Frankish merchants,—or in trading stations leased from some feudatory of the Moghul.

This situation of the English traders was attended with certain inconveniences, especially when the decline of the Moghul Empire became pronounced, and even walled cities were not safe from predatory raids. In the west of India trade languished. Bombay, though a British possession, was not regarded as a very suitable site for a great centre of trade. It was on the open sea, and was therefore exposed to pirates. The hinterland was sterile and thinly peopled, and Bombay was in any case cut off from it by the Portuguese, the Marathas, and the hills. Bengal was remote; Sindh was hostile. It was therefore on the east coast of Madras, in the so-called Carnatic, that the energies of the Company were concentrated. Here the Company flourished, as small landed proprietors and great merchants, for many years.

Then came the war of Jenkins' Ear. It seems

now well established (what was at one time in doubt) that Jenkins at one time had had an ear, and that it was cut off. But the whole business reflected little credit on the common-sense of the British people, or on the honesty of the politicians. Both are, perhaps, capable of defence, and it is now known that there was, at any rate, this justification for the howl for war, that there was actually a conspiracy between the Bourbon Princes for the suppression of British trade, and that freedom of trade was becoming every year more essential to the mere existence of Britain. The war spread to India. There, as elsewhere, it went against England, and the prestige of the French grew. The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle restored the possessions of the Company, but that was rather a reason for the French Company to try to extinguish the rival firm by indirect means. The French were more esteemed by the native powers than the English, but there was this difficulty, that the French Company, though also a great trader, had never sufficient capital or goods to satisfy the demands of the import and export trade. Therefore the local rulers were unwilling to allow the total extirpation of the English, who were first and foremost traders, and therefore excellent customers.

Reluctantly the servants of the East India Company laid aside the ledger and yardstick, and took to the drill-manual and musket. It was

not till the daring and brilliant diplomacy and strategy of the French chiefs seemed likely to make that nation supreme over the whole of the south of India, and till it appeared by evident signs that the French intended to use that supremacy to extirpate British trade, that the British entered into a struggle which, nominally between rival local Indian chiefs, was actually a combat between French and English, at a time when there was formal peace between the Crowns. That struggle was long drawn out and abounds in thrilling and picturesque incidents, and ended in the total annihilation of the French interest in the south.

Gladly now would the Company have reverted to the old state of things, whereby the territorial sovereignty was left to the local princes, and the British confined themselves to the position of privileged traders. But such a retrograde step was clearly impossible. The British had during a generation of war built up a large army. They had also entered into engagements with numerous native chiefs and must preserve the means of meeting those obligations. The army could therefore not be disbanded and must be paid. Territorial revenues were therefore necessary. Moreover, should the British leave the field, others would step in. The French after the Seven Years' War fostered their colonies and marine, and their hopes of vengeance. The Dutch showed ambitions

in the Indian field, where they already possessed some settlements, and which was adjacent to their important settlement of Ceylon. The memory of the Danish, Prussian, and Imperial enterprises was not extinct. Wisely, therefore, the British, though reluctantly, resolved to retain what they had won. They did this with a better conscience because there was no one with a very clear title to whom their conquests could be resigned. The Moghul power was in these parts utterly extinct. The Nizam's claims were no better than those of the English. The Nawab of the Carnatic was a mere figurehead, and was apparently quite content to be such.

Meanwhile in Bengal an extraordinary series of accidents had given to the British the superiority of that rich and important province, and it was not difficult to connect the Carnatic with Bengal by obtaining a cession of the wild and isolated no-man's-land which connected them.

This was the nucleus of the British dominion in India.

This dominion was organised by Clive and Hastings, extended by Wellesley, and established by Lord Hastings. By the 'twenties of the last century all the Indian lands, with the exception of the basin of the Indus, were ruled either immediately by the British or by Princes acting with them in "subordinate co-operation." In the meantime Russia had extended her Empire east-

wards and southwards, and showed evident signs of attempting to establish an influence in the highly disorganised Afghanistan, which, if established and consolidated, must evidently have proved fatal to the British interests in India.

This attempt was clearly premature, but the British thought necessary to counter it. They therefore invaded Afghanistan, to discover that the Afghans were not Indians, and that though to beat the Afghans in the field was not difficult, yet to pacify the country would be costly and dangerous. The British accepted the verdict of the Khurd Kabul Pass and withdrew from Afghanistan. But for a race of conquerors to show not only that they can be defeated, but also that they are prepared to accept defeat, is to give discontented subjects and doubtful friends a dangerous lesson, and the Afghan campaign had as inevitable consequences the annexation of Sindh, two wars with the Sikhs, and ultimately the great mutiny. The mutiny, however, was in the future. By 1854 the whole of the sub-continent was British.

This extension of British dominion was an inevitable necessity from the moment that the British had any territorial possessions at all. A civilised power which has valuable possessions, on whose frontiers are weak and uncivilised states, is forced in mere self-defence, or in order to fulfil the most elementary duties of protection to its own subjects, to extend its power until either it meets



some natural obstacle which renders further progress useless or impossible, or till its frontiers become conterminous with those of some strong power which can preserve the order of the marches. Step by step, therefore, the British had advanced. The Home Government was opposed to this extension of British power. The Court of Directors, which was not an ambitious body and regarded dividends rather than glory as the proper objects of desire by a trading company, dreaded such extension as likely to endanger trade, and still more likely to lead to the interference of the Crown. The Company's servants and even the Governors-General were on the whole pacific.

Events, however, proved too strong for pacificism. To assert, therefore, that the British Empire of India is the result of a series of unjust wars is a calumny. With the exception of the annexation of Sindh, for which the Company was in no way responsible, there is no instance of aggression which was also successful.

The really shocking stories of our dealings with Mir Jaafar and with Mysore are not stories of political aggression on peaceful neighbours. Here is a mere saturnalia of impudent corruption, in which were protagonists certain individual Englishmen, some of whom happened to be employees of the Company, but who were acting in clear defiance of the orders of their superiors both in England and in India.

Some of the annexations of Dalhousie were an unjustifiable exercise of power. They were not, however, aggressions on independent states. They were merely acts of internal administration whereby territory, up to the present governed mediately through vassal princes, was now converted into immediate possessions of the Company. This may or may not have been a mistaken policy. It was not in any way an example of an aggressive foreign policy.

In 1854 Dalhousie could look about him with satisfaction. The Empire of India had now extended to what appeared to be its natural boundaries. Inside those natural boundaries the will of the Company was supreme. There was nothing in the physical sphere that could shake the dominion. This great empire had been won by means for which there was no need to blush. It was administered, according to the lights of the rulers, for the benefit of the ruled. To those who, brought up in a philosophy of utilitarianism, imagined that Government was a mere mechanism, there seemed no reason why the Company's rule should not endure eternally.

It is not difficult to ascertain why the Company had been able to do what none of its predecessors had done, that is to say, to extend its raj from Assam to Peshawur, and from Hardwar to Cape Comorin. It was a corporation and not an individual. Therefore it did not die of a fever, or

take to drink, or lavish public revenues on concubines and mausolea, or appoint eunuchs and pandars to important military and civil commands. It was ruling in the East, but was not an Oriental ruler.

Its governing body was composed of elderly prudent merchants, many of them Scots. Such a body was not in the least likely to plunge into wild and romantic adventures. It was very averse to war at all, and only engaged in it when war was clearly necessary. That is to say, it generally waited to be attacked, and for an Indian state voluntarily to attack the Company was an evident sign of some lack of prudence in the Government of that state, or at any rate of a restless spirit of aggression which made the enemy of the Company dreaded also by its Indian neighbours and rivals. The Company therefore never lacked powerful allies. There was thus never any general confederation among the Native States against the Company.

The Company was wealthy. It possessed the revenues of two rich provinces. Madras had certainly been wasted by war, but its irrigation system was intact, and in any case the devastation there was far less than elsewhere. Bengal had suffered little if at all from invasion. The Company had also the profits of its trade. Having a certain reputation for honesty and good faith, it was able to raise loans in India on terms

which, heavy as they seem in modern days, filled its rivals with admiring despair. It had behind it, ultimately, the credit and resources of the City of London and the Imperial Government.

For the greater part of this period its finances were well administered. For the mercenary, therefore, the Company was an ideal paymaster, and India was the happy hunting-ground of the mercenary.

Except for a short time during the American rebellion, the English had not only superiority but absolute dominion at sea. It was the dream of various hostile powers to embarrass the British Government by striking at its Indian trade, and there were numerous comings and goings of French and other agents. Confederacies admirable on paper were built up, but dissolved as soon as it was discovered that no European power had the faintest chance of throwing any considerable military force into the country. The existence of these intrigues was rather a cause for the extension of British power.

The British wielded a formidable military power. In addition to the European troops, both those of the Royal and of the Company's army, there was an ever-increasing establishment of Indian troops. The French were the first to employ sepoys, but it was the English who discovered that it was possible to discipline them, and that when disciplined they were capable of great

things. The Indian soldier was not a mere mercenary. Attracted no doubt into the service of the Company by the lure of good and regular pay and decent treatment, he developed a strange sort of loyalty based on a belief in the *ikbal* or *numen* of the Company. India was full of masterless fighting men, and they rallied with enthusiasm round the ever-victorious standards of the Raj.

For many centuries it had been known in Europe that the decision given at Adrianople in A.D. 375 must be reversed. It was no longer true that the cavalry arm was superior to the infantry. The introduction of the missile weapon, first the long bow and then the musket, had rendered the predominance of cavalry doubtful. The invention of the bayonet, which armed the infantryman with a weapon which was at once a missile and a pike, still further weighted the balance against the man on the horse. Then came the revival of the Roman infantry drill and tactics, which gave to the battalion or *tertia* a flexibility and a power of alternating between attack and defence which no cavalry force could rival. Finally came the combination of the three arms—a combination worked out during the Thirty Years' War—which rendered purely cavalry tactics obsolete. Observant Franks had noted, even in the palmy days of the Moghul Empire, that there was nothing in India which

could stand against a small force disciplined on the European model, and this truth was amply proved by the first successes of the French in the Carnatic. India was still in the cavalry stage. One of the early English historians records the impression produced on him by a charge of 10,000 horse—"be their valour and discipline what it may,"—but it was soon found that against even a very small brigade, provided it was well drilled and disciplined, and well led, the utmost power of Indian armies was applied in vain. It was discovered also, what was previously unknown, that infantry can outmarch and wear down cavalry. The invention of the galloper gun made it certain that when the cavalry force was brought to bay it would be broken up.

It is true that the Indian princes soon grasped the superiority of the foreign tactics, and themselves formed military establishments on the British model. But these were condemned to inferiority to their original. In the first place, the pick of the fighting men preferred the service of the Company. In the second place, the foreign mercenary—the Arab or the Afghan—was a poor substitute for the European troops; in the third place, there was a deficiency of officers. The tactic was really foreign to Indian ideas, and Indian officers were incapable of wielding it. The Indian princes therefore engaged European

mercenary officers. But valiant and loyal as these men were, they were yet mercenaries and foreigners, and were mistrusted even by their own employers as such. The princes therefore dreaded to make the corps so officered too perfect, and used their disciplined battalions merely as subsidiary to the huge, useless, expensive and thoroughly noxious Asiatic armies of the old type.

Desperate as the fighting therefore was between the Company's forces and the disciplined battalions of Mysore and Sindia and the Sikhs—the disciplined battalions in the latter case being supported by a formidable artillery,—the conflict was never really in doubt. The struggle with such of the powers as kept to the cavalry tactic, but avoided pitched battles, was more troublesome, but could end in one way only. It was only the Afghan *levée-en-masse* which proved unconquerable.

That *levée-en-masse* was the rising of a free and turbulent people against a foreign invader who wished, no doubt, to introduce order and good government into a lawless land, but who wished in the process to reduce the country to foreign subjection. This was intolerable to the Afghans. In India, the British encountered no such moral obstacle. For eight hundred years the country had been subject to the sway of foreigners. Patriotism was an idea unknown to

the Indian, as it is to the Oriental in general. His attachment is to his own village, his own community, his own religion. Thus a Guzerathi Moslem is a Moslem living in Guzerat. To him a Moslem from Timbaktu or from Constantinople is a fellow-citizen. A Hindu or Christian Guzerathi is a foreigner. His affections are not territorial. In some rare cases, no doubt, the nationality was so small and so concentrated in one particular area, that there was patriotism in our sense. Such was the case in Coorg. In others there was strong tribal attachment overriding the general attachment to race and religion, and it might be that the tribe had a confined and compact territory. In this case again there was something like local patriotism. Such was the case in Bhopal or Nepal. But these were rare and local exceptions to the general rule. And as a matter of history, this local patriotism was apt to invoke the aid of the British against princes who were menacing the small nationality or the isolated tribe. It was due to the intervention of the British that Bhopal and Coorg and the Rajput states preserved their municipal independence. With the nationality of Nepal the British soon established a *modus vivendi*.

The country, therefore, of the Hindu and the Moslem was Hinduism and Islam, and not any local area, and his ruler was Allah, or the gods, and in no case any territorial prince. And there



was certainly nothing about any of the Indian princes which made people anxious to die for them. The collapse of the Moghul Empire had left India a welter of weak states, ruled for the most part by incompetent descendants of soldiers of fortune, whose title was no better than that of the Company, who were just as much foreigners, and who were far more oppressive. There were, with the exception of the Marathas, no great Hindu rulers. The Moslems were degenerate. From the beginning, the Moslem interest in India had been maintained by a perpetual flow of foreigners from Persia and Central Asia. This influx was now cut off by political changes in those countries, and by the rise of the Sikh power in the Punjab. The Mussulman ruler of the eighteenth century was therefore, as a general rule, the descendant in the third or fourth generation of some Indianised Turkish or Persian family. He showed his origin by softness and effeminacy, modified by outbreaks of tigerish ferocity. There was nothing attractive about these cruel, spoiled children, the puppets and victims of the harem. They were also for the most part followers of a sect of Islam which was distasteful to the Indian Moslem, and were therefore looked on, in general, as little better than infidels.

Haidar Ali was a man of genius, and his son, Tippu, an able vigorous Prince. As the establishers, maintainers, and propagators of Islam in

a region, even now the seat of a peculiar kind of Hindu orthodoxy, they were to a certain extent regarded as national leaders by the Moslems. But this by itself was sufficient to alienate Hindu sympathies. And their triumphs were not won against Hindus and Christians only; they fell also on the Moslem lands of the South, and the strange restless reforming zeal of Tippu rendered him highly suspect to orthodoxy.

The titular King of Delhi, after long yearning for British protection, was at last able to obtain it. Moslem intriguers were apt to use his name and authority, but it was impossible for him to assume an attitude of official opposition to the power which maintained him in a position of dignity and affluence to which he had long been a stranger.

The Marathas, who were in their own homelands a patriotic enough community, commended themselves as rivals to the British neither to the Hindu nor the Mussulman. In theory the state was formed on a Hindu basis, and was intended to form a rallying-point for a Hindu insurrection against the Moslems. In practice it did annihilate the Moghul power, but proved equally oppressive to Hindus and Mussulmans. Outside its own homelands it performed none of the functions of sovereignty, contenting itself with the exaction of tribute from Hindu and Mussulman alike, and supplementing these resources by campaigns which

were mere razzias. At a later period individual Maratha chieftains set up independent monarchies, but the individual Maratha was by no means a popular figure outside the limits of his own land.

The Hindus, therefore, were without a leader, or, worse, their leaders were generally abhorred. The Moslems looked anxiously across the northern frontiers of India, but no permanent help came from there. The invasion of Nadir Shah gave the *coup-de-grâce* to the Delhi monarchy. The invasions of Ahmad Shah broke the force of the Marathas and gave Islam a breathing space, but established no competent government in Indian lands. Thus the Empire was without a master, and might as well fall to the Company as to any other claimant. There appeared nothing in the rule of the Company which was a menace to Hindu or Moslem orthodoxy. The servants of the Company were of course Franks, and their customs were strange and disgusting. But they kept themselves very much to themselves and did not obtrude their ideas on the Indian. They were supposed to be Christians, but showed no zeal in the propagation of their religion, regarding conversion, indeed, rather as a disqualification for favour than a recommendation. The Company seemed extremely reluctant to supply churches or priests even for its own servants, and there seemed to be no particular thirst among its employees for these spiritual refreshments. It is sad that

the rulers should be infidels, but it is better than that they should be persecuting bigots. The Company and its servants seemed also to have few prejudices. It was guilty of what we should now consider as rather scandalous compliances with Hinduism. Also the two great religions were protected by the laws and the administration. The religious law, at any rate in so far as it dealt with matters of inheritance and civil relations, was enforced. And just as much as Tweedledum was vexed that he could not persecute and mortify Tweedledee, so he was gratified that Tweedledee was not allowed to persecute and mortify him.

This religious indifference was not due to any doubts on the part of the British people that Christianity was superior to Hinduism and Islam, or that Western civilization was superior to Eastern civilization. But in the first place, the directors of the Company were traders, and the experience of the Portuguese had shown that crusading and trade do not really harmonise. "Sad it is, no doubt, that our subjects should be Pagans and Moslems, and therefore, presumably, doomed to reprobation. But it is better to deal in trade with solvent infidels than with orthodox bankrupts." The Company did not go as far as the Dutch, who, good Calvinists, and therefore indifferent to religious symbols, had no scruples in purchasing the right to the lucrative trade of Japan by trampling on the cross.

In the same way the Company did not interfere with national customs. This was not because the Company or its servants regarded the state of Indian society with much approbation. The "sympathetic officer" was yet to be born. The barbarous Briton of the eighteenth century, if told it was his duty to sympathise with sodomy, polygamy, child-marriage, sati, usury, perjury, forgery, treason, and the other fruits of a decadent civilization, would have answered with coarse brevity, for there was no doubt that Indian civilization was decadent. The Hindu civilization had, ages ago, produced all the fruit of which it was capable, and nothing more of profit could grow on that sapless trunk. The Moslem civilization was purely exotic, and dependent on continual reinforcement from the Moslem lands of the west. Over those lands also the night was now creeping fast; Islam under the hegemony of the Turk was sunk in that deathlike sleep from which only now there are signs of an awakening.

The Company was, however, tolerant, so long as its customers had sufficient morality to pay their debts and perform their contracts. Individual Englishmen were as a general rule indifferent. The individual Englishman is apt to regard all foreigners as a queer unintelligible unaccountable lot, who are obviously inferior, and cannot be expected to comply with British ideas. To reform the Indian seemed unadvisable, and was

obviously quite hopeless. It was therefore not attempted.

There were some ardent souls who hoped that by an exhibition of a British model, and particularly by the spread of English education, matters might be improved. These persons were not looked on with much favour, in official circles, as likely to produce a dangerous ferment. They did not know (what is, however, a fact) that a nation is capable of reaching only a certain level of civilization. When that level is reached a decline necessarily takes place. The nation is then not capable either of reaching again the same level of civilization from which it has degenerated, or itself of developing a new civilization. It is only by the introduction not merely of new ideas but of fresh blood to such an extent that the national stock is profoundly and permanently modified, that any fresh progress can be made. You cannot make a C3 man into a A1 man, or an A1 man into a C3 man, by literary education. But the error of the eighteenth century (an error which is still vital enough) was the idea of human perfectibility. The character and intelligence of every man, according to this school, when he is born, is a blank sheet of paper. It is the duty of the educationalist to write on that sheet of paper, and according to the inscription so will the character of the human being be. This doctrine, neglecting as it does the influence of heredity, is totally false and therefore exceedingly dangerous

for the politician, but its disciples in India were not yet in a position of power, and its dangers were not therefore yet apparent. Still islanded in his own arrogance, the Englishman was perfectly satisfied with his own culture, lopsided as it was, and his own vices, and had a contemptuous toleration for those of the Indians.

And indeed the progress of decay of Indian society was very marked. Religion as a moral guide seemed to have vanished. Even the morality which binds together buccaneers, the recognition of the necessity of loyalty to your leader, of fidelity to your "pal," of keeping a promise to a confederate, was rapidly growing obsolete. India, like Italy in the fifteenth century, was a sort of traitor's paradise. With religion perished also the laws, for to the Oriental it is religion and not the State which forbids and commands. What there was of piety and learning had withdrawn from the world and taken refuge in the sanctuary or the forest. Corruption was universal. There were no tribunals and no judges who made even a pretence of chastity. If there had been there was no executive to enforce decrees. The currency was debased. Trade languished. Outside the British settlements manufactures disappeared. Over all the country for three generations had revelled an endless, devastating, inconclusive war. Vast areas of productive lands had relapsed to forest.

To a people thus fevered, thus tortured, came the

British peace as a healing anodyne. The rule of the Company was for twenty years oppressive enough, but its oppressions were confined to the powerful, and spared the peasant. Enough, however, of the tale of tyranny reached England to shock public opinion, and the proper remedies were applied. Since that time it cannot be denied (save by those who would deny anything) that the British Government has always sought for the material welfare of its subjects, and has never consciously and intentionally oppressed them. Further, the British Government insisted on a high standard of public morality among its servants and agents in India. Warren Hastings, for instance, was persecuted not so much for what he did, for all his actions were severally justifiable, but for the way he did it. It cannot escape the observer that here was not an English statesman but a man applying the Machiavelian "Politics" to Eastern questions. He was actually a beneficent ruler. Had policy seemed to point towards oppression, he would as easily have been a tyrant. His only guide was a cold, passionless, acute, and unmoral intelligence.

The Company did not attempt to do much more than perform the very elementary duties of a ruler. It kept order, administered justice, and guarded its territories against the enemy, and in order to do so, raised revenue. But it did all these things with an efficiency hitherto unknown in India. To the great mass of the people the Company's raj was



a paradise, and the peaceful inhabitants of all the states in India prayed that it might be extended to them. Lands abandoned for a century were taken again into cultivation, cities were repopulated or new emporia founded, commerce revived, temples and mosques were built anew. To the swashbuckler, the brigand, the court parasite, the rule of the Company was an evil thing, but these had played their part long enough.

After a short and unedifying excursion into the domain of Oriental intrigue, the Company and its servants had decided that "honesty was the best policy." The meaning of this much misunderstood proverb is merely that to tell the truth is a valuable diplomatic artifice. I do not think it is true, as so often asserted, that the British do not make good liars and intriguers. There is a certain amount of evidence the other way, and I have no doubt that in this field also the highly competent British nation could far excel the Oriental. But on the whole, it appeared that the British were likely to obtain their ends more by getting a reputation for truth and fidelity to their word than by deceit and fraud. This was a new and valued trait in the ruler.

The subjects no doubt missed a certain lavishness and display to which they were accustomed in their rulers. They would not have minded a few capricious acts of tyranny. They appreciated the impartial justice, but recognised that that justice was expensive, slow, and uncertain, and sighed

sometimes for the rapid despatch of the court of the Kazi. They would have liked to see magnificent palaces and pleasure-grounds testify to the taste, wealth, and power of their rulers, provided they were not erected on their own fields. They would have rejoiced to see the troops after a victorious campaign rewarded with lands and donatives. They would not have objected to the erection of sumptuous churches, provided that the mosques and temples were also preserved and endowed. They would have thought it only proper that the Company should endow learned and pious men of all religions including their own. The absence of these attributes of royalty puzzled them, but they shrugged their shoulders, saying: "These Franks are all mad," and enjoyed the peace and prosperity to which they had become wholly unfamiliar.

The princes of India, mostly rescued from imminent destruction by British protection, also benefited by the general peace and prosperity of the sub-continent. A competent ruler was allowed to go very much his own way, even though that way was not quite that of the British. In cases where it was needed, the British Government gave private counsel to an erring ruler. In more serious cases it openly intervened. In cases of gross tyranny or rebellion, it preserved the dynasty by removing the individual. It took little or no tribute from the states, exacting, however, a rigorously strict payment for services rendered. It was not till

the end of this period that the idea became current that it was the duty of the British Government to extend the blessings of British rule to as many Indians as possible, and that therefore, in cases of misgovernment, it should not merely remove the monarch, but abolish the dynasty, and should, wherever an opportunity occurred, annex a principality when there was no direct heir. These doctrines, when applied and laid down as general principles, horrified and alienated the native princes, but they were not prevalent till the fifties.

There is therefore no reason for surprise that the British dominion spread over the sub-continent with the ease and irresistibility of some natural process.

## CHAPTER II.

## THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

ALTHOUGH theoretically India was the private property of a private Company, it was impossible for England to abstain from interference and control. The whole Kingdom was interested in Indian trade; experience had shown that the Company was unable to provide its Indian subjects with good government, and incidents had occurred shocking to humanity; at any moment imperial assistance might be invoked to preserve or extend the Company's possessions. At the same time neither political party was much in favour of State interference with private rights. The Company was also a corporation, and there were other powerful corporations who were not anxious to allow the establishment of a precedent, which a Government, which might wish to interfere with them, might invoke. The Company was itself extremely influential.

After much heated controversy, and after various abortive experiments, a compromise was arrived at

satisfactory to all parties. The Company retained its trading rights unaffected. As a Sovereign it controlled its officials in India through the Board of Control, the president of which was a politician, a member of one of the Houses, and was theoretically appointed by the King. Actually, of course, he was appointed, subject to objection by the King, by the Premier. The appointment was a political appointment, and if the ministry fell the office was vacated. According to the practice of the constitution, therefore, the King's ministry was responsible for the acts of the administration in India, and an adverse vote in the House of Commons in respect of some act of the Indian Government would lead to the fall of the ministry.

Legally and theoretically the president had great powers of overriding the wishes of the Company, and on occasion he did so, but as a matter of practice he was reluctant to come into conflict with so powerful a corporation or with the wealthy and influential members of it. The salary of the president was paid by the Company, and did not, therefore, figure on the Parliamentary estimates. There was thus no regular and certain means by which the opinion of the House of Commons as to the administration could be elicited, but in cases of importance particular questions could always be discussed in the House on special motion. Such occasions were not frequent, as it was felt that

India should not be a party matter, and that it was sufficient for the House to lay down the general lines of policy which it considered suitable for India, leaving to the constitutional authorities the duty of settling details.

The Company held its privileges by statute, and this statute always fixed a time when the Company should cease to exercise these privileges. Before that date it was necessary to pass another law. This act of legislation was made the occasion of a regular enquiry into the affairs of India, and the new Act generally cut down the rights of the Company in some way, or imposed on it duties which the Legislature thought it was proper that the Sovereign of India should assume.

The control thus exercised by the British people was remote but effective. The system was and is, in theory, absurd, but in practice it worked admirably.

As regards the administration in India, it was vested in a Governor-General. The Governor-General was appointed theoretically by the Company, but actually, subject to representations on the part of the Company, by the Minister. He was almost invariably a peer belonging to the party actually in power. His tenure of office was, however, five years, and it often happened that a Governor-General appointed by one party administered India under the control of a ministry composed of his political opponents. In contra-

distinction to the case of Ireland, the Governor-General of India did not thereon resign. Theoretically the Company might recall him. Actually it never did so, unless there were other reasons for this step than mere party differences. Both parties were pretty well agreed as to the general policy to be followed in India, and details were best left to the local people. Occasionally, but only occasionally, this lack of harmony in political views between the Governor-General and the home ministry led to friction. The Governor-Generalship thus was not a political appointment.

The Governor-General was assisted by a council. This consisted of a certain number of permanent servants of the Company, with the addition of a Commander-in-Chief. This latter might be a servant of the Company or of the Crown. Later on an English Jurist was appointed. This council was more than a council. The members divided among themselves the principal branches of administration, and, though theoretically all executive acts were the acts of the Governor-General-in-Council, there was thus something like cabinet responsibility. The individual member had considerable control over his own departments. Important matters only were brought before the plenum. The Governor-General was merely the president of this board. As a member he had one vote; as president he had, in cases of equality of the opinion, a casting vote. But the power of the

Governor-General was actually greater than would appear from this bald statement. In the first place, it was etiquette that the Commander-in-Chief always voted with him, except on purely military subjects.

In the next place, there was no regulation as to the *quorum* necessary for a decision, and if the Governor-General was not at the seat of Government, he might take the votes of such of the members as were present. In the third place, the evils of faction had been so clearly demonstrated, and the natural weight of the opinion of a close friend of the home ministry, a peer, and a prominent politician, was so great, that members were extremely reluctant to cross the Governor-General. Finally, in very grave cases it was possible for a Governor-General to override the opinion (even the unanimous opinion) of his council.

The council was appointed by the Crown. But as regards the civilian members, the Crown, that is the home ministry, acted on the recommendation of the Governor-General. The appointment was also for five years, and was not a political appointment. It might therefore well happen, and in fact continually did happen, that a member of council appointed by the recommendation of one Governor-General was in office through nearly the whole government of the succeeding Governor-General. Thus there was a continuity of policy.



Similar arrangements existed in the minor Presidencies of Bombay and Madras. Though the Government of each of these Presidencies was subordinate to the Government of India, yet their Governments were also in direct relations with the Board of Control.

Originally the Government of India was also the Government for the whole of the north. Eventually this was found inconvenient. Attempts were made to set up the presidency system in North India, but failed. Finally the old original dominion of the Government of India was divided into provinces, each of which was placed under a Lieutenant-Governor, theoretically the mere delegate of the Governor-General. This officer, therefore, had no council, and of course had no connection with the home Government. He was appointed by the Governor-General, and an ex-member of council was generally selected for the post.

It will be seen that the common-sense of the British people had carefully excluded from the India system that bane of Colonial administration, namely, the assignment of all the important and lucrative posts at the disposal of the Crown to political supporters, who contented themselves with drawing the salary of the appointment, and performed its duties through ill-paid deputies. So inexpedient did it appear to permit this in India, that it was provided that if the Governors

and Commanders-in-Chief left India, they at once vacated their posts.

Nor were the minor executive appointments available for the purposes of party corruption.

The rights of the Civil Service of India to these appointments were recognised by custom and statute. This Civil Service was composed of men who were the permanent employees of the Company. Originally they were clerks and writers engaged in England, and employed in India.

As the Company from a trading corporation became a sovereign, it appointed its writers and clerks to executive posts. At first the results were not satisfactory. The salaries given by the Company to its employees were wretched, but they were allowed to supplement that miserable salary by engaging in the lucrative inland and coastwise trade. This was well enough while the Company was a mere trader, dealing with exports and imports on a grand scale. But for an executive officer to be also a trader is not so well, and for an ill-paid executive officer, particularly a European executive officer in a newly conquered country, *not* to trade, and therefore to have no legitimate means even of existence, is even worse. Therefore the civil servants of the Company were at first a corrupt and oppressive class, though far less so than the Indian *amla* whom they had superseded. The scandals became intolerable, and what was worse, the Company's own interest

became menaced. The only possible remedy was applied. The Civil Service was prohibited from trading and taking gifts, and was paid on a scale which enabled the members to live with extreme comfort and dignity in India, and if prudent, to accumulate a reasonable fortune. To these advantages were added also in time a pension, and a family provident fund, to both of which the officer contributed from his pay.

Corruption and oppression being thus unnecessary, and the classes from which the Civil Service were drawn not having any particular love for unnecessary corruption and oppression, the service became noted for purity, and every member, therefore, felt it incumbent on himself to preserve the traditions of the corps.

The recruitment of this service was left very much to chance. A certain number of "writerships" were filled every year. The right to appoint was distributed among the directors. A director might appoint a relative of his own, or a relative of some friend or political supporter, or the son or nephew of some meritorious public servant, or he might put his patronage at the disposal of the President of the Board of Control, who would use it for the purpose of rewarding political supporters. Like many English institutions, the system was theoretically unsound, but actually worked very well. The same was the case in the Navy. The directors were naturally anxious that their protégés

should do them credit, and were careful not to appoint lads who might be unworthy. The President usually applied his patronage to securing the Scotch vote in the House for the support of the general administration, and in those days at least it was almost impossible by any process of selection to pitch on an incompetent Scot.

The civil servant, once appointed, served in India, with rare intervals of leave home, for the whole of his active life. From this class, which did not number as many as a thousand, were selected officials to fill all the higher executive and most of the higher judicial posts in the Empire. From them were selected the Members of Council, and the staff of the higher administrative machine. They were thus actually though not legally a powerful corporation. To this corporation only Europeans were admitted.

India was divided into provinces, which in their turn were divided into districts. The district might average about three thousand square miles. In each district there was a collector who was the principal executive officer, and invariably a civilian, and generally a Judge who was also a member of the same service. These officers might have under them assistants who would usually be junior civilians; and deputies and inferior agents who would be Indians or Indian-born Europeans.

The District Administration was connected with

the Provincial Administration, which in its turn was connected with the Government of India, by means of the Secretariat. There were several Secretaries each in charge of a vast and growing number of departments. The Secretariat, in the interest of uniformity, controlled the District Administration, and furnished the Provincial or Imperial Government with information and recommendations. The Secretaries and Under-Secretaries were generally civilians.

One might have supposed that a service so small, so closely connected by private and official ties, so homogeneous in origin, possessing such a monopoly of power in all its branches, might have been dangerous to the State, using its power for selfish, personal, or sectional ends. This was not the case. It is not, however, at present necessary to ascertain why this was so.

The Governor-in-Council in the Presidencies, and the Governor-General-in-Council for the rest of India, were for the greater part of this period also the legislature. Legislation was, however, not effected by the issue of sudden and arbitrary edicts. It was carried out formally and deliberately, and the laws when passed had to be registered in the Supreme Courts of the Presidencies affected. Such laws might be disallowed by the Directors of the Company, but till they were so disallowed were valid unless they conflicted directly with some Imperial statute.

There were two systems of Courts in India. There were the Company's Courts, which had jurisdiction over the whole of India outside the Presidency towns, the judges of which were civilians, and there were the King's Courts in the Presidency towns; the judges of these latter Courts were barristers or advocates appointed by the Crown. The East India Company, though exercising sovereign rights, was not in the eye of the law a sovereign, and it could therefore be sued in the King's Courts, and the validity of its acts and of the acts of its officers thus questioned. Very high officials were, however, exempt from the criminal jurisdiction of those Courts, and the law provided for a special tribunal to try Indian delinquents, which never actually sat. The power of impeachment by the Commons before the House of Lords (which was the process applied to Warren Hastings) still exists; and possibly also the legal fictions whereby the King's Bench assumes jurisdiction over crimes committed outside the four seas.

The army was officered exclusively by Englishmen. There was a small body of European troops recruited by the Company, and a larger number of Royal troops; but the main defence of India was entrusted to the Indian Army. This vast body, recruited from the whole of the sub-continent and its adjacent areas, numbered about 250,000 at the time of the Mutiny, as against a force of the paper strength of 50,000

European troops. It was in no way homogeneous, and was composed of units of very varying military value. All the regimental non-commissioned officers, with the exception of one European sergeant in each regiment, were Indians. There was also a corps of Indian officers who held the Company's commission, but all these were inferior in rank to the European commissioned officers who filled the grades from ensign upwards. This corps of European officers was a permanent corps of servants of the Company, appointed in the same way and drawn from the same classes as the civil servants. Service in the Indian Army was eagerly sought by young men of military tastes who had no private means, and to whom, therefore, the British service in time of peace was closed. Such men were likely to be the sons of military officers, and service in this force tended in the European as in the Indian ranks to become a hereditary profession. There was much jealousy between the officers of the Indian Army and the Civil Service on the one hand, and between those officers and the Royal officers on the other. Service in the Indian Army, agreeable enough in time of war to the young, became very tedious as the officer advanced in years. Promotion was slow and the duties monotonous. The talented young officer therefore did his best to escape from regimental duty either into an Irregular corps or into some civil or quasi-civil employment. In the regiments

were left either very keen soldiers or disheartened old men who ought long ago to have been superseded.

None of the other departments which now function in India had been created, with the exception of the medical department. The Company provided free medical attendance for its employees, both military and civil, and was therefore obliged to keep up a corps of military surgeons. These were of course all Europeans.

The trading privileges of the Company, gradually diminished, were towards the end of this period wholly abolished. In accordance with the ideas of the Manchester school, the trade of India was thrown open to the whole world. In accordance also with the doctrines of that school the trade was free. The sole relics of the trading activity of the Company were now the monopolies in salt and opium.

Such was the Government of India, and such up till recently it, with slight modifications, remained. It was an autocracy. It had not, however, the malignant properties of an autocracy.

In the first place, it was the creature of the law of a free people. The same power which created it and maintained it might abolish it. It had no claims to divinity or to peculiar relations with the Almighty. It knew well enough that it would have to justify its existence and its policy before public opinion in England, and it well knew



that that public opinion would never tolerate oppression.

In the next place, its superior agents and supreme directorate were men trained in the atmosphere of a free state, and a free state particularly jealous of paternal government. Its officials were therefore by no means men who would have been the servile tools of an oppressive tyranny. They felt they had two duties, a duty to India, and a duty to England. But they felt that every one whose opinion was of any value would feel that in doing their duty by India they were also doing it by England. England required no tribute from India. She did not ask for any special privileges there. She looked merely to the increasing wealth and prosperity of this valuable market for her material reward, and to the consciousness that she was ruling and benefiting three hundred millions of the human race for the satisfaction of her appetite for less material recompense.

The despotism was not only the creature of law, but worked also through the law. It was bound not only by Imperial statutes, but by its own laws, and these were (because they could be changed at will) preserved for the benefit of the subject with peculiar sacredness. The Government had no regal prerogatives. No act of it was legal unless sanctioned by law, and every act, therefore, could be controlled by the Royal Tribunals.

The principal objection to despotism is that it

destroys itself. The functioning of this smooth-working efficient machine sooner or later destroys the efficiency of the subject, and the more efficient the despotism is, the more rapidly does this result follow. The result is that the despotism, which must draw its directors and servants from the people thus emasculated, itself loses efficiency and perishes with the nation which it has ruined. But in India there was no such objection. In the first place, the subject was already as inefficient as millennia of despotism could make him. In the next place, the despotism did not draw its directorate, or principal officials, from this source at all. To fill these posts it could draw on the vast and unpolluted sources of administrative efficiency put at its disposal by its intimate connection with a free people.

In Europe despotism is disliked largely because it is inclined to interfere with private opinions, especially in the religious field. The Indian despotism had no prejudices, and showed not the slightest wish to interfere with its subjects' beliefs and practices, as long as such practices were not *mala in se*. That it was a despotism was not to its discredit in Indian eyes. The Oriental understands no other form of government. There are many tendentious stories in Herodotus, but the imaginary dialogue of the Persian nobles at the death of Smerdis exceeds all bounds. To the Oriental, if he could understand it, a democracy

would appear a mere irreligious anarchy, and an aristocracy a confederate band of robbers. He requires the rule of a master. That master must rule according to the religious law and the customs of the people. If he does not, he is removed; for as there is no check to the royal power, so there is no sanctity in a king.

That the Indian Empire employed only Europeans in high office was not surprising to the Indian or resented by him. He was used to the rule of the foreigner. He regarded it as only natural that the ruler should wish to benefit his own clansmen, and should prefer to employ people in whom, owing to their affinity to him, he could trust. The Government had an uneasy feeling that there was not enough scope for ambitious native talent under their system, but there was really no remedy. The Government had in its first days been anxious to employ Indians in the higher military and civil posts, but found that it would not work. The temptations of the situation working on men born and bred in the atmosphere of the India of the eighteenth century proved too much for their honesty and loyalty. The Indian of that epoch was, moreover, unsuitable for employment under the new régime. Education of some sort was necessary, and with rare exceptions the Indian of the more manly castes, whether Hindu or Moslem, was averse to education. This is still an insuperable

difficulty in India, though there are now some races which are both manly and educated. But in the rough India of the days of Clive and Hastings, executive ability of a high order was needed, and that was not, and is not, to be found among the literate classes. Moreover, it was not the intention of England or the Company to set up an Oriental despotism fortified by the arts and arms of the West. They wished to give India the Government worthy of, and possible in, an Oriental country which was a dependency of a Christian and European Empire. For the administration of such a Government the Oriental, without even that veneer of Western culture that he now possesses, was wholly useless. He was therefore excluded from it. The Government consoled itself by reflecting that a great part of India was under native princes, and that in those areas native talent would find ample scope for employment, without embarrassing itself or the Government by forced participation in unfamiliar and distasteful policies.

To the subject scourged for centuries by a corrupt *amla*, the removal of his fellow-countrymen from high posts in the administration was an immense relief, and his sole regret was that he could not be delivered also from the rapacious Indian underlings who, under the new régime, seemed to cross his path at every turn.

In a country where nepotism is not a vice

but a sacred duty, it was no small boon to be freed from the necessity of providing for a whole horde of relations and hangers-on of the principal executive officers of the country. In a country lacerated by such bitter racial and religious factions, it was no small comfort to know that the last word was with an official who was no more interested in the petty squabbles of the time than Gallio. No Indian will ever believe that any fellow-countryman of his can be so lost to all decent feeling as to sacrifice at the shrine of an abstract virtue like impartiality the interests of those who should be most dear to him.

The administration was perhaps, according to modern ideas, somewhat conservative and unprogressive. The European officer cut off from England and from the free influx of English ideas, living for most of his life in a small coterie, in receipt of a regular salary, rising from post to post by mere length of service, was apt to stagnate; and was content to carry on the administration on lines already laid down without trying experiments, which could not benefit him personally, which might give him much trouble, and which after all might prove noxious. That is to say, the European in India became intellectually somewhat Orientalised. But this was not a bad property of one entrusted with the Government of Orientals, nor is too rapid progress advisable in a country essentially con-

servative and extremely resentful of changes forced on it from without.

Such then was the progress and history of the Indian Government during the three generations which lay between Plassey and the Mutiny. It is unnecessary to go into the history of the Mutiny or to try to ascertain its causes. What is the cause why a horse shies and stumbles? Why is the rider shaken but not unseated? Does it matter very much, provided the horse does not break its knees, and the rider does not loose his nerve? All that is necessary is to remark that the Mutiny was in no way a national revolt, except in Oudh, which was hardly part of the British dominions; the Mutiny was a military rebellion. To the rebellious soldiers added themselves certain disorderly elements of the civil population, but the mass of the respectable inhabitants were at worst neutral. The princes, after a little natural hesitation, and with a certain amount of precautionary hedging, joined with cordiality the banners that were obviously destined to be crowned with victory. When the military force of the rebellion was broken, peace was rapidly restored. The power of the Company had proved unshakeable by the temporal force. It remained to be seen whether in the spiritual sphere any ally was to be found for the East, now, after a long truce, about to engage again in its secular struggle against the West. Perhaps some god might come to aid, and Clyde and

Canning, admirable men as they were, were clearly unfitted to contend with gods.

The defect of the Government of India was not that it was autocratic, but that it was mechanic. It was a thing of human invention imposed by foreigners, not an organisation growing naturally out of national institutions. There have been many admirable and many tolerable mechanical Governments, such as that of the Roman Empire or of Russia, but the philosophic enquirer will condemn them except as a desperate remedy for desperate ills. If it is impossible for the nation to evolve out of itself an organic Government (of however low a type) which can preserve the peace and protect the nation from the foreign foe, then it is probably better for the nation to put itself under some mechanical government rather than immediately to perish. In some cases, a mechanical government has been transmuted by a vigorous nationality into a living organism, but this is very rare. The machine, however skilfully constructed and carefully tended, must eventually wear out and then there is nothing for it but the scrap-heap. Thus a Rolls-Royce is no doubt a more agreeable vehicle than a one-horse chaise drawn by some miserable garron. But in ten years your car will be an unseemly heap of rusted iron. A thousand years hence some Eclipse or Persimmon may count the garron among its ancestors. In the organism

there is at least this one thing—life,—and while there is life there is hope. Had then the British, in establishing their dominion by means of the elaborate and artful mechanism called the Indian Government, destroyed some living organism, or even the rudimentary germ of such an organism, they could not at the bar of history plead “not guilty.” They must throw themselves on the mercy of the court, and plead extenuating circumstances.

To my mind no such guilt attaches to the British nation. In view of the extreme decadence into which the Indian peoples had sunk, of the degradation of the national character, the lack of the flexibility in the national intellect, India could not, in the short time left to her before the interference of the foreigner would have become serious, have organised any sort of national Government which could have kept the foreigner at bay. Indeed, it is extremely doubtful to me whether, even had the foreigner by some accident been excluded, there would have been anything of more importance than the emergence in a province or two of some fairly vigorous sultanate. In order to develop a national Government you must have a nation, and there was, and is, no Indian nation. There is an India as there is a Europe, but there is no more an Indian nation than there is a European nation. Just as nothing but strong compulsion from the outside will ever bind the nations of Europe North of the Balkans



and West of the Vistula into one confederated state, so it was only the rough compression of the foreign conqueror which has given to India the semblance of unity. This question is still *sub judice*, but if I am not wholly mistaken, there is no doubt as to what the ultimate finding of the final tribunal will be.

Therefore the English were in no way to blame for setting up the Indian Empire. It is true that a grove of oaks is, because it is a collection of organisms, a nobler thing than the hall, however royal, which is built of the timber of those oaks when cut down. But that consideration would not induce the traveller overtaken by a rain-storm to seek for shelter in a grove rather than in a hall. So it was no discreditable thing to the British to have constructed, from the shattered fragments of the old Imperial organisation, a safe abiding-place for so large a section of the human race. Its end was certain. It must in time perish, whether the destructive agency was the violence of human hands, or the natural fury of the elements, or the chances of flood or fire, or mere dry-rot ; but in the meantime the Empire was a protection against the foe, the city of refuge against the oppressor, the palace of justice, the royal seat, a temple of the gods. Well-guarded, it might last five hundred or a thousand years, and if it then perished—well, all things must perish, all human things pass, the gods alone are immortal.

## CHAPTER III.

## DISSIDENTS (I).

ONE of the phenomena of history which it is needless to try to explain, and useless to deny, is the secular struggle between East and West. Some obscure impulse brought the Persian to the Strymon, the Arab to Tours, and the Turk to Vienna. Some obscure influence led the phalanx to the Indus, and the eagles to the gates of Ctesiphon. In this struggle there were brilliant but irrelevant episodes, which seemed mere interludes in the great spectacle. Such were the Crusades and the rising of Mithridates. Such was perhaps the adventure of British India.

For the last two hundred years there had been a great "going forth of the Franks," and the East was restless. India was generally apathetic and contented for the present. But there were some men whose feelings were other. This class may be figured under the imaginary character of Panditji.

Panditji then was a man of the Brahmin caste; to him was due by birthright a lordship over millions, a lordship which was the more firmly

established because it was not confirmed by temporal sanctions. He found this lordship threatened. That the foreigner ruled in India was in itself no menace to his superiority. The foreigner had ruled before, but the superiority of Panditji had been rather confirmed than shaken by the rule of the Scythian, the Pathan, and the Turk. The foreigners who now exercised the rule of India showed small respect to the claims of the Brahmin. They prided themselves on their equal justice, and to them, theoretically, the Brahmin and the sweeper were all one. They had obviously a poor opinion of the executive ability of all Indians, and showed evident signs of intending to confine the Brahmin to a very subaltern part in the administration. They seemed also radically to mistrust this caste, and to prefer the Mussulman or even Hindus of inferior status. The removal of the political career from the horizon of the Brahmin would no doubt have been a serious loss to him. Not only was such a career lucrative, but while the Brahmin had his due influence in Durbar, there was little chance of his superiority in other fields being denied. The new system, however, menaced Brahmin predominance in such other fields. The foreigners were, nominally at least, Christians, and therefore hostile to the caste system. They made no attempt to propagate their religion, but that did not affect the fact that an opinion strongly held by the rulers is bound to act in the sphere of administration.

They did attempt to propagate their culture, and that also was radically hostile to the caste system. Panditji, therefore, naturally enough—I am not accusing him of selfishness — disliked the intrusion of the West into what was essentially an Eastern land. It is, after all, material interests that have the final word. No man loves a system which attacks his pride and pocket. He may, however, conceal successfully from himself the real reason why he is hostile to a régime which is noxious to him, and in perfect good faith attribute that hostility to religion, patriotism, or some of the other causes which men invoke when they wish to commit a baseness.

Panditji was therefore not inclined to love the English system. He also ceased to respect it. He absorbed its culture and hated it. He knew many Englishmen personally, and summed them up as barbarians. He thought he was acquainted with the English political and social system and despised it. There seemed, therefore, nothing which justified the continuance of the English régime except the physical force of the conquerors. But physical force, though an essential for an Imperial race, is, if it stands by itself, no very safe pillar of Empire. The force of the English might be broken down by internal revolt, or by foreign invasion, or by natural decay.

Might not the British dominion thus be broken down? In the domain of force it has been

menaced. Haidar had nearly crushed it. The Afghan and Sikh wars had shaken it. The Mutiny had brought it near to annihilation. These attempts had indeed failed, but new opportunities might hereafter arise.

But Panditji has an aversion to physical force. Not himself a warrior, and mistrusted by the fighting races, it is safer to try the way of diplomacy. In fact, the principal defect of Panditji as a statesman was always that he hoped, like the Italian statesman of the cinque cento, to obtain his ends "by finessing and trick," forgetting that in the rough game of politics the last word is to the master of the legions. How many a web has been spun by the Oriental spider! And how often, just when the fabric was perfect, enveloping in a fine and glittering network, in which was no single flaw, some blundering wasp, the contemptible insect has shattered the whole delicate and radiant snare with a few brusque, brutal, and purely instinctive plunges.

Still it *was* possible to realise his policy without force. All that was necessary was to convince the British people or the British politicians that to continue to rule India through a European agency was unnecessary and indeed noxious. That, *ceteris paribus*, it was only proper that India should be ruled by the Indians was an axiom admitted by everybody. Panditji hoped to convince the West that not only abstract justice, but

imperious necessity, rendered the transfer of the administration to indigenous hands a matter of practical politics. That point gained, all was won. The supremacy of Panditji in temporal as well in spiritual affairs would, it appeared, be for ever established. The defence of India from the foreign foe, and even the maintenance of internal quiet, might well be left to the Imperial forces. The foreign religion exotic to India would soon wither, or might even be perverted to subserve the purposes of Panditji. The dangerous foreign culture kept in safe hands would be a mighty weapon at the disposal of Panditji to deal with the foreign rival and domestic enemy.

Panditji would have to play a part. It might seem difficult to convince the world that he, to whom caste was all in all, was really a democrat, that a polygamist and a worshipper of the phallus had much in common with Western civilization, that a believer in a lofty, if nebulous, philosophy was really an admirer of the shallow nominalism of the West. But much might be done in a good cause. Just as without in the least compromising his Brahminhood, he had invested Akbar with the sacred thread, and in return accepted the spiritual guidance of The Most Great God, just as he had in the drinking-parties of Jehangir capped the merry monarch's improper Persian verses, so he might learn to talk the jargon of democracy and utilitarianism.

Just so the newly-landed Greek in the household of the Roman patrician must acquaint himself with the lie of the land, and ascertain what are his master's political aims and associates, who are the wife's gallants, to whom does the daughter wish to send an apple, what astrologer does the son consult as to his father's life. Thus, if the goddess be propitious, he may come to mastery. So it was necessary for Panditji to study the whims and fancies of the people to whom the gods had, for some wise purpose, for the moment granted the sovereignty. And just as that same Greekling would, if he were wise, also study the character of his fellow-slaves, and especially that of the all-important steward, so Panditji would not neglect to study his own countrymen and the Government of India.

The business was, no doubt, risky. The patrician may take alarm and crucify the too-ambitious slave before he has established his power. But the prize was splendid, and there is to the Oriental, and particularly to Panditji, something very attractive in an intrigue as an intrigue, without any particular reference to the possible profit. The Occidental does not understand this trait—which is, however, a basic part of the mental constitution of the Indian,—and consequently often cannot believe in the existence of intrigue, which is patent as the day, and equally patently childish. Panditji, with all his ability, is an

Oriental and must work with appropriate tools and technique.

Such an observer would first turn his glance towards England. The key to India is not in Herat, and not in Delhi or Calcutta, but in Whitehall. It was on the power and resolution of the British people to retain India that the continuance of the Empire depended. As to the physical power of Britain there was no doubt. Armed rebellion by the Indians was hopeless. Besides, there were no classes in India who were both willing and able to rebel. Intervention by the foreigner was unlikely. The British Navy kept the seas. Russia, however much she might manœuvre and bluff, had at present no serious intention of jeopardising her very existence in a great war—that terrible test of national efficiency,—or, if she did, of committing large armies to the defiles of the Hindu Khush.

Moreover, there was the danger that in presence of another mutiny (even if such were possible), whether or not associated with foreign invasion, the British people might be roused to swift and ruthless repression. No doubt such repression might be followed by reaction. The British people might say, "Intolerable indeed must have been the misgovernment which has driven the amiable Oriental into insurrection against our beneficent sway," and might introduce changes into the Government. But who could guarantee that power



would pass into the right hands? Perhaps there might be a movement towards setting up of more feudatory states. This would never do. It would seem then that actual insurrection (with or without foreign invasion), though a possible policy, was not the most desirable. There seemed little hope of shaking the Government of India in India by agitation. But would it not be possible so to enfeeble that body that it would be unable to function? If this could only be effected, organic change would be necessary. That organic change would be effected in London. Would it not therefore be possible, by playing off the home Government against the Indian Government, and by appealing alternately to the various factions who played their part on the political stage of Westminster, to render such organic change necessary, and to see that it was effected in a manner likely to lead to the result that we desire?

The political situation in England was not unknown to Panditji. The idea which he formed thereof, erroneous or not, was as follows: By the reform of '32 the power of the great houses had been broken, and the power of the King, whether direct or indirect, was a thing of the past. For about fifty years the country was under the excellent but uninspiring rule of the middle class. The period is one of social progress and increasing prosperity at home, but of shame abroad, and a total absence of any definite Imperial domestic

policy. There was no real difference between the parties. The alternations of the Government were merely on the rotative system. It is felt that Tweedledum has had enough of the sweets of office. It is now the turn of Tweedledee. Five years hence it will be the turn of a bloated and satiated Tweedledee to give place to an esurient Tweedledum. Just as the party system breaks down when the nation is divided into two parties whose basic principles are so antagonistic that the members of one would rather appeal to the sword than be governed by the other faction, so when there is no difference of principle between the two parties, politics are merely a May-game of faction where the Tadpoles and Tapers play a not unprofitable part. Under such a régime, principle and patriotism rapidly vanish, and the test of public spirit is merely whether the politician possesses the amount of fidelity that must exist between a successful quack and his accomplices. Under such a régime national spirit must sink to a low ebb.

The various suffrage acts enlarged the electorate but produced little effect on politics. The "people" had not yet learned their power. Nothing therefore came to agitate the rather stagnant sea of politics. Politics, indeed, became less and less attractive as the rotation system became more pronounced; and as the growth of the number of the electorate, and the consequent development

of the machine, discouraged the young man of ability from a political career, the affairs of the country were thus more and more entrusted to the old Parliamentary hands, to whom the results of the next division, or at furthest the next election, were more interesting than any attempt to forecast the ultimate results of any policy. A "good cry" was therefore all-important, and the most successful slogan was "A Free Breakfast Table."

It is symptomatic of the real bankruptcy of the age that the Laureate of this epoch was the sweet-tongued Virgil, whose Eternal City was Ascalon.

In such circumstances it is not to be wondered at that to avoid war was the highest duty of the statesman; and it was on the whole fortunate that this fact was grasped, for the Crimea showed that war cannot be successfully waged by politicians who are no more than politicians. The nation was not wholly averse to war. It was essential, however, that the other party to the combat should be defenceless.

As regards the Empire the question was, did it pay? It was extremely doubtful whether it did pay, and the general opinion was that the Colonies were an infernal nuisance, and the sooner they separated the better. Here again the British Empire was fortunate, because where the Imperial Government did interfere in Colonial affairs its interference was highly pernicious, and had it been

persisted in, would have driven the Colonials into maddened revolt.

The British people were therefore fond of the Indian Empire; it certainly did pay, and might be relied on to furnish them with a perennial crop of cheap laurels.

From this drugged sleep the British people were awakened by a series of shocks. The Russo-Turkish war, the assumption of the Imperial title, the shame of Majuba and the Soudan, the Home Rule agitation, the scramble for Africa, the Boer war, rendered the old careless optimism out of date. People became interested in the Empire, and Panditji saw that uninstructed interest might be capable of being guided into strange paths.

For the British Electorate, whom some caprice of Providence had made masters of the destinies of the human race, were lamentably ignorant and had no safe guides.

So matters stood at the death of Victoria. Then came feverish years. All old things were passing, and the nation, as if in despair, seemed to fling itself wildly in any direction which promised it relief from a growing feeling of approaching doom. In the political arena the old figures were rapidly vanishing, and the old cries becoming more and more obsolete. Everybody knew, though they did not confess it, that at home the parties would soon be struggling for the survival of civilization, and that abroad dangers were banking up which might

settle all domestic disputes in the same manner as the Turkish cannon had decided the differences between azymote and zymote. Then came the war, which proved, if it proved nothing else, that the nation was still sound at heart, and that the individual citizen was still ready to die for an idea. But it proved even more clearly how worn out was the whole apparatus of government, and how possible it is for a great nation to be content to take its leaders from the pettiest of men. The war and its aftermath led to the final disappearance of the old parties. It became more and more clear that there were only two parties in England, the subversives and the Conservatives.

The old Tory party, which had at least a constructive policy, had perished. It could not survive the treason of its leader twice repeated, and the crushing defeat of the first Reform Bill. Its successor, the Conservative party, was annihilated by a third treason, and after lingering for nearly twenty years as a mere faction, was merged in the Unionist party. The name of this party is sufficient to condemn it. It was obviously pledged to the mere negative policy of preserving a Mezentian union, a union which was, in any case, certain to be dissolved as soon as the Irish vote became the arbiter of the destinies of the Kingdom. When the Unionist party did attempt to form a constructive and positive policy it was annihilated.

The Unionist party rather tended to arrogate to

itself a particular interest in the Empire. But this claim was not admitted by a considerable section of the Liberal party. The Liberal Imperialist (if any such existed in fact) was, however, hopelessly handicapped by the fact that the tail of the party (a very important part of the anatomy of the Liberal body), and the mass of its supporters in the constituencies, still thought that there was something dangerous and almost indecent about the idea of an empire. The Liberal Government maintained the foreign policy of their predecessors, neglecting, however, to provide the resources, without which a brilliant foreign policy is a dangerous drug, and were loud in their homage to the Imperial idea. Would it not be possible to appeal from the new to the old Liberals? Was there not the chance that some veteran Liberal statesman might be convinced that the old ways were the best? Might not the chance of becoming sponsors to a great and constructive act of statesmanship appeal even to the Liberal Imperialists, naturally anxious to show that, while becoming Imperialists, they had not ceased to be Liberals? It was not to be expected that any party, Liberal or Tory, would take very much trouble about India. India did not command a single vote in the House; but the slaves of Jamaica had not commanded a single vote, whereas their masters commanded many. Nevertheless the conscience of the British people insisted on the freedom of the slaves. The

Boers had not commanded a single vote, yet they had once forced the British Government into a shameful treaty, and once into a daring but magnificent stroke of statesmanship. Surely, among the motley hosts that followed the Liberal banner, some group would be found, or some one statesman of leading, who would set the feet of India on that path down which Panditji wished to guide her.

The great Whig party, which organised itself as a part of the constitution about the end of the seventeenth century, and which committed harikari (thus ending a mere post-mortem existence of about thirty years) in 1865, had little to do directly with the destinies of India. It made one cynical attempt to secure the valuable Indian patronage for itself. This attempt—Fox's East India Bill—was frustrated by means shocking to the constitutionalist, and the party resigned itself to hoping for a mere share of the golden harvest which it had sought to monopolise. India was treated a non-party question, and is equally grateful to Whig and Tory Presidents of the Board of Control.

That the Indian administration was a despotism (though a legal despotism) was not shocking to the genuine Whig. Just as the Jew imagined that the revelations of Sinai and the promises of Jehovah concerned him alone, and were in no way communicated to the Gentile, so the real Whig knew that the Gospel of 1688 was revealed,

and the blood of the martyrs, Hampden and Russell, and Sidney and Titus Oates, was shed certainly for the Englishman; probably for the Scot, possibly for the Colonial and Irishman, but in no way for the foreigner, and least of all for the man of colour.

This was perhaps fortunate, because the genuine Whig doctrines were highly oligarchical, and were thus unattractive to those who are not enamoured of that austere and insolent domination. I do not mean the real arcana of the party, which may be summed up in the phrase, "It is essential to the well-being of the human race that all the descendants of Lord Gower should be provided with a place"; but the more common and vulgated doctrines. These doctrines took form during the century-long struggle between the Stewart kings on the one side, and the richer burghers and the greater landed aristocracy on the other. "The executive is hostile to us. We must insist on trial by jury, because otherwise the King, by means of his creatures the judges, may put us to death. We insist on religious freedom, at least for protestant dissenters, because we expect political support from schismatics; the Church also is suspected of absolutist yearnings. We object to a standing army because that might be used to put us down; we insist on a free press, as we must be allowed to attack our political enemies when in



power. We rather value war, if trans-oceanic, and provided we are not overtaxed, because many of us are burghers, and we find profit in that class of state activity. We insist on the rigorous execution of the existing laws, just as the whist-player insists on rigorous compliance with the rules of the game; and because we have a great body of legal talent at our disposal, which will enable us to use the laws for our own purposes. We do not approve of continual legislation, because that throws all into confusion. Imagine a whist-table, where the players might by a bare majority change the rules from rubber to rubber. As the royal power is hostile to us, and the executive power is still nominally in the hands of the King, it is graceful to be theoretically a republican, especially when in opposition; but the republic we admire is the later Roman or the present Venetian state. Jacobinism and democracy are still in the womb of the future. Meantime, we will effectively bridle the royal power by parliaments, in both houses of which we will hold and maintain a majority. We will scan carefully, or even with malignancy, the use of the executive power, lest any beginning of tyranny may escape notice."

There was obviously much of value in these doctrines, adopted in opposition but maintained in power; but they were essentially negative and therefore sterile, as is invariably the case

with the ideas of oligarchies. Again, like all oligarchies which are hereditary, but which are not close corporations, the Whig oligarchy produced many competent administrators, and possessed a great quantity of second-rate political ability. Like all oligarchies, it was extremely jealous of genius, and, while using, abhorred brilliant men, especially if such forced themselves from outside into the sacred circle.

The Whig formula offered no solution of Indian problems. But the doctrine that government is for the good of the subject, though not exclusively a Whig doctrine, is derived with greater ease from the Whig than from the Tory theory, and both Whig and Tory, in their dealings with India, kept this doctrine steadily before them. The Whig policy, in general, was one which excited little enthusiasm except among the Whigs themselves. But just as Judaism, spreading among a Grecised population, left the narrow confines of the Promised Land and became a universal religion in the form of Christianity, so Whiggism, provincial as it was in its origin, was destined to become the metropolis of a cosmopolitan creed. It was the official faith of the revolted American colonies, for it was to Whiggism that the revolution owed its justification and success. The principle was studied, popularised, and universalised in France. Whiggery indeed started back in horror at its spiritual offspring. But

the pure Whig had rarely been able to stand alone. In the days before the party was anything more than a faction, it had allied itself with the fanatic, the rebel, the assassin, the perjurer, the foreign spy, and the foreign enemy. There is no particular blame to be attributed to it on this account. Those who are engaged in a great and holy struggle must not, when the day is going against them, be too nice in their choice of allies. Later on, the Whig party always had a considerable left wing whose opinions were as abhorrent to the official leaders of the party as they were to the Tories, but to whose revolutionary ardour the orthodox were forced to appeal for support. The revolutionary hoped to use the Whig doctrines for the purpose of paralysing the Government which kept him out of whatever Paradise he, at the moment, contemplated as realisable on earth. The Whig knew that the forces of order were too strong for the enthusiast, but had not the slightest objection to using the energies of the anarchist and the sympathies of the neutral elector with those who promised him a speedy relief from intolerable conditions, to affirm his own predominance. There was always, therefore, in the Whig ranks a mass, ever increasing, of extremists. How this tail, growing in size and muscularity, eventually succeeded in wagging the dog to which it was attached, and what was the fate of the

dog, and what will be the fate of the tail, may be studied in any standard history and book of political prognostications.

Whiggery has now perished, and Liberalism, its favourite bastard, is fast perishing, but both have left strong parties which regard themselves as the legitimate heirs of those great inheritances. These new parties by no means impose on themselves the self-denying ordinance of abstention from interference in Indian affairs. It is necessary, therefore, to discuss these parties and their doctrines more at length.

In a certain degree every Englishman is a Whig. The present British constitution is a Whig invention, and is certainly a wonderful and admirable mechanism. By it, for the first time in the history of institutions, faction, a passion natural to man, but dangerous to the public weal, was made an instrument of government. We are so used to the scenic thunder of our mimic revolutions, and so grateful to a system which appears to require that no measure of importance should be carried into execution without the assent of a great majority of the citizens; so used to debates which appeared to be serious enough; so used to compromises between apparently irreconcilable opinions; that the silent, smooth-working, efficient Indian despotism appeared something monstrous. The average Englishman is so used to amateur legislators, and amateur administrators, that he

flatters himself that bureaucracy is unknown to the English system; and the Indian system of government by experts was unfamiliar and therefore suspect. There was no trial by jury in India, and the judges were all paid servants of the Crown, many of them removable at pleasure. What guarantee was there for the safety of the lives and property of the Indians? There was indeed freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom of speech, freedom of religion. But these franchises were held by a base tenure. The despotism, as it permitted them according to its pleasure, might theoretically revoke them at will.

The constitutionalist, therefore, looked with a somewhat uneasy eye on the Indian Empire. But being a practical man, he was not inclined to interfere with an institution of which he was proud, and which was obviously conferring untold benefits both on England and India. He doubted, but acquiesced.

Some of the men of formal law felt rather uneasy as to the success of the Indian experiment. "If," they said "despotism and bureaucracy work so well in India, may not that be perhaps at some time used as an argument for introducing something of the same system here?" Those who knew anything of the history of Rome were aware that the empire was the revenge of the provinces. The fear was really baseless, because none of the

conditions which rendered the despotism desirable in India existed in England, and the nature of the case would have rendered it impossible that a despotism and bureaucracy set up in England could have been fenced round with the precautions which render the system innocuous in India. No one, however great an admirer he may have been of the Indian system, ever supposed that its introduction into any state accustomed to and still capable of self-government was desirable. Despotism and bureaucracy are the last resources of a dying nation, which do but enable it to postpone the fatal day of total dissolution. The constitutionalist, therefore, on the whole, though uneasy in his mind about India, did not think it desirable actively to tamper with the general administration, reserving himself for occasional interference, when it appeared to him that the Indian Government was straying too far from the spirit of English institutions. This interference did an enormous amount of good, and a certain appreciable amount of harm. It became more baneful as agitators in India discovered that it was possible to get sympathy among a powerful English party, when they wished to attack certain isolated acts of the administration. On the whole, though, the existence of this party was a preservative for many years. But as is only natural when British statesmen in official positions began to declare that the Indian administration must be

brought more into harmony with current political ideas, they found a sympathetic, if somewhat surprised, audience among the constitutionalists.

Other relics of the Whig party found refuge among the sentimentalists and subversives. Both these parties have had considerable influence over the destinies of India, and seem likely to have more in the future. It will therefore be necessary to deal with them at length. But before entering upon that enquiry, it is necessary to attract attention to the lonely and august figure of the mugwump.

In India we do not call them mugwumps; they are lumped together under a generic name which it would be libellous to apply in print to any class. I therefore use the word mugwump to describe the members of a particular school. I have borrowed the word from the United States, but do not use it in the sense in which it is there now applied. I return to the original etymological meaning.

The mugwump is a superior person—a great man. He is superior to the vulgar prejudices of his race and age, particularly to those prejudices which, being based on instinct and not on reason, are probably deeply rooted, and on the whole, presumably salutary. An instinct is a hereditary race-memory, and was acquired by the race through the method of survival. At one time, therefore, it was essential to the security of the individual,

and therefore of his community, and the burden of proof that such a race-memory now indicates the road not of safety but of destruction is always on the assertor.

The mugwump either does not possess these instincts, or he refuses to regard them as safe guides, and is eager to impress his views on the community. Racism, patriotism, respect for national honour are anathema to him. The methods by which a healthy community will vindicate its rights, punish dissidents, suppress the foreign foe, are therefore, in his view, sinful. The national ideals, the national religion, the national morality are all suspect to him as being tainted with particularism. He pays little respect to use and wont. He considers anything as an open question, the utility of which is to be tested not by any apparatus of pragmatism, but by the mediæval *a priori* and deductive method.

The mugwump is a convincing debater. His methods of pleading are one of two. There is the cold demonstrative mugwump who deduces his ethic by reasoning of the type of a flawless mathematical theorem from his little bundle of axioms and definitions. The fact that the definitions are not necessarily accurate, and the axioms are not axioms, but propositions of exceedingly doubtful truth, is apt to escape the auditor. There is the emotional and rhetorical mugwump who can point out with great force and power of ridicule the



illogicality and unreasonableness of prevalent ideas. Here the defect of the process is that the ideas are based not on reason but on instinct, and the demonstration, therefore, that they are irrational is no demonstration that they are not true.

The genuine and convinced mugwump is often really a great man, and his disappearance would be a sad loss to the world. There is little doubt that theories based on instincts ought to be tested. Many of the teachings of instinct are now erroneous, and should be neglected. In some cases, the instinct itself has now become obsolete, and is, therefore, a dangerous guide. It is probably chiefly by the efforts of the mugwump that progress is made.

Some of the greatest men of the European race have been mugwumps. Cato of Utica was a mugwump. In fact, the taunt of Cicero may be regarded as the ultimate definition of mugwumpery. "This man imagines that he is living in the republic of Plato, instead of in the dregs of that of Romulus." . . . Dante was a mugwump; he boasted with true mugwumpishness that he was proud of having made a party to himself, and as he loathed the Guelfs whom he had left, so he abhorred the Ghibellines with whom he was allied. The Girondins were strongly tainted with mugwumpery, and it is to this fact that the total failure of continental liberalism is due. The peoples felt blindly that this sort of thing will never do. "This teaching is very admirable and

convincing, but it is clearly false. Let us vote for the Catholics or the Socialists, who *are* in touch with the questions of the day." That liberalism in England has been the great power that it has been is due to the fact that the founders of the party were practical politicians, and not idealogues. Mugwumps there have been many in England, but their influence has, up till recently, been negligible. Now, in the general dissolution of the national organisation—due not to the progress of enlightenment, but to obscure economic causes,—the mugwump is coming to his own. Use and wont, and instinct, furnish in the England of to-day a guidance which appears by no means safe, and people are eagerly looking round for a new gospel.

Mugwumpery is unknown in the East, where instinct and use and wont are all powerful. There have been daring sceptics and teachers who have lifted whole populations out of the ancient well-trodden track into new ways, but they have invariably cloaked their scepticism, and have never used the method of rationalism. Such mugwumpish literature and teaching as exists in the East does not pretend to be genuine. It is obviously and confessedly an appeal by the Oriental fanatic for the assistance and support of a faction powerful among the masters.

In ancient days, the mugwump was not a popular character. The Greek states formally legislated against him. The accusation by Anytus of Socrates,

if translated into modern English, is nothing more than an accusation of mugwumpery. The "Clouds" to the intelligent reads much like one of the "Noctes Ambrosianæ," or a modern causerie in 'Blackwood.' And, indeed, the dialectic method of Socrates was a terrible solvent applied to the ancient world. It was not for many ages that the teachings of the pupils of Socrates became the basis of a new organisation which was to supersede the old one. Socrates was to the ancient world "The Vitruvius of Ruin." It was more the mugwumpishness than the impiety of the Christians which made the minds of the Roman statesmen turn towards the *toga molesta* and the Numidian lion.

We live under a milder dispensation, and the mugwump is, in times of order, safe. His fate, in times of revolution, is generally certain. Our mugwumps are safe enough, because we have found out a way to give a lie to Critias, and our revolutions have not yet been bloody; and in the United States he has so far escaped anything worse than tar and feathers. But in countries where "political changes are bringers of death," a slaughter of the mugwump is inevitable. He has generally ushered in the revolution by destructive criticism of existing institutions. At first, therefore, he is regarded as an infallible oracle and divine leader by the revolutionary party. As the struggle becomes intense, power falls more and more into the hands of

extremists and fanatics, and the one thing that a fanatic will not tolerate is negative and destructive criticism. Hence the mugwump goes to the tumbril amid the howls of joy of an enthusiastic population. He has probably regretted when the revolution (as it must, if it is to endure) settles down into a state of equilibrium between the extremists, but our sorrow for the Girondin must not blind us to the fact that his proper place is in the study or common-room, and not on the tribune.

The Indian Empire was for long immune from the attacks of the mugwump. There was a convention that this part only of the Imperial system was to be immune from destructive dialectic. This convention, as the strife of parties at home became more embittered, could not last; and it is not to be expected that the Indian system will escape criticism of the ideologue.

It is necessary, therefore, to see what the principles of the modern mugwump are. We can then apply them to existing conditions in India, and see how far the existence of the Indian Empire is compatible with the undoubted influence of mugwumpery in England. It is a great and growing party.

For it must be remembered that, just as every one who put on a cloak, and grew a beard, and read Cleanthes, was by no means a Stoic, so the great majority of those who talk the jargon of

the mugwump are not mugwumps at all. The mugwump is generally a great intellect and a pure character, and it is for that reason that he is really rather lonely in the world. But he raises a banner round which gathers a really infernal crew. The pacifist, who is not a pacifist but a coward; the conscientious objector without a conscience; the internationalist who is an internationalist mainly in the sphere of finance; the humanitarian who has excellent personal reasons for objecting to jails and the triangle; the frondeur who supposes that the whole of existing society is banded together to annoy him; the brocanteur who sees in the crash of empires merely a magnificent opportunity for peddling the remains; the rebels and unemployables to whom all existing things are abhorrent, and on whom any organisation presses hardly; the degenerates whose sin-excited nerves require a *détente*, which the ordered system of things as they are refuses; the disinherited who are moved by malignancy against the thing which has ruined them,—all these and many more—the old party of Catiline—march to a more successful Faesulae in the uniform and under the banner of mugwumpery. These classes are increasing in England, and possess a solidarity which the normal classes lack.

It is worth while, therefore, to ascertain the principles of the leaders and thus divine the plan of campaign. And it is fortunate that we possess

a little work which will help us in ascertaining what the whole doctrine of mugwumpery, in the sphere of Imperial affairs, is at present. There is a life of a recent English king which is written by someone well acquainted with the doctrines of the school. The book is one of pathological interest, but at present it is chiefly of value to me as a "Mugwump's Manual," or "Defeatist's Dictionary." This is not to say that the book is not otherwise valuable. I find myself in agreement with a great deal of it, but then I have myself strong mugwumpish leanings, and I was always a defeatist.

The doctrines which I extract from this work, and from similar works, discussion of which is relevant to the present enquiry, seem to be these.

There is no such thing as race. An Englishman is a man living in England; a Frenchman is a man living in France; an Andamanese is a man living in the Andamans. If you took a family of Andamanese and settled them in Glasgow, then even in the absence of interbreeding the descendants of that family would become Scots.

Every race is entitled to self-determination. It is entitled to retain its ancestral territories whatever may be the use to which it puts them. For any foreign power to interfere is an act of tyranny. It is particularly wrong for Britain to interfere.

Nevertheless, the said race is bound to conduct its policy as we think fit. It must do what is

right and avoid what is wrong. What we think right is right, what we think wrong is wrong. Thus for the Boers to exclude settlers of British blood from the franchise is right; for the Rumanians to exclude Jews is wrong; for the Zulus to massacre European settlers is right; for the Turks to massacre Greeks or Armenians is wrong.

Democracy is not merely a form of government. Belief in democracy is a religion. Just as to the Christian the teachings of Christianity are always and universally true, so the democratic formula is always and universally applicable. Wisdom is from below.

Government from above is always wrong, and particularly so when the government is autocratic. The sole exception was the autocracy of Russia. Dissenters are generally liberals; liberals are generally democrats. The Czar was a member neither of the Church of England nor of the Church of Rome. Therefore he was a dissenter, and indeed an armed apostle of dissent. Therefore the Russian Government was really a democracy in disguise.

The people is always right, except the people of Great Britain, which was apt for about fifty years in the century to go wrong. They were too inclined to be led away by the jingo and by the financier.

War is always wrong. To wage aggressive war

is the unpardonable sin. Almost as bad is to prepare for a possible war. It is obvious that if you do not prepare for war you cannot fight, and that, therefore, you cannot commit the unpardonable sin. The people of other countries are always right. There is, therefore, no reason to fear that any one will wage a war of mere aggression on England. If any other power does attack England, it can only be because the right is on the side of that power. In that case to resist would be sinful. Therefore, as war must be either aggressive or defensive, he who contemplates the waging of war as a possibility is contemplating a sin. Such a man is a jingo. A jingo is generally a fool, but very frequently a knave who appeals to the basest passions of the mob in order to gratify his own childish ambitions. He is also generally the tool or the accomplice of the financier. The financier is grievously suspect. Any one who, having lent money, should expect repayment, is clearly a person of a base and sordid nature. So obvious is this that it needs no demonstration, that when a State interferes on behalf of a financier in order to enable him to recover his claims from foreign debtors, the rulers of the State are acting merely from corrupt motives.

It is wrong for the powerful to make use of their power. Rights should never be pushed to extremes. If you discover and disarm a burglar in your plate-room, compound with him. Let him take the



spoons, provided he will leave you the forks and the ladles. It is unchivalrous to push a defeated enemy too far. He is probably really right. It is also dangerous. This is particularly true about the action of Governments, because Governments, unless indeed the members of the Government are mugwumps, which is rarely the case, are generally wrong.

The Governments of the world, in so much as pure democracy has not yet permanently triumphed, are generally wrong, and are too much under the influence of the jingo and the financier. In such circumstances the Governments are capable of great atrocities. Therefore, there is no antecedent improbability that they will commit atrocities. Therefore, any story, of however doubtful or suspect an origin, is good evidence on which to formulate an accusation of tyranny against a Government or its agents.

Particularly is this true when the Government is operating among "inferior" races. Although "the people" is invariably good and wise, yet the individual members of the people are ambitious, rapacious, selfish, tyrannical and lecherous. Give to any man the opportunity of being a Caligula and he will become one. This is particularly true of the Englishman.

My views are right. Any one who differs from them and holds other views is wrong. At the best, therefore, my opponent must be a fool. But the

truth of my opinion is so self-evident, that it is hard for the most charitable to suppose that my adversary is *merely* a bone-head. He is, I fear, wilfully shutting his eyes to the light, and he can only be actuated by some sinister and base motive.

The above does, I think, fairly represent the doctrines of the modern mugwump, in so far as it is necessary to ascertain them for the purposes of this inquiry. For I am merely trying to ascertain what the modern mugwump would think of the India of to-day and of to-morrow.

It is unnecessary to criticise the above doctrines; they are obviously attractive. It is good that men should be optimists. It is good that they should have a high opinion of the nobleness of man. It is good that men should hate tyranny. It is good that the victor should spare the vanquished. It is good that men should require that Governments also should obey the moral law. But it is also easy to see what ruin these principles can work, not only in the physical but also in the moral sphere, when they are applied, not by austere and selfless men, but by the party of Catiline to the furtherance of his anarchic purposes. The children of Belial, moreover, have by no means forgotten the arts of their ancestor, and, like that unexalted spirit, know how,

With words clothed in Reason's garb,  
To praise ignoble ease, and peaceful sloth,  
Not peace.

## CHAPTER IV.

## DISSIDENTS (II)

ANOTHER party which regarded the Indian empire with interested suspicion was the party of sentiment. It cannot be denied that this party was of much service to the maintenance of the empire. No section of public opinion in England was likely to tolerate overt and confessed tyranny. But there was always the risk that the governing classes in their caste-prejudice, and the party of material interests in their appetite for gain, might shut their eyes and refuse to recognise as oppression what was really such. The empire was therefore fortunate in possessing a very vocal and influential class, which almost invariably threw its weight into the scales of humanity and justice.

It is perhaps worth while to deal at some length with this party—the humanitarian. No one has yet written a history of sentimentality, though perhaps the materials exist. Small traces are found of it in classical times. Euripides may perhaps

be classed as a sentimentalist, but Euripides does not represent even Athenian, much less Greek thought. In Rome there are certain incidents, such as the feelings of the populace at the elephant massacre of Pompeius, the indignation aroused by the execution of the slaves of Pedanius, the protests against the first execution of Christians, that indicate clearly enough that the sentiment was not wholly absent from the city of the ergastulum and the amphitheatre. In the Middle Ages, the sentiment was confined to the cloister, and was not by any means found in every cloister. In England it does not appear in any of the better writers of Elizabethan and Jacobean days. The second half of the seventeenth and the earlier part of the eighteenth centuries were periods of progressive brutalisation. A study of the Annual Register from 1757 onwards is instructive enough. In the earlier volumes human suffering is treated with a calm callousness which is surprising. Later on, we get sentimentalism in full blast over the question of the negro. And both the real and the imaginary wrongs of India excited for a time this passion (so noble and yet so often irrational) to the full.

But in its modern form, the sentiment was a discovery of the French. Rousseau and the Encyclopædia are the Prophet and Law of what was almost a new religion. This doctrine made many converts among certain of the Whigs, but it was suspect to the masses of the middle class,

on account of the lewdness and impiety with which it was connected. It was not till it was combined with a particular form of Christianity, and a peculiar and strict code of morals, that it spread among the political classes in England. How little the doctrine derives from the doctrines of the ancestors of the Liberal party may be realised with ease by him who would consider how Cromwell and St Vincent would have dealt with Governor Wall on the one hand, and with Governor Eyre on the other.

It is true that to hate injustice and cruelty is the right of every man, and not of one particular faction. It is more especially the duty of those who administer affairs among a subject population to cultivate that feeling. But severely to punish those who openly set themselves against the laws, promptly to crush an incipient rebellion ruthlessly, to trample out a flagrant insurrection, these are equally the duty of an administrator. When there is a doubt some will give it *in favorem vitæ*, others *in favorem republicæ*. And here is the difficulty. It is no small check over a vigorous administrator that he knows he will have to justify any act of severity at the bar of a clamorous, powerful, and prejudiced tribunal.

This sentimentalism therefore, so long as it is kept within due bounds—as long, that is to say, as it is an advocate, and not a final tribunal,—is a great power for good. The empire may continue

for a time under weak and timid administrators, but an empire which habitually gives itself over to injustice and oppression is not a city of God but a den of thieves. Empire is consistent with Arcadius. It is not consistent with Rhinotmetus. The wise man was therefore duly grateful to Messrs Stiggins and Chadband and their political associates, and suppressed any temporary natural feelings of indignation.

For the left wing of the party was very irritating. The impatient young officer was apt to say: "These men are ignorant. They do not know that it is possible to be as incontinent in the marriage-bed as in the *maison tolérée*; that a man can be a thief in his counting-house as well as on Bagshot Heath; that the smug villa at Clapham, with its gravel and calceolarias, may be a house of tyranny no less than the castle of the Burgrave."

One is apt to figure this left wing as made up of men married to elderly or unattractive wives; of widowers of middle age, with pale faces and clammy hands; of unattractive virgins of temperament; of wives unhappily mated or sterile. Symptomatic it seemed that this very party was interested above all in "purity." Such types are familiar to the alienist and the correctional police. To such people the most fantastic tales of blood and lust are agreeable, and therefore credible.

It is true also that this humanitarianism is apt to be connected with a form of religion which to

many appears revolting. Their god is not the Jehovah of the Calvinist, but the soft Syrian Adonai. It is he who pardons the adulteress, not he who decrees the death by stoning. It is he who weeps over Jerusalem, not he who sends up the legions against the perverse, rebellious city. To them are attractive the tears and agony of Gethsemane, the scourging in the prætorium, and the blood—particularly the blood—of Calvary.

It was perhaps wrong to say of these extremists that they thought it a sin to kiss a white girl's mouth, and a virtue to kiss a black man's—foot. But it is perhaps no exaggeration to say that their humanity never slumbered save when an Englishman was murdered, or an Englishwoman violated by a negro or an Asiatic.

To this party the Indian empire was highly suspect. There was the memory of the oppression and extortion of the days of Vansittart. There were the calumnies of Burke and Macaulay. There was the fact that before the Mutiny many of the officials in India lived lives which were, according to Christian doctrines, reprehensible; there were the exaggerated tales from the hills as to the morals of more recent days. There are black sheep in every community. Isolated cases of corruption and oppression occurred from time to time, and it was not always possible for an administration which governed by law to punish offenders with the severity that the public opinion

rightly demanded. There were too many men who, while stainless and upright administrators and valiant soldiers, adopted the blustering, bullying, "damn-nigger" attitude. The administration and the administrators had much distrust of the missionary, and the missionary was the ally and informant of this party. The local official, civil or military, was rarely drawn from those classes which furnished the bulk of the party, and if he was, he soon lost all sympathy with them. The axioms of Clapham were paradoxes in Calcutta. The people of the cathedral and the people of the chapel, the pupil of the public school and the pupil of the select seminary—between these there lie oceans of misunderstanding. In fact the humanitarian knew that the Anglo-Indian was not a Radical and doubted if he was a Christian. Can anything good come out of a system which is held together by men like these?

The palace has its latrines; the temple its sewers; the empire its swashbucklers, its concessionaires, and its petty tyrants. There are persons who prefer to direct their gaze towards that which is sordid rather than to that which is magnificent. There are those who are so blinded by the magnificence that they forget the reverse. He is to be envied who keeps a steady eye and an impartial mind, and observes both. I suppose Apollo is best pleased, not with him who is always nosing about the lavatories, or him who concen-



trates on the sacellum, but with him who pays due attention both to naos and apodyterium.

The influence of this party was damnatory to India in two ways. In the first place, its mania for atrocity-mongering was continually embarrassing the administration in its attempts to suppress crime. But at present it is necessary rather to refer to the other branch of its activities—namely, its tendency to press on the Government of India measures which, desirable enough in the abstract, were by no means acceptable to the Indian people. Purity-legislation may be construed as an attack on the Hindu family or the Hindu religion; factory acts, as an attempt to handicap the Oriental rivals of Manchester; opium legislation, as a wanton interference with the habits of the people, or an ill-judged attempt to embarrass the finances in the interest of the British consumer of raw materials; free trade, as an attack on the economic development of the country; pacificism, as an attempt to use the blood and treasure of India for extension of British commerce. A long list might be given of various measures, excellent in themselves, which were pressed on the Indian Government, and reluctantly adopted, or reluctantly rejected, in each case rendering the good faith of the British Government suspect.

The political Indian laughed in his sleeve at the sentimentalist. The enthusiasm of the party for purity was unintelligible to the Indian. The

Oriental is saturated with sexuality from the cradle to the grave. He regards the satisfaction of the sexual instinct not as a thing to be tolerated or apologised for, but as the duty of man. The virgin of both sexes he regards as a traitor to humanity. The Moslem steps into a more austere world when he passes the door of the mosque, "but there is no monachism in Islam." The Hindu in most of his temples finds the divine power displayed chiefly in the energies of sex, and the divine unity at the same time veiled and manifested by sexual symbols. A few devotees there were of both creeds who abjured allegiance to sex, but the very fierceness of the revolt was conclusive proof of the predominance of the despotism from which the ascetic freed himself.

The active humanitarianism of this party was also surprising and unintelligible to the Indian. Few Indians are cruel in the sense that we use that term. To see blood and suffering rarely gives pleasure to the Indian, whether a Hindu or a Moslem of Indian ancestry. Exceptions there have been, no doubt, some of the Moslem rulers in particular having been victims of the blood-lust, but it will generally be found that cruelty in India has been the work of alien races, particularly that of the Finno-Ugrian stock — the Turk. Still less it is a pleasure to the Indians to commit atrocities. Nor will he, as a judge, a juror, or a legislator, countenance the shedding of

blood, or the actual infliction of positive physical pain.

But this calm, and perhaps effeminate, repugnance to the infliction of suffering is very different from the hysterical passion excited in the sentimentalist by the smell of blood. The Indian has himself little fear of death, which he by no means regards as the worst of ills. Whether a population is annihilated by famine or the pestilence, by the lance of the foreign foe or by the rifles of the domestic ruler, is really a matter of very little importance. Mere efflux of time would, anyhow, in a few years have swept away alike victims and oppressors. All men are under sentence of death; it is for the gods to decide when the sentence shall be executed, and by whom. As regards pain, sad it is that men should suffer; but existence, from its inception to its end, is associated with suffering, and he who will not pay the price can always decline the prize. "We will not ourselves inflict pain on any sentient creature, because that is a positive act, and therefore presumably sinful. But we will not interfere to prevent the infliction of pain or to alleviate the suffering of the victim, because that again is a positive act, and may well itself be sinful. In any case, we do not understand how anybody can be so excited about the sufferings of his brother, the man, and so indifferent to the wrongs of his sister, the cow, and his cousin, the bug."

Massacre, as part of the activities of Government, is by no means in itself abhorrent to the mind of the Oriental, and the Indian was familiar enough with it. There are several forms of the political massacre, and there was nothing about any of them which was repugnant to the Indian. There is the massacre which is the resource of the weak Government. If offences are not punished from time to time, and particularly if dangerous agitation is tolerated, then it invariably happens that the Government must ultimately abdicate or fight. In England, where the divergencies between parties are not vital, the Government abdicates; but should it ever be the case that there was a revolutionary party in England which obtained considerable strength, so that it felt itself strong enough to defy the Government, but which could not command sufficient political support in the country to insist on the abdication of the Government, then I suppose there would be the solution by massacre. Matters have not come to this pitch for many years in England, because the parties have not yet been sufficiently irreconcilable. The Gordon riots are perhaps the only case in point. There are, however, precedents in British history which tend to show that, when the occasion arises, the British will display a surprising energy and thoroughness in this branch of administration. The "administrative massacre," as this kind may be called, is, of

course, familiar enough to the Oriental. An Oriental dynasty lasts for about seven generations. The first three generations are generally represented by active and efficient rulers who have fought their way to the throne and have a summary method of disposing of enemies. The last two generations are represented by dolts and dastards, and under them the kingdom is the sport of powerful factions, contending as to which should supply the new ruling house. The two intermediate generations are represented by rulers who neglect the affairs of the State, but are not so incompetent that they can be set aside as a matter of routine. In these two generations, then, the administrative massacre is common. The ruler is, as I say, negligent, and allows particularist factions to become strong. Eventually he finds that some faction is dangerous, and yet cannot be dealt with by the ordinary routine. He is not prepared to abdicate; massacre is obviously the only solution.

The Oriental has such a horror of anarchy, and requires in the candidate for the throne such evident proofs of his superiority to the actual incumbent, that he will regard this administrative massacre as highly laudable, rather than reprehensible. In fact the Oriental writer on statecraft blames the over-weak rather than the over-severe monarch.

There is an instructive story of one Ziyad. He

is known as Ziyad-bin-Abihi, because there were numerous claimants to his paternity. He, however, succeeded in affiliating himself to the clan of Abu Sofian, which at that time ruled Islam. He soon displayed great competence as an administrator, and was specially appointed by the Khalifa to govern Basra. Basra was a sort of military colony, and the inhabitants (a very mixed race) were both seditious and irreligious. On his arrival at the seat of Government, Ziyad found matters in a sad state: the ordinances of Islam openly flouted; strong Alid sympathies; no man's property, and no woman's honour safe. So he called on the people to desist, and they laughed at him. He found that much of the crime and many other abominations were perpetrated at night. People, instead of devoting the dark hours to sleep or domestic duties, to prayer or study, were perambulating the streets, thronging the wine-shops, consorting with painted women, frequenting proscribed conventicles, invading the domiciles of the respectable, and behaving generally like sons of Belial. Therefore he issued an edict that no one should be found in the streets and squares of the city after evening prayer. So they laughed at him.

The first night he perambulated the city with a competent armed guard and executed four thousand offenders; the next night four hundred. On the third night he marched through a vast and

silent wilderness of empty streets and squares till the dawn, when he came to a remote market-place. Here was an old shepherd sleeping among his flock. So the governor said to him : "What make you here?" The shepherd said that he had come in during the night, before the gates were closed, in order to sleep in the square, so as to be the first at the market. "What about my edict?" The shepherd had not heard of it. "It is the duty of the subject to acquaint himself with the laws." The shepherd urged that he could not read or write and lived in a remote district, and was really unaware of the new rule. Ziyyad said, "I acquit you of intentional disobedience, but the matter does not rest there. If I once admit excuses on the part of those who disobey the laws, I shall be flooded with excuses. Excellent ones too, most of them. Thus the laws will be utterly set aside, the ordinances of Islam made vain, the blood of those whom I have already slain will have been shed uselessly, and I shall be responsible before God for the blood that must flow hereafter. And Paradise is better for you." So he slew him.

Ziyyad, as a strong supporter of the Ummaiyyids, is not popular with Mussulman writers, and most of them gently censure his dealings with the shepherd, but his policy in general, as far as keeping order goes, is regarded as a model.

To come nearer home, Muhammad Tughlak was

a ruler of almost insane cruelty. He was otherwise a great prince, scholar, ghazi, and ruler. His cruelty was such that (a rare thing in the East) the subjects revolted out of mere desperation, as the Romans did from Maximin. We have a contemporaneous account of his times from the learned and amiable Ibn Batuta, who twice himself nearly perished at the hands of Muhammad. He *does* censure the tyranny, but very mildly.

Another form of massacre not unknown to the East is the political massacre. This differs from the administrative massacre, because it is not really necessary. It is done *ex majore cautela*. If there is a party, or faction, which *may* become powerful and so dangerous, it is often wise to massacre it in time. This form of massacre is common enough in Europe, the most well-known example being the St Bartholomew. It is generally approved of by Oriental public opinion.

Closely allied to the political massacre is the pogrom, which is a massacre not carried out directly by the armed forces of the Government, but by its friends and sympathisers. This form is not looked on with much approval by the Oriental political writers. They do not in general approve of amateur statesmanship and administrative effort, and prefer that the Government should itself decide on the necessity of a massacre. It of course often happens that the political massacre begins as a pogrom and ends as an act



of state, and then the viciousness of its origin is condoned by its ratification.

The wanton or capricious massacre by the Government of persons to whom the ruler has taken a personal dislike is not looked on with approbation, though such an act is a true kingly act, and the Oriental likes his king to be a king. The slaughter of the sons of Barmak excited horror and compassion owing to the nobility and innocence of the sufferers, and the terrible peripeteia expressed in the two entries in the state accounts: "To a robe of honour for Jaafar the Barmaki, one hundred thousand dinars," and a day or two after, "to reeds and oil for burning the body of Jaafar the Barmaki, five farthings." But the Oriental regards Harun Al Rashid with very different eyes to those with which we look on Nero or Caligula.

To apply this to better-known instances. The Oriental would approve of the tables of Sulla, mildly and hesitatingly disapprove of the acts of the three disciples, strongly reprobate the Cinnan severities, and suspend judgment as to the dealings with the Gracchans.

The political Indian, however he might smile at the humanitarian, soon learned to use him. It was found possible to represent almost any act of severity as a wanton massacre or unjustifiable execution, or a gratuitous torture. Hence the paralysis of the executive powers of the govern-

ment. Hence in due course disorders and hence necessarily the shedding of oceans of blood.

It is not to be supposed that I approve of massacres. In fact my main objection to the policy of the humanitarian is that it makes them necessary. It will be seen from the analysis of the reasons which make massacres part of the mechanism of Oriental rule that they may all be reduced to one, namely, the feebleness of the executive. Where there are proper laws rigorously and justly enforced, and where the power of the Government exercised through loyal troops and active administrators is unshaken and undoubted, there is no reason for massacres, and it is for that reason that they are not at present common in the West. But the Oriental ruler who hesitates to arrest the preacher of sedition, or to disperse the first few disorderly mobs, will soon find himself struggling desperately to preserve the last traces of social order. It is then not a question whether there shall be a massacre. The question is merely whether you or your adversaries shall be the subjects.

I have seen riots put down with severity, but I never knew one riot which could not have been prevented had proper precautions been taken in time. To him who is fond of the Indian peoples it is a matter of indignation. You see the artful agitator at work. No one interferes. You see some seditious doctrines preached publicly. That

is a point of view which the subject may properly hold and express. You see the first beginnings of disorder. These are mere temporary ebullitions; let the angry passions of the people find that vent. Next day you are struggling with the whole mobilisation of anarchy. One mob is looting the bazaar, another is killing swine in the mosques, a third cows in the temples. Flames are going up from all the public buildings. Isolated Europeans are flying for their lives; stragglers are being clubbed to death. Women are being left for dead. Loyal Indian officials are plundered of all they have and are being put to death with tortures. Then the troops are marched into the city. There is street fighting. The troops are reluctant to fire on their compatriots. At last they warm to their work. There is a great effusion of blood. The People discover that the Sirkar is not dead. All disorder disappears as if by magic, and you see nothing but corpses and ruined buildings, and smiling faces and salaaming multitudes. The agitators are honoured and rewarded. There is a howl from England for the heads of the civil and military chiefs.

This form of administration is not intelligible to the uninstructed Oriental. I personally am not much enamoured of it. A Government that can only be carried on by periodical massacres seems to me little better than anarchy, and there is no particular reason to import foreigners at vast expense to confer on India the benefits of anarchy.

The Indian can provide that by swadeshi efforts in as great a quantity as may be required by the most exigent.

A very instructive incident occurred some years ago. There was an area which we will call Pongoland. The Pongos were a simple Dravidian people recently reclaimed from forest life, and addicted to drink. They were totally illiterate, and remarkably bad agriculturists. The landholders were degenerate Rajputs, who treated the cultivating Pongo with every sort of oppression and contumely. Pongoland was not directly under British administration, but under political control, so the Government was not responsible for the relations of landlord and tenant. There were, however, many Pongos in adjacent British districts.

Presently a holy man appeared. He preached the Word among the Pongos. He made them give up drink and excessive sexual licence. He made them take vows of fidelity, grading all his converts according to their progress in the divine science into classes, and expounding the doctrine with greater clarity to the higher illuminati. To the inferior ranks, implicit obedience to the new Messiah was recommended. To the higher orders, temporal dominion as well as eternal bliss was promised. The people now began to refuse to pay rent to the landlords, and to resent illegal demands for duty-labour and servile dues. The landlords and their caste-men tried force. This was met by force, and the landlords were driven

into the towns. The chiefs applied to the Paramount Power. A high official was despatched to negotiate. He found the ascetic with a large force on a strong high hill, which was to be the New Jerusalem. The people would not listen to the high official, but drove him into a fort and beleaguered him. Government now sent a sufficient force, which approached the hill. The majority of the Pongos now showed signs of wavering, and were about to disperse. Then suddenly the British force fell back. The commandant had just received a telegram directing him to try further negotiation. The Pongos were now, of course, convinced that their leader's claims to divinity were unimpeachable. Had he not, merely by his divine presence, caused the forces of the Sirkar to retreat without striking a blow? They laughed at the efforts for negotiation, and sent out runners all over the country to call the whole Pongo nation to arms. They met with a ready response, and an insurrection was on the verge of breaking out in four districts. Next day, however, the troops were ordered to advance. The Pongos had no arms except swords, spears, and bows, but they were now convinced of their invincibility. They would neither fly nor surrender, but maintained the position on the almost inaccessible rock. Consequently when the troops did fight their way to the summit, it was a bad business.

I never met any Indian who was not convinced

that the Government was desirous of having a massacre, so as to strike terror. All attributed to Government the wily policy of Kruger. The object of the first recall of the troops was, they thought, to stiffen the resistance, and to collect as many of the fanatics on the hill as possible, so that when "the tortoise did put out its head," it might be more conveniently decapitated. In vain I used to point out that the action of the Government, though apparently imbecile, was really intended to be humane. They used to agree cordially and change the subject.

Another evil effect of the influence of this party at home is produced elsewhere than in India. The humanitarians, of course, highly disapprove of war. Therefore they regard expenditure on the fighting forces as wicked. At the same time they are, many of them, wealthy burghers engaged in trade. To England and its trade, command of the seas and free access to the markets is essential. Now as things stand, this command and access cannot be maintained or acquired without, at any rate, a show of military force. For the last two hundred years our wars have been principally directed to these two objects. For other nations imagine that, by excluding British commercial enterprise from these transoceanic regions, they may themselves secure the riches which now fall to England. Hence a time comes when the humanitarian finds his material interests are

menaced by some foreign foe. Then Government is pressed actively to intervene. Or again, some foreign power may give itself up to an orgy of massacre of its own subjects. The sympathies of the humanitarian are aroused. He insists on a stiff Note being despatched to the guilty power. The foreign Government is required to desist from its enormities. The true path is dogmatically indicated to it. No ultimatum is actually issued, but severe threats are made in case of recalcitrance. All that seems needed is the mobilisation.

This *démarche* is generally mere bluff, because the forces of the Crown are not sufficient to impose the will of England on the recalcitrant power. But the bluff is often successful. Occasionally, however, some state calls our bluff, whereon we throw in our hand. Fortunately, foreign policy is little known to the average Englishman, but there are incidents, particularly in the dark years between the first and second Reform Bills, which make the most hardened blush for shame. As for more recent incidents, it is undesirable to refer to them.

The Oriental is an acute detector of bluff. He is used to fine-sounding titles covering mere emptiness. He also has had his "Kings of the World, whose rule extends from Delhi to Palam."

He has no use for a coward as ruler, and a coward is no less a coward because he cloaks his lack of manliness by fine talk about being too

proud to fight, or the horror of blood-guiltiness. Where the Oriental makes his mistake is where so many have gone wrong. There always, up to the present, has come a point beyond which, in the matter of concession, the British have not been prepared to go. It is possible to drive them into war.

It is then the duty of the humanitarian, as far as possible, to embarrass the Government. He should agitate among the people of England on the topics of the wickedness of war, the atrocities of the troops, the effusion of blood, the disturbance of commerce, the waste of wealth wrung from the labour and sweat of the toiling masses.

At the same time, he should press for the conclusion of a premature and inconclusive peace, and he should, if possible, arrange that the vanquished foe should at the peace conference be restored to his old position, and particularly that he should be enabled to revenge himself on the friends and allies of England.

The political Indian, therefore, thinks that if he could only bring about a general rising, there would be much chance that the British would evacuate the country. If they fought, he thinks it would be possible so to spin out the contest that the humanitarians might have time to intervene.

The Oriental politician, with his rather childish mind, does not understand that general principles



do not always apply to particular cases. This is peculiarly true in cases of dispute with the British Government, which never prided itself on its logic. He is also unaware that the laurel is the object of desire to all. It is only where the laurel is not to be won without much dust and struggle that competitors are few. For an easy and sweatless conflict, the competitors are many.

Some there are who, looking at certain phenomena, have been inclined to deduce the existence of a Church of Anarchy. What may be called for convenience Western Civilization is, they say, menaced by an organisation which is sworn to destroy it. It is this organisation which has prescribed the policy to the realisation of which the efforts of the discontented are directed; which supplies the strategy; which provides the leaders; which engages or subsidises the apostles. The progress of anarchy during the last five generations is, they say, too regular and too obviously under discipline to be fortuitous.

What the organisation is, is doubtful according to these people. Some refer to the Illuminati, others to the Freemasons, others to the Jews. I do not regard the existence of any such organisation as proved, and on *a priori* grounds I consider its existence extremely doubtful.

As for the Illuminati, if they were ever of importance, they soon merged in the Freemasons. The founder of the sect lived till 1830, but was

of no consideration for the last forty years of his life. Such is not the fate of the successful apostle. Not so does Satan reward his servants.

That certain forms of Freemasonry have been infected with anarchical doctrine, and that certain lodges have been conventicles of Satan worshippers, is probable enough. But a great deal of the suspicion against the Freemasons has originated in the fact that Freemasonry has tended to be anti-Catholic. Pius the Ninth, having risen to the Papacy largely through the influence of certain lodges, was not prepared to be the vassal of his associates, whose policy he found inconsistent with that of the Apostolic see. He therefore prohibited Catholics from entering Freemason lodges. The policy of the Grand Orient had long been secularist, but the elimination of Catholic members necessarily made the organisation purely secularist, and therefore anti-Catholic.

Unfortunately, the legends of the Freemasons were connected with the building and maintenance of the Temple of Solomon. This fact tended to make the superstitious Catholic suppose that the craft was in some way a Jewish conspiracy. Further, the abominations falsely attributed to the Templars, who were themselves closely connected with the ideal Temple, were now attributed to the Freemasons. And the craft, anxious to assert its antiquity, anxious to keep at bay the Papal spy, and apparently also from pure love

of mystification, by no means discouraged this accusation. Very possibly the Grand Orient and derivative systems may be anti-Catholic and secularist, and very possibly some lodges may have adopted a burlesque and blasphemous ritual. But the evidence adduced by the Catholic writers to prove that the Freemasons derived from the Scottish rite are the worshippers of Baran Satanas, and as such pledged to the destruction of Western civilization, is not worth the name. It is possible to be an anti-Catholic or a secularist without wishing to annihilate European civilization. That civilization might, for all I know, exist without being supported by any positive religion at all. If a "transcendental policeman" is necessary, the needful sanctions might be imposed by the word of Apollo or of Mithra, or the Beelzebub of the Comtists, as well as by that of the Man of Sorrows. European civilization existed in essentials before Christ, and may very likely survive him.

There was more to be said for the Jewish theory. Many subversives have been Jews. But there is no evidence that the forces of anarchy were directed by any purely Jewish corporation. *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, though possibly published in good faith, were based on older tendentious forgeries or mystifications. *A priori*, it is extremely unlikely that the Jewish race, which has profited so much

in the last century by Western civilization, should wish to destroy it.

That many subversives should be Jews is not a matter of surprise. It is not to be marvelled at that the oppressed should rebel, and that if his rebellion is successful he should wish to avenge himself on his late persecutors. The Jew is disinherited and, on the whole, poor. The social order thus denies to this talented race those opportunities for advancement which it promises to all its members, but reserves in fact for those who have money or influence.

The existence of large masses of disinherited is a menace to any social order. Far greater is the danger when among the disinherited are found thousands of men conscious of great powers, yet denied the profitable use of them. "We, the twice-born, may without fear strip the pariah of lands and houses, the exercise of professions, the use of arms. We have done this for long centuries, and the pariah now hardly resents it. It is doubtless a divine decree that we should have all, and he have nothing. The gods hate the pariah. If he rebels, as we have crushed him in the past, so we shall crush him in the future. This two-legged animal, hated by the gods, what chance has he against the wealth, the science, and the solidarity of the twice-born? But let there arise intelligence among the pariahs, either by inclusion in their body exiles from

ours, or by spontaneous generation in his own, is there not then a serious menace? And if the process continues, so that the pariahs are by no means lacking in leaders of an intelligence equal to ours, then, seeing that they outnumber us ten to one, is there not great danger to the great lords of cattle and dividers of bread?"

These considerations, I think, are sufficient to account for the emergence of the Jew in all revolutions, without supposing the existence of any general Jewish conspiracy against the civilization of the West. As a matter of fact, the civilization of the Semite is not radically different from the civilization of Western Europe. It has a different conception of the Deity, and the status of woman is slightly different, and perhaps inferior. There is here nothing like the divergence between Western civilization and that of, *e.g.*, the Mongol races, or even between Western civilization and the original Slav civilization. Much of the apparatus of our civilization is borrowed directly or indirectly from the Semites.

It may perhaps be admitted that the Jew, while using our civilization, has a poor opinion of it. This is not unnatural. He has seen so many civilizations pass. He has used them all. The more degenerate they became, the greater the influence, and thus the greater the profit of the Jew. He has seen bud blossom and wither,

the civilization of the Babylonians, of the Persians, of the Ptolemies, of the Romans, of the Caliphs of Baghdad and Cordova. He was always present, and always able to accommodate himself to the demands of the age. He was generally able to exercise great influence over the Government, and always found aiders and favourers among the powerful. Thus he was in a position to profit himself and his friends. But he was never so bound up with the current civilization that he shared its fall. This being so, what is George more to him than Belshazzar?

The heathen imagine a vain thing, and their devices come to nought, but the Kingdom of Zion is an enduring kingdom.

One may imagine a Society which knew no other game than Bridge. Such a Society would be convinced of the superiority of the Ace of Spades to any other card of the fifty-two. And there might be another Society which played all card games. Such a Society would know that there was nothing absolute about the value of the Ace of Spades. They would be perfectly aware that in other games the Knave, and in others the King of the trump suit, whatever it might be, was far more valuable than the said Ace. But this knowledge would not prevent the Cosmopolitans when playing Bridge from attributing as much value to the Ace as the Bridge Fanatics, though he might smile a little when he recollected how short a time ago it was

that the Ace of Hearts was the valued card, and the Ace of Spades occupied the unfortunate position of the people of Megara.

The Jew, then, may be perfectly loyal to the ideas of the society in which he lives. Yet his belief in them is not of that degree that is requisite for martyrdom. Just as the most valiant and loyal mercenaries will break and fly after suffering losses which a national and volunteer army would bear without wincing, so the Jew is rarely prepared to stake all on the maintenance of a social state in the absolute value of which he has no belief.

As a capitalist also he is inclined to compromise. It is after all necessary to insure. Is it really desirable to push Catiline to extremes? The programme of Catiline seems unattractive to me as a capitalist, but how can I tell that a "massacre of the equites" is not one of the items of the programme of the optimates? Perhaps it is better to make terms with Catiline while it is yet time. He will doubtless be rapacious, but my experience is that every man has his price. I am not by any means sure that the price of Antonius will not ultimately be as high as that of Sergius.

Again, the instincts of the Jew are towards broking. Excluded for so long from the guilds, forbidden to hold land, he was driven for a living to this sterile form of business, for which his international connection admirably equipped him. He does not, *e.g.*, himself grow apples, but he dis-

covers that A. *owns* one hundred tons of apples, and that B. *needs* one hundred tons of apples. He introduces A. to B., and takes his commission. But what a magnificent commission there may be for the broker between Julius who wishes to purchase, and the Roman people who wish to sell, the Crown.

Retail trade is also an hereditary occupation of the Jew, but here again he was hindered by the regulations of the corporate cities. Consequently he was relegated to the less esteemed trades such as the second-hand business. To buy up bankrupt stock in the bulk and dispose of it in retail is a profitable speculation. And how if the concern in liquidation is an empire?

It is but recently that the influence of the Jew in politics, and particularly in foreign and imperial politics, has awakened uneasiness in England. The Englishman prided himself on his liberality, and regarded the anti-Semitism of the Continent as a base and ignoble feeling. And in this he was no doubt right. The Jews were not numerous in England, and their control of many important industries was unknown. In a country like England, where the small share of power which is not monopolised by wealth was wielded by intelligence, there was thus every probability of the Jew becoming one of the dominant castes. Jews were welcomed as intimates, advisers, and sons-in-law by leaders of both the great parties. Jews



provided the empire with statesmen, lawyers, men of the pen, and men of science. I cannot for the moment remember any great Jewish general or admiral, but I have no doubt that many brave and loyal officers of that faith have shed their blood for England, as they have for the Tricolour and the Stars and Stripes. For many years they abstained from an active share in politics.

This latter policy has been abandoned in recent years, to the regret of the old-fashioned pious Jew. And here, I think, the Fromme Jüde was right. No one can be blind to the beginning of a reaction against Jewish control. The case of Lincoln disturbed many. The strange revelations of the war created a vague uneasiness. The large influx of poor Jews who, by their superior industry and lower standards of living, compete with the indigenous worker in certain trades has alarmed powerful interests. The alleged monopolisation by the foreign Jew of certain reprehensible traffics has revolted the pious. There is therefore a vague anti-Jewish feeling floating about in solution in England which needs but a shock to crystallise it. The fall of the Coalition is principally to be ascribed to an uneasy and probably erroneous idea that the Jew exercised too much power in the counsels of that remarkable body, and that that influence was being applied to unpatriotic ends. Erroneously, no doubt, it was supposed that the last rags of

honour of the British people, the last pieces of gold in an exhausted treasury, the last drops of the blood in the lacerated body of the republic, were about to be jeopardised, in order to decide which of certain Jewish financial houses were to have the profitable business of liquidating the Turkish Empire. The mere absurdity of the supposition is convincing proof of the reality of the general uneasiness.

And as usual the uneasiness of the people, though in itself apparently baseless, was not actually without a rational basis. To return to first principles, it is inexpedient, in a world where rightly or wrongly the idea of nationalism has such power, that the affairs of the nation should be conducted by men who, in so far as they are not citizens of a foreign nation, are cosmopolitans by birth, training, and inclination.

Thus it is that the Jew is wrongly suspected of subversivism. It is not true that subversivism is a Jewish invention, or machine for battering down the walls of the mystic Babylon. The mystic Babylon, though not the true home of the Jew, is an agreeable sojourning-place for that nomad, and he has no desire to see its pleasant places wasted with the fire of insurrection.

On the other hand, many Jews are subversives, and the race as a whole is rather inclined to make terms with the foe than to withstand it to the utmost.

Further, the fact (if it be a fact) that certain of the organisations deriving from the Freemasons have become seminaries of subversive doctrines, coupled with the fact that Continental Freemasons are often Jews, cannot but spread a sympathy with such doctrines among those sections of the Jewish race which inhabit countries where that form of Freemasonry is powerful.

For the last three generations organised labour must be counted among the subversive forces. In the propagation of Socialistic doctrine individual Jews have taken a considerable <sup>part</sup>. But to suppose that the diffusion of Social<sup>e</sup> <sup>ism</sup> among the labouring classes is due to the efforts of a small subversive secret society is ludicrous. All attempts to make Socialism an international church directed by an extra-nationalistic directorate have hitherto failed.

No; the apostle of anarchy is misery. The baptism of the anarchist is the bitter sweat of hopeless toil, and the tears of oppressed women and children. His church is not the hall of the freemason, nor the synagogue, but the barrack, the jail, and the casual ward. The deity of his adoration is not Baran Satanas, nor Baphomet, but the transcendental vision of Man-to-Be. His paradise is not a mystical Zion, but a city here on earth, which is even now being builded. And if the path to that city must lead through blood and fire, the subversion of thrones, the crashing

of empires—well, the path of God has ever lain over the abyss. *Non pacem sed gladium.*

There is in all societies a body of wretched men. These are they for whom civilization reserves its penalties and to whom it denies its boons. They are the pariahs.

The existence of this body is due to causes which vary from country to country or from age to age. It may trace to the survival of an inferior and conquered but not extirpated race. Such are the real pariahs. It may trace to the survival of a conquered but not an inferior race. Such were the Helots. It may consist of the survivors of external, defeated but not necessarily inferior, races who have been introduced into the body politic for some economic or social reason. Such were the inhabitants of the Roman *ergastulum*. It may consist of members of the community who, for some reason, have found it impossible to move forward on the march of development followed by the bulk of the community, and who thus represent a primitive epoch in the national social history.

Needs must there be compassion for the pariah. Evil is the tyranny of race over race. Terrible things have been done in the darkness of the abyss. From these imagination averts herself, shuddering. But for none can there be more compassion than for the pariah of modern civilization.

For these men are our own flesh and blood.

They are where they are, not on account of any original inferiority, nor on account of their own fault. They represent the result of careful selection, for which they are in no way responsible.

They are there because the squire drove their great-great-grandparents from the common lands; because the manufacturer wished for cheap labour and found it among the children; because there was a war; because there was a new invention; because a trade route changed; because their ancestors infected them with the virus of syphilis and alcohol; because some pretty girl in the eighteenth century was tuberculous or feeble-minded; because the capricious gibbet spared some primæval brute; because the parson was a pluralist; because the schoolmaster was a pedant; because the mother died, and the stepmother was harsh.

The optimist denies the existence of the pariah. He asserts that you have only to catch the pariah young, and bring him up in favourable surroundings and with a good education, to eliminate the pariah taint. This is not true. You may prevent members of the community whose stock is sound, and who are in danger of falling into the pariah class, from incurring that penalty, but the real pariah is the victim of hereditary taint which renders him irreclaimable. He is unemployable. For him there is nothing but precarious bread, the casual ward, the jail, the asylum, and the pauper's or the felon's grave.

Into this class we ourselves may at any time fall, and into it will certainly be merged some of our descendants.

Wretches who through no fault of their own are thus condemned from birth to misery, cannot be expected to be very satisfied with a system which seems a negation of natural justice. Add to this righteous indignation the natural instinct of the brute to burn, plunder, rape, and destroy, and it is not a matter of surprise that there is pressure on the dykes which preserve civilization from the flood of anarchy.

For this class is a growing class. No one ever rises out of it, and many are continually falling into it. As the elaboration of civilization becomes greater, so proportionately becomes greater the efficiency required in those who are to benefit by it. Those who fall below the ever-rising standard of efficiency—for such there is nothing but the pariah's doom. The savage English criminal laws of the eighteenth century, and the total ignorance of sanitation, prevented the increase of the pariah body. We are now more humane and know better how to preserve life, even of the wretched. Thus over all the west the people of the Abyss increase.

The people of the Abyss are themselves utterly incapable of overthrowing the social order. The most they can effect is to revolt and devastate for a few hours or days some small part of the lands of civilization. By reason of the very fact

that they are pariahs, they are incapable of forming a definite policy of faithful co-operation or of leadership, nor can they subordinate for one moment the desire for personal gratification to the common weal. But no potentially powerful party will long want leaders.

The pariah finds his leaders among men of the sound stock. There are always men of this stock who have some personal reason to be displeased with existing conditions. There are men who commit some grave offence against the code of the caste, and are expelled from the community. Such are the Exiles. There are others who have become bankrupt, either in fortune or reputation, and voluntarily withdraw themselves from a society which they find irksome. Such are the Disinherited. There are many to whom the existing order, though it imposes no disabilities on them, is distasteful. Such are the Rebels. There are those who, ambitious and competent and yet handicapped, think it on the whole wiser, at any rate for the present, to seek to advance themselves by revolutionary means. Such are the Arrivists.

The pariahs will therefore never lack leaders, many of them men of great ability, some men of genius, some of them selfless and unpractical altruists, many of them rotten-hearted, self-seeking egoists.

Such is the real subversive party. I do not think that there is any real danger to civilization from it. The pariah himself is no menace. The leaders

are cranks and fanatics, or themselves unemployables or temperamental traitors, who for due reason would be as ready to abandon the cause they have adopted as that which they have already betrayed.

But it cannot be denied that subversive doctrines find favour among large and sound classes of the community.

If men consider positive pleasure as the *summum bonum*, very few attain it. There is, of course, no such thing as lasting positive pleasure. But those who are excluded from what they suppose are opportunities of enjoyment resent this exclusion. For the vast majority of men life must be hard, toilsome, full of pain, full of apprehension, cramped, monotonous. And to the citizen of the modern industrial area, situated generally in some cold wet region in the North—a citizen whose life also is spent under the shadow of the dead Calvinism which teaches that enjoyment is sinful,—there is none of the joy in living which even the poor man, a denizen of sunnier climes, knows. Small wonder that men who are by predilection loyal citizens, honest and capable workmen, devoted fathers and husbands, should blame a social order which denies them a fuller and securer life.

Then comes the prophet, and says: "Brother, you work hard all your life. Your houses are sordid. Your food is distasteful. Your wife is a slattern. Your children are disinherited. You shall work hard all your days. If you are lucky you will, after paying the taxes, and the rent, and



the shareholders' profits, have just enough over to pay for food and clothes, and perhaps some small surplus for emergency. When you grow old there is nothing for you but the pauper's dole. At your feet is the abyss yawning for you. Come with us. We will show you a better way." Or, "See those who batten on your sweat—men and women who have never done an honest day's work in their life. Is it right, is it just, that they should squander on an hour's idle pleasure the wealth that it takes you a year of labour to produce?" The workman is no anarchist. He wants security with reasonable freedom. The Capitalistic State seems to deny it. The apostle of anarchy seems to promise it. Is it not reasonable enough that he should sympathise with the subversive?

I was once in a crowded carriage immediately after the war. We were a very mixed lot of passengers, and as it was night and the light was bad, it was impossible to read. Conversation began, and I listened with much interest. The principal person of the dialogue was a naval officer, who was haranguing the public on the unpatriotic attitude of labour to the war, both as regards strikes while the war was in progress, and as regards the attitude of labour to unskilled labour after the war.

The cudgels were taken up by an artisan, who was a man of some reading and much virulence. He expressed the usual views about the war, about the fighting services, about the capitalist, and about

the colonies and India. The whole universe had been banded together for ages to make the toiler a slave. Now the old régime had committed formal suicide, and labour intended to enter on the inheritance. Then the naval man used the usual argument, that a rise in the nominal wages of labour was of no advantage to the labourer, as prices rose in proportion. To which the workman replied: "All I can say is that, before the war, very few of my mates could send their children to the 'Igh School, and now they all can."

I was disappointed. I thought I had discovered at last a Bolshevik, and that I should learn what form the abstruse doctrines of Marx had taken in the Mechanics' Institute; whereas that one phrase was sufficient to show me that here was no proletarian. He was a bourgeois. He had obviously love of family, desire to improve, desire to save, desire that his own should be superior to those of others—in fact, all the base bourgeois virtues.

And I am convinced that not one in a hundred of those who vote "labour" have any sympathy with the real policy of the Labour party. That is, with Bolshevism, to be realised by constitutional means.

Then there are the ardent and enthusiastic young people who feel a generous sympathy for the oppressed, and seek a fairer field for the exhibition of great talents than that to which the beaten tracks lead.

Then there are the idealists. Men must have something to worship; something, if necessary, to die for. Men cannot live by bread alone. An immense hope has traversed the heart of man; in spite of reason we must lift our eyes to the heavens. Surely from somewhere must come the redeemer?

Whither is he who seeks an ideal to direct his eyes? To the heavens? They are empty. To the throne? It is tenanted. To our country? Patriotism is the last resource of the scoundrel. To learning? It is vanity. Where, then? Only to struggling humanity, the protagonist in a cause which seems lost, and therefore which needs noble champions in a cause which must ultimately triumph, when we too shall march behind the victorious car, participators in the glory.

Anarchy has therefore a great strength, more than properly belongs to it. The doctrines of anarchy are fallacious, and to put them into practice would lead mankind, not into a radiant paradise, but back to the kitchen midden. Particularly in England would disaster ensue from a very slight application of the treatment, and I do not think that the fate of any English Lenin or Trotsky would be enviable. In a few weeks, however, such a fanatic, vested with the absolute powers that can be conferred on the supreme active executive under the English Constitution, might reduce England to a graveyard. The

actual holders of power, therefore, are timid, and seek above all not to increase the numbers of sympathisers with anarchy. The doctrinaire and humanitarian must be courted. Concessions must be made to labour. No risk must be run of alienating any classes which might be in the least inclined to throw in their lot with anarchy.

It will not have escaped the observer that the history of anarchy has, up to the present, proceeded much on the lines of the Christian Church. Christianity began as an anarchical religion. The Magnificat and the Nunc Dimittis are the pariah's pæans. It made its earlier converts as a world religion among the disinherited. It called men to turn away their eyes from a world full, to them, of grievous oppression to a brighter and better universe. It gave men hope where they had no hope. Round this nucleus gathered ambitious men, idealists, and pure souls panting for redemption, yet it still remained an anarchic creed, looking to the destruction of the social order, of the State, of the globe itself as the desired preliminary for the salvation of the human race. War was formally engaged between the Church and the Empire—a war in which both might have perished. So far, the history of the Church and the history of anarchy is identical. Will there arise a Constantine, who will know how to make anarchy the purifier and preserver of the State? If not, I think both must perish.

The Oriental has no sympathy with anarchy. To him the social order is God-appointed, and he no more dreams of trying to destroy society, because it presses hardly on him personally, than he would think of burning down a temple because he personally did not get a place of honour therein at the darshan. Anarchical sects there have been both among the Zoroastrians and among the Moslems, but the sword of orthodoxy has always ruthlessly, and with general applause, disposed of them.

Some of the political Indians are inclined to coquet with Bolshevism, and some to take the money of the Bolshevik. But some Indians would take money from Satan himself, and rejoice that they had, to that extent, crippled the resources of the enemy of mankind. Themselves in revolt against Western civilization, they naturally seek allies among the enemies of their enemy.

To the subversive, of course, the Indian Empire is an abomination. "Not content with making the garden of the world a den of slaves, it is necessary that the capitalist system, in its eagerness for new fields of labour to exploit, must invade the tranquil and immemorial East. In happier days capitalism and the wage-slave were unknown there. Each peasant cultivated his own little plot of land, and found by the simple process of barter the means of gratifying all his desires. The

artisan worked for himself with his own tools. His customer supplied him with the raw materials. Thus there was no need of capital, and the worker was his own landlord, foreman, and employer. Thus he was never crushed down by the iron law of wages. No foreign enemy came to disturb the inhabitants of this earthly paradise, or, if he did, he was met, not by the hired mercenaries of capitalism, but by the free and noble warrior castes.

“Now the scene has changed. From a thousand factory chimneys there rises into the pellucid Indian air the smoke of the burnt-offering to the capitalist Moloch. The English boast that they have made the country secure. Yes! that they may be undisturbed in their exploitation. They boast that they have introduced law and order. But law is the rich man’s weapon. It is by the law that he is enabled regularly to grind the faces of the poor, and order means only that the law can function undisturbed. The country is intersected with roads and railways, in order that the wealth produced by the sweat of the toiler may more conveniently be carried off by the brigands of capitalism. The English boast that they are the apostles of a higher morality. Yes; the morality which the master teaches his slaves, that they may be content to be profitable slaves.”

Also, the Indian empire being a great and

outwardly imposing thing, to destroy it would be most impressive. It is effective to blow up an opera-house or a cathedral, to burn a museum or a picture-gallery, to breach a railway or a barrage. That makes the cowardly bourgeois tremble in his filthy shoes; that gladdens the heart of the pariah. Much more impressive would be the eradication of an empire, particularly when such eradication would hit the capitalist very hard in his only very sensitive spot—the pocket. There would be, moreover, the agreeable side-product of a great effusion of blood. The debacle could not but be accompanied with stimulating incidents of looting, and massacring, and rape. The party, or its sympathisers, produces a certain amount of imaginative literature—I do not mean political brochures, but fiction and poetry,—and when its fancy turns to a regenerated world, it is on the incidents of a servile war in India that it rests with peculiar pleasure.

Such were the results of the survey by Panditji of politics in England, and such the opinion which, erroneous or right, he had formed. Briefly, then, the Tory party was annihilated. Little could be hoped from the Unionists except passivity. That could be relied on; in power, they would let things drift; in opposition, they would regard any criticism of Government proposals in the matter of India as factious. The Liberal party embraces many minor parties, on whose sympathies and on

whose active support, on occasion, Panditji could rely. Some of these parties would need careful handling; others would be only too glad to lend a hand to any subversive work, but they might prove dangerous allies.

As regards the country in general, apart from the politicians, there was really nothing to fear. The mass of electors knew nothing of, and cared nothing for, India, which they conceived of as a vague sort of place full of tigers, and cobras, and sepoys, where a servile black population, fed on rice, was ruled in summary fashion by bullying white men dressed in topis and pyjamas, riding in palanquins, nurtured on brandy-pawnee and curry, living in bungalows where they maintained each a considerable harem. Some imagined the empire as a vast heathen land panting for the Word, and only restrained from gratifying its desires by the obstructive tactics of the Government and the evil example of the whites. Others who had read the works of Max Müller, and had perhaps made a hasty trip to the show places of India, were aware that India had at one time possessed a civilization not inferior in promise to that of the other Nordic races. That that civilization had long ago come to its acme, and had rapidly declined, they could not know. The trading classes who had business connections with India knew little beyond a few great cities.



This community was on the whole Liberal, but in any case traders do not look very far beyond the next balance-sheet. This community valued in the Indian system only the peace which it preserved, and the communications that it opened. It was grievously suspicious of its courts, and it resented the checks which the Government, like all bureaucratic administrations, applied to private enterprise in the region also of commerce. Continual political disorder would soon set this class looking about it for another system which might promise better hopes of tranquillity, and throw open wider fields to commercial exploitation.

The Anglo-Indian was entirely without weight. He was cut off from politics owing to his long exile. Where there was an Anglo-Indian in the House he was generally a man with a grievance or other frondeur, whose chief pleasure was to attack the system which had inflicted on him personal injuries. As for the press, the Anglo-Indian was not a good controversialist. Accustomed to the minute, the memo., the report—those stately vehicles for the interchange of opinion between official and official,—he found it impossible effectively to manipulate the *spiey par*, the bright *entrefilet*, and the brainy, breezy article which modern taste exacted from the journalist. He occasionally came out with a volume of memoirs, but these were read merely for the anecdotes.

In any case, however, he was not likely to prove a very effective champion of the existing system. It is more or less rudimentary that it is not the man who is well acquainted with the details of a system who is capable of forming or expressing a philosophical view of the whole.

It is Macaulay and Bentham, not Mansfield or Stowell, and still less Eldon, who writes the codes; it is Vegetius and not Stilicho who writes the Art of War; it is Clerk of Eldon and not Rodney who invents the breaking of the line; it is Aristotle, and not Eubulus, who writes the Politics.

Some great writers there were, but they appealed only to the cultured. The works of Kipling, works of genius as they are, were apt to give a false impression. Their form condemned them to represent merely isolated and striking incidents, and their tone was highly offensive to many. Out of mere contrariness, if not from a nobler sentiment, many were prepared to challenge the justice of a white predominance so energetically proclaimed.

The actual administration of India, therefore, was conducted in accordance with a tradition that had remained undisturbed through nearly a century. That century had been one of revolution in solution. Was it too much to hope that this tradition, supported merely by a convention that India

should not be treated as a party question, might be abandoned?

Certain it was that any statesman who was inclined to lead India into the pleasant paths of revolution would meet with small opposition from loyal colleagues, a bewildered opposition, an apathetic electorate.

## CHAPTER V.

## THE RAJ.

IN the meanwhile India had been undergoing changes which, necessary in themselves, were nevertheless such as would facilitate the designs of Panditji.

The Company had been dissolved. The President of the Board of Control was now the Secretary of State for India, and invariably a Cabinet Minister. The Board of Control had been abolished, and its place was occupied by the Council of the Secretary of State. This Council, composed of retired Anglo-Indian officials or merchants, had no authority, and its views might be safely neglected. Its principal use was to serve as a screen for the activities of the Secretary of State. At the same time, Indian affairs being very uninteresting to the average elector in England, and to his representatives except to a few apparently negligible cranks, little control was exercised over the Secretary of State by the Cabinet. Moreover, circumstances had tended to increase the power of the

Secretary of State over the Government of India. A Secretary of State of strong views would have little difficulty in realising those views.

The Executive Council of the Government of India had increased in numbers. The new members were not drawn from the Civil Service, but were, as a general rule, experts despatched from England. Able men were selected, though naturally here, as elsewhere, party claims were considered. The Executive Council tended more and more to be a congress of heads of departments, and the theory of corporate responsibility, though not entirely obsolete, was becoming so. In such a body, the influence of the Governor-General, or rather of the Viceroy, was very great; and the fact that it was from the civilian members of the Council that the Lieutenant-Governors of Provinces were selected, or the members of the Council of the Secretary of State were appointed—such selection of appointment depending on the goodwill or good word of the Viceroy,—by no means tended to diminish it. In the minor Presidencies no such change had taken place, and the abolition of the post of Commander-in-Chief in those provinces reduced the Council to a body of three, namely, two civilians and the Governor. In this case the civilian influence on the general administration was perhaps excessive, and that administration did, to a certain extent, give colour to the attacks on a bureaucratic system. Moreover,

as will appear later, the civilian members of the Councils were not very much in touch with actuality. A tactful Viceroy, or a Viceroy of great personality, could carry any measure he pleased, and so could the Secretary of State if he appointed, or found in office, a Viceroy who was contented to be his agent. A policy, therefore, which was merely the expression of the views of some individual statesman might be brought into force in India, and made to appear as the results of the considered judgment of the Parliament of Great Britain and of the Government of India.

In the days when it took a year to get an answer from India, much had to be left to the man on the spot. It was not possible for the Home Authorities continually to interfere with the details of the administration. They contented themselves with laying down the general lines of policy, and with selecting men who they thought were capable of carrying out the policy thus generally indicated. But the application of steam, the opening of the Red Sea route, the cutting of the Isthmus of Suez, and the invention of the telegraph, had brought India very close to England. Continual interference from home was, therefore, possible and inevitable. In such a state of things it is invariably the case that the local agent, knowing that he, if he acts on his own initiative, may be censured and exposed to the humiliation of having his policy reversed, prefers, before doing anything,

to get preliminary sanction. In this case you have the man on the spot who is legally responsible but impotent, and the official at home who is all-powerful but in no way responsible. This cannot but result in the general enfeebling of the Executive.

Moreover, a very vicious system had sprung up of private correspondence between the Viceroy and the Secretary. This was a copy of colonial precedents. In the Dominions the Governor is really an Ambassador, in so far as he is anything more than a figurehead, and with an Ambassador it is right enough—that the state which has appointed him should correspond through a secret and confidential channel. In India the Governor-General was the supreme head of the Executive, and the views, wishes, and orders of the Secretary of State could not constitutionally be communicated to him otherwise than through official channels.

Thus Mr Q., the Secretary of State, might think that the Simla monkeys should be forced to wear trousers. He would write a private letter to Lord A., the Governor-General, asking what he thought of the proposal. Lord A. would write back and say he did not think much of it. The monkeys were amusing little beasts, and their nudity was, to enlightened Indian opinion, rather gratifying than otherwise. Mr Q. would reply privately, to say that the more he thought over the imbraccation of the monkeys, the more he came to the con-

clusion that the measure was necessary. Lord A. would write back privately to ask whether Mr Q. had considered that it would be necessary to cut off the animals' tails. Mr Q. would then reply that a trifling consideration of that kind would not be allowed to stand in the way of a needful reform. Public opinion in England could no longer tolerate the public indecencies of Indian administration, and the condemnation of *Homo caudatus* to a perpetual state of inferiority to *Homo sapiens*. Lord A. would then sound his council privately, talking over the matter at dinners and other social entertainments in a friendly and hypothetical manner. He would report that the Commander-in-Chief was indifferent, the matter being non-military. The finance member was doubtful, as he was not sure where the funds were to come from. One of the civilian members was opposed because he thought that the measure would give offence to the Indians. "He tells me, what is very interesting, and what I never knew before, that some Indians regard monkeys as sacred." Another member was factious, and would probably oppose anything. Mr Q. writes back privately directing the Governor-General to push the matter through. The objecting civilian member is appointed Lieutenant-Governor somewhere, and a member whose vote can be relied on appointed in his place. The factious man is won over by some small concession, and a measure which, had



it come up for consideration in the ordinary routine, would have been laughed out of court, is carried by the unanimous vote of the supreme council.

This system of setting up the Viceroy against the Governor-General was another cause of the enfeebling of the Executive.

Although, theoretically, the Governor-General in Council was still the legislature, in practice there had been a modification. Certain individuals were added to the Executive Council when it was sitting as a legislature. These individuals were nominated. Sufficient officials were nominated to secure that the Government had a permanent majority, but there were other members nominated from the more important communities, European and Indian. This is not the place to discuss the relations of the Executive and the legislature. It may merely be said, that as an Executive parts with any of its Imperial powers, and as it encourages criticism of its acts, so it directly enfeebles itself. It is true that this enfeeblement may be amply compensated for by accession of strength gained from conciliation of public opinion, but in this particular case there was no such accession of strength. India had little or no public opinion, except on a few vital points, and it was not used to expressing that opinion through the legislature, and, in any case, the Indian legislatures were extremely unsuitable organs for any such purpose.

On the whole, then, the structural changes

described had all this one effect, the enfeeblement of the Indian Executive, and it was on the Indian Executive that the laws cast the duty of maintaining the English interest. This silent revolution was, therefore, noted with satisfaction by Panditji.

The administrative machine was not yet showing any signs of decrepitude. It was, however, being called on to deal with problems unknown before, and to work through appliances hitherto untested. It remained to be seen whether it would not be possible so to tamper with the rather complicated mechanism that it would be unable to function.

Just before the Mutiny, the appointments to the Civil Service were thrown open to competition. After the Mutiny, officers of the Indian Army were appointed by seconding from the corps of officers of the Royal Army. This corps was also appointed from candidates successful at a public examination. The advantage of a competitive examination as a means of selection of public offices is apparent. It does away with patronage and possible corruption. No doubt it excludes many who would be admirable public servants, and whose intelligence is not in defect, but who have not the particular ability necessary to satisfy the examiners. On the other hand, it does not exclude cranks. But it does exclude wasters and unemployables. To some it may appear advantageous, because, though apparently a democratic measure, "*la carrière ouverte aux talents*," yet it ruthlessly excludes

the children of poor parents, unless those parents are capable of great self-sacrifice.

At first it was provided that European ancestry was a necessary qualification, and with that limitation no very great change in the composition of the services was probable. The Anglo-Indian officer or official was generally intelligent enough himself, and selective enough in choosing a mate to render it probable that his children would be of rather superior intelligence; and the services were well-off, and could thus afford to give their children the best education possible. But that limitation was soon removed. It was a generally accepted axiom that, in contradistinction to the case of European candidates, literary ability among Indians was rather a proof of lack of administrative ability. But there were whole provinces in India where the duties of an executive officer did not seem to call for much administrative ability, but merely for the conscientious and loyal carrying out of routine. In such circumstances, the Indian in subordinate posts had shown great competency. Office was the ambition of every literate Indian; it would clearly be unfair to exclude him from it. Individual Indians there were who were men of spotless character, unsuspected loyalty, and high attainments. There were also many judicial posts which did not require executive ability, and the Indian had developed a great love for the law. He was, therefore, admitted to the competitions

for the Civil Services. There was no fear of his flooding them, for he was handicapped by the fact that the examinations were held in England, and by the curriculum.

In addition to this infusion of the Indian element into the Civil Services, certain appointments which had been up to that time reserved for members of those services were taken away from them, and assigned to a new service composed of persons nominated to it by the Indian authorities. In this way, it was hoped to throw open to Indians of birth and character, who were not capable of passing into the services through the portals of Burlington House, an honourable and lucrative career in their own country.

This reform, so just and necessary in itself, and yet so dangerous, was watched with a pleased eye by Panditji. This path might lead to great things.

The increase of the country in wealth and civilization, and the progress of political thought in the West, which tended more and more to throw on to the shoulders of Government duties which had hitherto been laid on the Church, the municipality, or the private citizen, had extended the operations of the Indian Government. Numerous fresh departments were created, and officials imported from England to fill them. These officials, many of them men of great ability and high education, were poorly paid and badly treated.

They were accordingly not over well affected to the Indian system, and particularly to the predominance of the Civil Service, to whose malignancy they attributed all their woes. Panditji observed the discord between the men of the dominant race with a pleased eye. He knew well how the spirit of faction will triumph over the calls of patriotism, loyalty, duty, and religion. Moreover, it was on the working of these very departments, useful indeed, but enforcing policies hateful to the Oriental, that he depended for the spread of disaffection among the masses.

This increase in governmental activity led necessarily to increased expenditure, and the finances of India were by no means robust. Many of the claims on it were payable in sterling, and the ratio of the standard coin of India, the rupee, to gold, was continually falling. In a Western country the loss of value of the current coin would have been compensated for by an automatic rise in the proceeds of the taxes already existing, or by the application of new taxation to the new areas thrown open by the change in the currency. This was not possible in India. The bulk of the revenue was the land revenue, which was fixed in some cases permanently, in others for periods of thirty years. Moreover, the rise in prices did not benefit to any very great extent the actual payer of the land revenue. Neither income tax nor sea customs

were very productive. The former was abhorrent to the people, and introduced only in obedience to imperious necessity. It was, moreover, easily evaded. The tariff was still an object of mistrust in England. It is unnecessary to plunge into the controversy whether the rupee had depreciated or the sovereign had appreciated. The question was merely academic. England as a creditor nation was in no case likely to become a convert to bimetallism, or to accept payment of anything but gold in liquidation of debts promised to be paid in that metal.

This embarrassment of the finances opened a vast field before Panditji. A king with an empty treasury is not very formidable to the foe. Nor is he long able to retain mercenary affection. Even loyalty if not well-watered with the streams of Pactolus is apt to droop. New taxation might be imposed. Few people who have hitherto escaped taxation like its extension to them. The Indian certainly does not, and abhors anything like a direct tax. New taxation would therefore create disaffection. Besides, the measures could easily be misrepresented in England. "Will the great British people continue to tolerate in their Empire, a gang of foreign blood-suckers, battenning on taxes wrung from the blood and sweat of the toiling millions of the East?" On the other hand, if fresh taxation was not imposed, the machine would soon cease to function, and an

administration which is bankrupt must be abolished. Panditji had probably read Carlyle's hymn on the Divinity of Bankruptcy.

The dual system of Courts had been abolished, and each important province was now provided with a High Court. The chief justice was an English barrister, and it was required that a certain minimum of the judges should be barristers, and a certain minimum civilians with judicial experience. The Court had original jurisdiction in the presidency towns, and appellate jurisdiction and a right of supervision over all the Courts in the province. It still, of course, retained its power of pronouncing on the validity of the Acts of the Government. The change was in itself beneficent enough, but there were possibilities which did not escape the attention of Panditji, and one of the results was largely to increase the wealth, power and influence of the Indian lawyers, a body extremely hostile to the administration.

Another cause of the enfeeblement of the Executive was a tendency which at first sight seemed to strengthen it. This was the progress of what is called centralisation. Just as the affairs of India were tending more and more to be directed from Whitehall, so the affairs of the provinces were tending more and more to be directed from Simla, and the affairs of the districts more and more from the provincial capital. Those who call the administration of India bureaucratic,

show merely that they do not know English, for the district officer was not, and is not yet, a mere functionary. Much depends on his initiative and personality, but there has been for long a tendency to fetter his initiative and check his personality. This was due partially to inevitable causes, the same namely as those which led to the growing dependence of India on England, and partly to the infusion of the Indian element into the administration. For the Oriental, as soon as he ceases to be a barbarian (and often before he ceases to be so), becomes essentially a bureaucrat and a paper-chewer. He is accustomed, that is, in the physical as well as in the religious sphere, to look for the "superior command." As soon as he finds it he is happy. Its existence frees him from that odious thing, responsibility. As he possesses no right of private judgment, so, if the superior command is absent, or is inapplicable to the particular case before him, then he has not the right of supplying what may possibly be an intentional omission. The best course in such a case is to do nothing. He cannot be blamed. It was necessary, therefore, for the superior directorate to exhaust themselves in imagining all kinds of hypothetical cases, and framing rules to meet them. But it is impossible to imagine all cases, and the more the directorate deal with isolated cases, the more the general principle becomes obscure.



Thus a functionary, finding a boy roasting a *purple* cat alive, will turn up his book of regulations and find that his duty is laid down only in the cases where the victim is a black, a white, a yellow, or a tabby cat. Being a humane man he will sigh and will shut the book with the remark, "The case is unforeseen," and return to the filling up of his forms. The less polished official would say, "This is shocking cruelty, and I cannot tolerate it." He would rescue the cat, extinguish the fire, and kick the boy, and would then sit down to justify these actions by extracting from the principles laid down in particular cases, the general principle which he conceived applied to cat-roasting in general. As long then as there was a continual flow of vigorous administrators employed in the higher executive branches, the progress of centralisation did little harm, and was often beneficial. When the administrators began to lose trust in the efficiency of the directorate, and particularly when the directorate began to show evident signs of, and intention to, sacrifice its local agents to agitation, then the evil effects of the process would no doubt become more pronounced. If a directorate wishes to be served by polished slaves it soon will be. Strong personalities can be eliminated, initiative, resource and daring can soon be atrophied. Thus we arrive at the white babudom of the times of Honorius.

Another evil of excessive centralisation, com-

plicated by the differentiation of the functions of government, was an increase of the departmental spirit. It is right and proper that the department and the departmental chief should think the work of that department the most important, and indeed the only thing of importance in the universe. Nothing is sacred for a sapper, and the P.W.D. would pull down the Taj itself for road-metal if there were no other equally convenient source of supply. The educationalist sees with a sigh money which might extend the blessings of education to the remotest villages wasted on cannon and manœuvres. The forest officer would like to see the people excluded from the richest lands, so that the mimosa plantations should flourish. This, as I say, is right and proper, but it is also right and proper that the directorate should control M. Josse. The activities of one department must be regulated in accordance with the general requirements of good government. The departmental spirit, having spread even to the Government of India, there was little or no check on the fanaticism of the departments, and popular prejudices and popular rights were likely to meet with very scanty consideration.

Moreover, the secretariat assumed an unhealthy importance, the secretaries often tending to eclipse the council which was constitutionally their master. The governor often preferred to apply

for information and guidance straight to the able expert, and only put before his council a scheme which had taken shape already during these irregular confabulations. Here again was an element of weakness in the administration. Moreover, the secretariat became rapidly divorced from actuality. A clever young man was taken up to the Olympian heights, and passed for the whole of his service from one staff billet to another, never again returning to the inglorious, uncomfortable, unremunerative, yet vital district work. From the secretariat were chosen the members of council, and it was thus easy and common for a man to spend thirty-five years in India, and rise to supreme control of a great province, and yet know little more of India and the Indians than he would have known had he spent those years in Whitehall. The Simla body, as the supreme directorate and its staff may generically be called, was a small and select band, and like all such coteries, was engaged in an endless internecine struggle for posts and decorations. As usual in such communities, the petticoat played an important part, and the wearer of the petticoat was not always free from the imputation of irregular influence. In such an atmosphere no great policy can be conceived and produced. With difficulty, through the noise of the grinding of axes, can be heard the footfall of the approaching barbarian, or the challenge

of the sentinel. Truth is apt to be disagreeable, and to say disagreeable things in polite society is really unpardonable. If any rough, blunt officer spoke his mind, the perturbation of all was piteous to behold.

During the period under consideration, the Government of India was not entirely imprisoned in the seraglios of Simla and Delhi. It spent part of the year in Calcutta, where it was to a certain extent in touch with healthy public opinion. But the public opinion of Calcutta was, in some respects, misleading. It is the most provincial of the great capitals of the empire, and has always regarded the rest of India as a sort of appendage to Our Lady of the Hoogli. This corrective was, therefore, not very effective, and such as it was, it was soon to be removed. The seat of the directorate then abounded in very able men, great writers of minutes, supreme intriguers, capable functionaries, but there was a complete lack of statesmen.

These evils were still mainly in germ, and it still appeared that, given a continuance of peace, the machine might function. But peace was denied to it.

Russia, crossed in Europe, began as usual a period of expansion in Asia, and her intrigues spread to Afghanistan. Afghan affairs had been sadly mishandled since the Mutiny, and ruler and nobles were, by such bad handling, converted

from willing friends into very mistrustful foes. Hence these intrigues were not unfruitful. A mere glance at the map (and the larger the scale the better) will convince any one who has the most rudimentary knowledge of strategic geography that India would be untenable if Afghanistan were strong and hostile, or were the outpost of a great and potentially hostile civilized power. My own belief is that, even at the eleventh hour, Shir Ali might have been converted into a friend; or, if that were impossible, that, with a little expense and diplomacy, a friendly Amir might have been enthroned. The Government of the time, however, decided on war, and, as usual, found that it was easy enough to win victories over the Afghan armies, but not so easy to make peace. The campaign, successful enough on the whole, and indeed abounding in brilliant military feats, dragged on without much prospect of conclusion; and in the meantime a bitter, unscrupulous, and factious agitation was being carried on in England against the policy of the Home Government and the Government of India. The elections proved unfavourable to the party in power. The policy was reversed, the Viceroy resigned, and the British evacuated Afghanistan in circumstances which made every one believe that they had been driven out. From '79, therefore, must be dated the beginning of a belief among the Indians

that the Raj was not invincible, and that the Home Government were prepared to accept defeat if it seemed that to try to conquer would be expensive or dangerous. It is not good that subject races should be taught this lesson.

This idea was, of course, strengthened by the results of Majuba and Khartum, as also by the Penjdeh incident.

Towards the end of this epoch fall also the victory of the Abyssinians over the Italians, and the successful campaign of Turkey against the Greeks. These were the first successes won by Oriental races against the Latins or the Franks for over two centuries, and it looked as if a new epoch was beginning. Meanwhile, no one could be blind to the rise of Japan. Here was an Oriental country which had been of no account, apparently destined merely to be a rich field for exploitation by some restless predatory Frankish nation. It had been wise enough, while preserving with care its essential Orientalism, to learn the arts of the West; and in the short space of thirty years it was a menace to Frankish predominance in the whole Pacific. There was, therefore, nothing wonderful about these Franks. It was not true that God had given to the Franks a charter whereby their perpetual dominion was secured. That dominion, like any other dominion, was a precarious thing granted and revocable at the will of the Lord, and it seemed as if it might

now be the case that the Lord was tired of the Franks. An evil day was the day of Tsushima for the usurpers of eastern lands from Fez to Hong-Kong. It was not only the Russians who were led captive through the streets of Port Arthur. All this it is true was in the future, but the future can be foreseen.

One of the results of these wars and menaces of wars was a change in the composition and distribution of the Indian Army. That army had been considerably cut down after the Mutiny. Many of its functions had been transferred to the civil police. One of the *sequelæ* of the Afghan war was an excessive contempt for the soldierly qualities of any man born south of the Vindhya. The Hindustanis were already mistrusted, owing to their part in the Mutiny. Towards the end of this period the army was centralised under one Commander-in-Chief, and the views of Simla, already partially realised, were put into full force. The area of recruitment was much reduced, and the army drawn more and more from a few races, some of which were not Indians at all. In such a body disaffection might spread rapidly, and if it led to an outbreak there would be no such power as those who dealt with the Mutiny possessed, of playing off caste against caste, religion against religion, Presidency against Presidency. An honourable and lucrative profession was closed to spirited young men who did not belong to the

favoured communities, and there were vast areas of India over which the sight of a soldier was as unusual as the sight of a dinosaur. Few people believe in the existence of a power which is not shown, and whole populations in India believed that the Raj had no military force. This illusion was fostered by the necessity of cantoning the troops in remote areas in the north-west where they could at once be moved into Afghanistan, or beyond the borders of that country, if occasion demanded. European troops were more numerous than they had been, but they were not the tough old veterans of pre-Cardwell days, and the Indian, who did not know how these boys could fight, felt a certain contempt for them.

There had also been serious disagreement between the Civil Government and the soldiers, which was, however, to bear fruit only later.

As Panditji did not contemplate a renewal of the experiment of '57, the condition of the army was indifferent to him. He watched, however, with pleasure the resurgence of the East, and the lessons of Majuba and of Candahar were by no means lost on him.

The worst of summing up in a few pages the history of forty years, is that a false impression is apt to be created. The Government of the Raj was still strong and respected. It was still performing a very beneficent task. External foes were excluded; disorder was rare; solvency was



somehow maintained; wealth and prosperity increased; the European official, if not loved, was respected and appealed to as an impartial arbiter. The British people had in no way lost faith in themselves or their mission. Discontent and unrest there was in India, but it was vague and unorganised. It was confined to a few classes. To the countless millions of peasants, and those in close touch with the peasants—that is to say, to all the population of India except about a million souls,—the Raj appeared a cold abstraction which was somehow beneficent. People do not love cold abstractions, particularly Orientals. But even Orientals appreciate beneficence. The population showed not the slightest desire to shake off the English dominion, and any proposal to transfer a British district to the most enlightened and progressive native state elicited the most vigorous protests. To continue our metaphor, Panditji was looking about him, and summing up the situation, but had not yet decided on the line of attack. There was an apathetic content about the population which must be broken. But that could only be done by the descent of the spirit of God on to the sleeping waters, and there seemed at present no likelihood of the birth of a redeemer.

The Indian administration were aware of the cryptic activities of Panditji, but they despised him. This was reasonable enough. To the request of Panditji, "Evacuate the country that

I may take your place," they could reply, "The people prefer us to stay here." To the allegation, "I shall make a better ruler than you," there was the obvious retort, "There is no evidence that this is so." To the argument, "The people require a national Government," the reply was, "The people would not shed a single drop of blood, or spend a single rupee, to instal such a Government." But the Indian Government on its remote Olympian heights did not observe the working of certain causes which might, in the long-run, arm Panditji with considerable support, or if it did so observe them, it was unable or unwilling to counteract them. The practical statesman, and particularly the British statesman, is apt to look only to the *act*. But the act is unimportant except as the result of a *thought*. It is thought that destroys empires, and constructs them anew. It is the Logos and not the Demiurgos that is the Destroyer and Creator. The ideas of Panditji were spreading. This malignant energy possessed a fecundating property, and the god might be born.

And there were many agencies at work preparing a matrix which would be duly receptive of the Spermatic Word.

English education was spreading. It had been decided as early as the thirties that it was the duty of the Government to open the doors of the temple of knowledge to their subjects. The men

who were responsible for this were both ignorant and contemptuous of Oriental culture, and were apparently unaware of the existence of the vernaculars. Their object was twofold. In the first place, they wished to create a class from which useful subordinates might be selected, and next they hoped that the Western culture (which was so obviously superior to the Oriental) might communicate itself through the medium of the instructed few to the eager many. In no other way had European culture come into existence in Europe than by the spread of ideas from a small educated class to the ignorant and barbarous masses. They foresaw a certain danger to European supremacy from this process, but the danger they foresaw was not the danger which actually arose. They thought, that is, that the European culture would rapidly oust the Oriental culture, and that the Indian would become a European. In that case there could of course be no excuse for the continuance of European control in India. But there would be no reason to desire such continuance. England would obviously have fulfilled her mission.

Science was not much esteemed in the thirties, and neither Mendel nor Weismann had yet delivered their message. The best intellects were still obsessed by human perfectibility illusions. They were perfectly aware that if you cut off a man's arms, his son will nevertheless be born with

two arms. But they imagined that education of the individual would extinguish, not only in him but also in his progeny, those deep-seated racial memories which are instincts. The matter is still obscure, but it is pretty certain that you cannot, by modifying the individual, affect the stock, except perhaps by a long process of selection and a suitable change of environment. A dominant race could no doubt supply itself with a perpetual succession of one-armed slaves, but that could only be by performing the operation of amputation on every child of the servile stock after birth.

It is extremely doubtful whether this process, if persisted in for a thousand years and applied rigorously, say, to the left arm, would result at the end of that time in a tendency in the servile stock to produce children whose left arms were in any way less robust than those of the masters. It was clear then that literary culture applied to a few males in each generation could in no way modify the instincts of that stock.

The experiment had been tried, accompanied also with interbreeding on a grand scale and a total change of intellectual environment (neither of which were attempted in India) on several occasions. Syria had been Hellenised. Egypt had been first exposed to Hellenistic, and then to Romano-Hellenic culture. Arab civilization had taken root and borne copious fruit and flowers in Spain. As soon as the foreign domination was

removed the culture perished in a day. The like fate would surely attend in India the superficial European culture. There was no real danger of the creation of a permanent stock of intellectual mestizos.

The real danger was quite other. Impotent permanently to modify the Oriental culture, the foreign culture would work as an irritant poison in the society affected by it. The society, therefore, would make convulsive efforts to get rid of it. Hostility would grow towards the foreign culture, and also to the domination which was poisoning society with a drug which was all the more dangerous because it was attractive.

Unhappy is the individual who is the result of a physical cross between two disparate stocks. Every cell is the theatre of a civil war. Hardly less unhappy is he whose intellect has accepted, but whose instincts reject, a foreign culture. It is therefore among the Orientals who are educated in Frankish lore, and particularly among those who have been educated in Europe and have returned thence to the East, that there is to be found the most bitter hatred of the Frank and of Frankish civilization.

This is true of the Oriental who is the subject of a free Oriental country, and the result was even more probable in the case of the Indian. Clever, studious, and intelligent to a certain point, he was able rapidly to absorb the foreign culture,

and in the class-room and the examination-hall he could easily beat his British fellow-students. Yet the British Government, which with perfect justification did not admit that superior literacy was any sign of superior administrative ability, or of superior character, showed evident signs of confining him to the inferior branches of the administration. This he probably thought was unjust, and if he admitted the justice he rebelled against the cruelty. Cruelty there was, though the cruelty of nature, not of the British Government; but he who is suffering from the agonies of wounded self-esteem is apt to attack the thing nearest at hand to which he can with any reason attribute his sufferings.

The net result, therefore, of this experiment was that a few individuals became thoroughly occidentalised, and had consequently much to bear from their Oriental kinsfolk and associates. A much larger mass became, more or less, superficially occidentalised, and in proportion as the virus had penetrated more deeply, so they loathed the Western culture and all that it stood for.

Moreover, quite apart from this acerbation of racial feelings by the conflict of jarring cultures, the culture, and the men by whom it was communicated, were not such as to render the pupils very satisfied with the Indian system.

The culture was English—that is, it was permeated with Whig and Liberal ideas all very

unfavourable to racial predominance, despotism, and bureaucracy. Such a culture was easily convertible into a means of propaganda of vague humanitarian, atheistic, and subversive ideas, masquerading under the form of democracy and self-determination. These ideas were abhorrent to the Oriental, and banners inscribed with those strange devices have time after time gone down before the might of the armed slaves of God and slaves of the King of Kings. But it was difficult for the Indian Government, and still more for the British Government, to reply otherwise than by the rather ineffective *argumentum baculinum* when some bright young B.A. asked, "By what authority do you hold us in subjection? If it is the name of your superior culture, that culture itself is hostile to your claims."

Much difficulty might have been avoided had there been a wise choice of instructors, but the instructors were by no means friendly to the administration. The Government was rather contemptuous of education, and exercised little or no supervision over the choice of the teachers, or their methods when appointed. Many of the officials of the educational department were men of great attainments, who might easily, if they had wished, have passed into the Civil Service. Yet they found on arrival in India that they were totally neglected, badly paid, and treated as a sort of inferior caste. They resented this, and

their resentment was reflected in their teaching. With this Government did not interfere. Priding themselves on their impartiality, they left the universities very independent, and many of the colleges became active centres of subversive propaganda. Despotisms are apt to make this mistake, from which democracies are generally wholly free. That is because they regard only the overt act. The Indian despotism, used as it was to tolerate all sorts of opinions and ideas, reserving to itself only the right to punish any illegal act which was the manifestation of the antecedent ideas, did not see the necessity, and perhaps did not possess the ability, to check the spread of ideas which, unlike the old ones, were not likely to manifest themselves in actions which were plainly criminal according to the *jus gentium*. The new ideas were extremely likely ultimately to realise themselves in actions, but those actions, though criminal according to the law of the land, might appeal to a higher tribunal, and if that appeal were made in the holy name of liberty, it might well be successful.

The result then of this process was that a large class of Indians was coming into existence who hated the Government. Its hate was partially a hatred for an institution which induced them to accept a culture which they felt was poisonous, and yet refused to accept them as equals. Partially it was caused by resentment of a hypocrisy which,



while continually hymning the praises of liberty and democracy, nevertheless denied to them the rights which liberty and democracy seemed to promise them. From this class were selected all the inferior agents of Government, and many of the superior agents. The judiciary was filled with them. The schools and colleges were almost entirely in their hands. The Bar was recruited almost exclusively from their ranks. The press was owned by them. They could with ease represent their case in England. Against all this menace the Government opposed nothing, either in the material or in the spiritual sphere. It was this class that was Panditji's *agema*.

Another department, the importance of which was neglected, was the judicial. Government had rather a scorn of it. The constitution and the powers of the High Court have already been given. Below this, there was in every district a district judge—a member of the Civil Service. With the subordinate judiciary we are not concerned. The collector and his assistants had considerable magisterial and police powers. There was an appeal from the magistrates to the Sessions (District) Court, and from the District Court to the High Court. Suits against Government were brought either in the High Court or the District Courts. Important criminal cases were tried according to venue, either in the District or the High Court. The civilian judges were

often men who had been found unsatisfactory in the executive branch, and the judicial department was regarded as rather a penal settlement. Once there, they were totally neglected by Government, and neither rewards nor honours fell to them. This, while perhaps good for their impartiality, did not make them particularly devoted to the Executive Government. The whole department from the High Court downwards seemed to have adopted as its motto the novel maxim, *boni judicis est intercedere*. This was a survival of the old Whig days, when legislation was comparatively unknown, and the law courts were the scene of many a victory or defeat of the contending factions. In such a state of affairs an impartial readiness on the part of the judiciary to butcher any one who could be brought within the four corners of some law, however obsolete, or to acquit any one, however notorious his guilt, could he but find some technical defence, was, of course, highly valued.

The courts in India displayed much ingenuity in interpreting the law so as to secure the acquittal of notorious criminals, and also a jealous scrutiny of the acts of the Executive. Heavy damages were given against officials who had exceeded their legal powers, and even against some who had not. Injunctions were freely issued prohibiting the exercise of executive powers. At present this tendency (which is an excellent check

on a despotism, however wise and beneficent) led to little more than an interesting sort of parlour-game—the Executive, through its creature the legislature, attempting to draft statutes which would bind the courts, and the court then in high glee driving a coach and four through them. But it is clear that this game might turn to deadly earnest. Suppose there was not a docile legislature, and that, consequently, powers proved to be inadequate could not be extended? Suppose that the tribunals were manned by men who were not merely frondeurs, but were hostile to the Empire? In such a case the Executive Government might be wholly paralysed. In one province it was already almost impossible to obtain a conviction for sedition or any political crime. Suppose this symptom occurred in all the provinces, and became accentuated? Both the District Courts and the High Courts were becoming filled with Indians, and with Indians who had a strong bias against the Government. These men were learned and able, and incorruptible, and, as far as any man can be, impartial. But this might not always be the case. The judges were selected from the Bar after the English fashion (unknown save in Anglo-Saxondom), and the Bar was filled with proselytes of, and sympathisers with, Panditji. The time had not yet come when European blood was considered as a disqualification for high judicial office, but

it was evidently approaching. Foolish is the ruler who entrusts the sword of justice to hostile hands.

India is cursed, and always has been cursed, with a seditious press. The English were the first offenders. Nothing can exceed in scurrility some of the rags of the time of Hastings. There was not likely to be reputable journalism at a time when at first the offender could be expelled from the country by the mere *fiat* of the Executive, or when later the journalist was controlled by a severe censorship. These checks were removed and a more reputable English journalism sprang up. The journals were, however, still anti-Governmental, although the majority of contributors to them were themselves Government servants. It is always more interesting to read a condemnation than a panegyric, and all people like rather to dwell on the faults than the virtues of their friends. Anti-Governmental writing, therefore, paid, and was therefore supplied in vast quantities. This peculiarity was copied by the Indian press, which was freed by the same measure as that which had freed the English press. There were *some* reputable Indian papers, but too many of them depended for existence on blackmail and indecent advertisements. As an inducement to subscribers they gave, not news-service, which was expensive, but endless and venomous diatribes against the Government and individual officers.

The editor, who was often also the proprietor, the printer, the reporter, the leader writer, and the office boy, was generally a member of the literate classes who had picked up some small smattering of education, but whose attainments or influence were not sufficient to obtain for him the humblest Government post. As time went on, the columns of the vernacular press teemed with libels, incitements to rebellion, and to murder.

Government, which had regarded these ignorant and malicious effusions with amused contempt, somewhat tardily took alarm and passed an act to control the vernacular press. The result was magical. The overt preaching of sedition and the sacred duty of murder ceased at once. This fact was made the excuse for repealing the act (in the sacred name of Milton) by the next administration, on the hypocritical pretence that it was no longer necessary. The fact, I suppose, that no one has yet broken into the vaults of the Bank of England is an excellent reason for abolishing those vaults.

I do not wish to enter into the controversy as to the benefits of a free press. I am acquainted with the arguments in favour of liberty, but I do say that a free press and despotism are incompatible. Further, I do say that the existence of a free press and a foreign dominion are incompatible. These may be excellent reasons

for abolishing the despotism, and for removing the foreign dominion, but you cannot have both. In the case of India, however, the matter is purely academical, because no native government would, for a moment, tolerate any hostile criticism.

Government, having thus freed the press from preliminary censorship, still reserved the right of prosecution for the crimes of sedition, abetting murder, criminal libel, and the like; but it never exercised it. A formal trial gave an agreeable advertisement to the erring sheet, and was really equivalent to a Government subvention. Such a trial also spread the doctrines which were the subject of the prosecution far and wide. And the courts practically refused to convict in any case, however grave.

Government had yet a third weapon at their disposal, that of counter-propaganda. But this it never applied. By this time it had got hardened to ill-instructed and malignant criticism, and thought it might safely neglect it. There was supposed to be something "un-English" about a subventioned newspaper or a Government organ. The foulest calumnies and most dangerous incitements were allowed to be spread freely among an ignorant and excitable population, without check and without antidote. Here again was a sad instance of the unwise tendency of Government to consider only the act, and not the idea. During the whole of this period the

Government of India reserved in its own hands the right of sanctioning prosecutions in press cases, and such sanction was never accorded, even at the most pressing requests of the provincial governments. Only in the rarest cases was an injured private individual, who happened also to be a Government servant, allowed to appeal to the courts for protection against the most wicked and groundless accusations.

As a means of propagating disaffection among the literate classes, and even among those who, not themselves readers of papers, had friends who were, this system could hardly be rivalled. As a means of preparing the ground for intensive agitation Panditji welcomed it.

The trade of India had been thrown open, and there was a great increase in such trade, the more so as increased transport facilities rendered the export of bulky staples possible. The jute fibre had been made available for the purposes of commerce by European science. Tea had been planted by English enterprise. The American Civil War had revealed India's potentialities as a cotton exporting country. There had been a great increase of wealth, and much of that wealth was invested in industries in India. There was also a great influx of European merchants and agents.

The Europeans were mainly Scotch Radicals, and they cordially disliked the Government. In the first place, the ideas of the Government were

not those of Glasgow or Dundee; in the next place, the Government was rather distrustful of the European man of affairs, both by tradition, because it feared the growth of a naturalised European community, and because it feared that the individual European might oppress, in pursuit of gain, the Indian, and thus lead to discords. There had been much trouble in this respect with the indigo concerns. Mistrust begat distrust, and the European suspected that the Government was inclined to favour the Indian at his expense, and attributed to a reactionary bureaucratic spirit what the Government supposed to be necessary and reasonable limitations on the right of private exploitation. A very serious cause of hostility was the childish feeling of pique that private merchants, however rich, did not figure on the lists of precedence; and that, therefore, at public and state functions, their wives were liable to be "sent in" after the wives of very humble Government officers. *Tantæne animis?* Remember the history of the Roman consulate. The whole of this body was therefore ill-affected to the Government, and not unwilling to embarrass it. On the other hand, in certain cases its practices were by no means such as commended the nationality which it represented to the Indian. Among a large community there must be some black sheep, and one fraudulent bankrupt, one perjurer, one insurance robber, one swindler, stood out in particular black-



ness against a spotless background. And it was on these very exceptional cases that the Indian was likely to concentrate when he was considering the claims of the foreigner to continue to rule owing to his superior morality.

The new Indian mercantile community had also what it imagined to be just grounds for dissatisfaction. Its money was invested in cotton mills, and in both the processes carried on in those mills it was exposed to the rivalry of Manchester. India had been for long a great market for Manchester goods, and Manchester was not particularly anxious to lose that market. The principles of Christianity and the principles of Cobden prohibited active discouragement of this nascent Indian industry, but the same principles prohibited the introduction into India of anything like a tariff which might operate as protection to Indian manufactures.

You had then the unedifying spectacle of a Government, forced by sheer necessity to raise revenue by a tariff, anxiously exploring how much import-duty sharkfins and scrivellos could bear, and yet refusing to impose any duty on articles which formed the bulk of the imports. When the same necessity drove the British Government into permitting taxation of Manchester mill products, it coupled the permission with the condition that an equivalent excise duty should be raised on the products of Indian mills. This was galling to the pride and deleterious to the profits of the

Indian mill-owners. The political Indian noted that after all to India was not conceded the financial liberty which was the right of the smallest white colony—of Newfoundland or the Falklands. That the whole population, and particularly the peasants, profited by cheap clothes, did not interest him.

The Indian did not prove a very good captain of industry. Numerous limited liability companies were formed, and entrusted to the management of Indian managing agents, on which the Indian system confers unwholesomely large powers. The agent often used the capital put at his disposal for frantic speculation. If the speculation was successful, the lion's share of the profits went to him. If unsuccessful, then the loss fell on the creditors and the shareholders. Hence widespread ruin. In India, the Government is regarded as a sort of superhuman being, all-wise and all-powerful. When any disaster then occurs which affects large classes of the population, those classes are naturally apt to doubt its beneficence.

The effect of these industrial changes were disastrous to many. India was still the country of the hand worker. The condition of many of these people became truly pitiable, especially that of the weavers. Their foreign market was lost long ago, and their home market was now threatened, both by foreign competition and by the competition of Indian mills. They were precluded from enter-

ing new occupations by the caste system. They lingered on in misery. Government were unable to do much for them, and made no attempts to do so. It was not among these classes, who were really hard hit, not by the foreign domination but by the same set of causes which had made it possible, that active disaffection spread; but starving operatives would furnish on a day of disorder no insignificant body of street-fighters. So also would the new element in Indian society—the factory hand where he existed. The factory hand came from the most depressed classes of the population. He was taken away from his village, where he was exposed to and fettered by the influences of the caste and social system, and thrown pell-mell into a great town where there were few restraints. He got what to him was an enormous pay. There, too often, he learned how to drink, and an attachment to other vices. He was the victim of oppression from manager and foreman. He was the golden sheep of the slum landlord. The class did not become hopelessly demoralised, first, because the Indian is naturally moral and religious in his way, and according to the *jus gentium*, law-abiding. He was also not permanently domiciled in the industrial towns. He kept up close connection with his home, and his one ambition was to make enough in the mills to return to his little village and buy lands there; but he was not the member, while in Bombay or Cawnpore, of a com-

munity. He was a mere unit in a mob, and as such was easily inflammable. The extension of the factory system in India, therefore, furnished Panditji with a valuable force for the purpose of street-fighting, and he was totally indifferent, so the mill hands fought, whether they killed or were killed. In fact, he preferred of the two contingencies, the latter. A massacre of Europeans by mill hands might, even in Labour circles at home, excite resentment. A massacre of mill hands by the arms of the Government might easily be represented as an atrocity.

Social changes were added to these political and industrial changes. There were many visitors to India, and many Indians went to England, either for study, or intrigue, or for recreation. The two peoples were getting to know one another better, and, as is usual in the case of peoples who are very disparate, began to dislike one another all the more. The Indian was at first, when he was a rarity, a lion or a pet in English society; but views soon changed, and he became something like a pariah. He was confined there also to the society of his own countrymen, or to that of classes of the European community which were not the most admirable. In England he was also exposed to the seductions of cosmopolitan subversivism. If he returned at all, he returned filled with loathing for England, and Western civilization in general.

Of course in a society like England, where wealth is so important and a new sensation is so prized, there were always certain sections who would welcome any foreigner whatever his colour, or character, or antecedents, so long as he was wealthy, and generous and amusing; and Indian chiefs and nobles found themselves treated with an enthusiasm in exalted circles which they could not expect to win in their own country. This did not tend to make them any more satisfied with the system in force in India. It is galling after you have been the friend of dukes and the intimate of countesses, to be told by some subordinate official of the Government that you really must not roast your step-grandmother or your salute will be cut down.

Moreover, the arrogant contempt of the ordinary Anglo-Indian for the culture—literary, artistic, political, religious and social—of the East could not but gall an Oriental who now knew how shallow, and in many ways contemptible and false, was the boasted culture of the West.

To sum up, then, results of all these causes: there was during this period a considerable influx of Westernism which pressed hard on a decrepit Oriental society. This influx, at first welcomed, soon became distasteful, and finally unendurable. It was necessarily odious to the orthodox, but it soon became equally so to those classes that had accepted it at first, but had found it poisonous.

There was thus a real reaction, and that reaction took the form of nationalism.

Nationalism was a spurious product in India. There being no Indian nation, there could obviously be no real nationalism. There could be no national soul capable of positive achievements. But there was a sort of negative nationalism. The inhabitants of the sub-continent were divided into many races, creeds, and castes. But much as they might differ among themselves, various as their instincts, inconsistent as their ideals might be, there were certain things which were disliked by all of them.

“I am a pagan, you are a Mussulman, X is an animist, but we are none of us Christians. I am a polygamist, you are a polyandrist, X is a universalist, we are none of us monogamists. I wear a cap, you wear a turban, X goes bare-headed, but we none of us wear a hat. I would rather die than be ruled by you, you would rather die than be ruled by me, and X would rather die than be ruled by either of us. But we are all excluded from the Government alike. Would it not be possible for us to combine against the Christian, monogamist, hat-wearing monopolists, leaving for subsequent decision our own differences?”

In this way a sort of nationalistic spirit sprung up. Being merely negative and destructive, it could accomplish nothing positive. But the

nationalist party, impotent in the material sphere, might well become powerful in the moral sphere. It had no real root in the country. It could not call to arms one soldier. It could not attract to its coffers one rupee. It might, the Government thought, safely be left in the sterile bog to which it was condemned by the very condition of its existence. The Government was unaware that an idea, even an idea of pure destruction (which is, after all, often the necessary precursor of a creative idea), is an enemy that can by no means be despised.

The party was wide-spread, indeed covered the whole of India. It had a common vernacular English. In possession of the press, the schools, and the bar, invading the administration and the judiciary, and in touch with powerful English parties, its influence bore no proportion to its material strength. All that was for the present necessary was to provide it with some sort of organization.

It is unnecessary to go into the history of the Ilbert Bill, though the subject would repay careful study by those who wish to learn how not to do things. The dispute, however, which was the right of Indians to try Europeans for offences committed by the latter, raised the racial question in an acute form. Government, finding among the Europeans factious opposition to a reform which it thought just and necessary,

appealed to the support of "enlightened Indian opinion." This naturally supported Government on that subject through thick and thin. The Government valued this support, and thought it might prove useful to it in the career of mild liberalisation which it intended to follow in Indian administration, and hoped also that the same support might be extended to the administration in general. "The Indians are now thoroughly convinced that we mean well to them. Being intelligent men, they will, of course, co-operate with us. We shall thus be able to win for our other measures popular support, which will strengthen our hands both in India and at home. The administration will, and must, remain a despotism, but a despotism considerate of the opinions of enlightened public opinion, and therefore supported by it." The Congress, therefore, came into existence with the sympathy and support of those in power.

The Congress was a convention of the literate party. Delegates were elected from those who paid in each district a small subscription, and these delegates met for a few days in each year at some important centre to debate and pass resolutions.

The Congress, as a whole, as is natural with a representative body, possessed in an aggravated form the qualities of its constituents. Some men there may have been who were statesmen, but



there was nothing constructive about the policy of the Congress. It sought the removal of grievances, but it never referred to the grievances which actually pressed on the people. Not a word was said as to agricultural indebtedness, or the condition of the artisan, or the oppression of the courts. In that body the people were not represented and had no voice.

Its staple product was vague, hostile, and merely negative criticism of the Government. It had certainly a list of stock grievances which were trotted out year after year. They were not grievances which weighed heavily on the people, but they all had this in common, that they referred to conditions which were inseparable from a foreign dominion. They were also such as were condemnable in the eyes of liberalism.

Thus there was a clamour for the separation of executive and judicial functions. That meant actually the subordination of the Executive Government to the judiciary, and the judiciary was to be exclusively Indian. There was a demand for simultaneous examinations for recruitment of the Civil Service to be held in India and in England. That meant the rapid substitution of the Indian for the European element in the imperial agency, and ultimately in the directorate. The repeal or substantial modification of the Arms Act was another plank. The reasons given were that to disarm the people was to emasculate

them. The idea of the literate classes, however well-armed, opposing equally well-armed Pathans and Rohillas was amusing, as was also the idea that the possession of a revolver would increase the virility of a bunnia or Parbhu. The possession of arms by the people would indeed facilitate murders of Europeans and even rebellions. The sale of liquor was attacked by men who themselves either never drank liquor, or drank it to excess secretly; because prohibition would make the Government unpopular among the low castes, would bring its agents into continual conflict with peasant smugglers, and seriously reduce the income of the Government, which might thus be forced to introduce protection.

Local self-government had been introduced by the Indian Government. Councils partly elective and partly nominated under the control of the district officers had been set up all over India, both in great cities and in rural areas. They had financial and administrative powers. Here was an opportunity for the Indian to show his capacity for self-government. The elective members were mostly men of the Congress type. They clearly demonstrated that the old defects of the Indian, which had ruined all the native Governments, were as strong as ever. The same dilatoriness, the same corruption, the same nepotism, the same lack of public spirit, the same sacrifice of the common thing to caste and race prejudices were here to

be found, and the bodies only functioned because they were under strict tutelage. The Congress, instead of trying to make these bodies a success, clamoured merely for extension of the powers exercised by such, and for removal of the control and guidance of the district officers. The Congress, in fact, performed no very useful function.

It was, however, the spiritual home of the disaffected party. It served a useful purpose in bringing together and systematising all the vague resentments felt in every quarter of the empire. It enabled the leaders to get into touch with one another, to settle the lines of agitation, to propagate sedition, and by convening the primaries, and by dictating to them the machine-made resolutions which they were to pass, gave to seditious agitation a superficial appearance of widespread public support. It was, however, very sectional. Instituted by Parsis and Europeans, it soon became the organ of the literate Hindu. It attracted few Muhammadans, and no Hindus of the land-holding and commercial classes. It was significant that among this body which was so eloquent on democracy, progress, enlightenment, and the like, no word was heard as to social reform. At first there had been a hope that the Congress might prove a rallying-ground for those who wished not only to reform the Indian Government but to reform Oriental society. The Congress, many of the members of which were

very lax Hindus, watched with jealous eyes any attack by Government on Hindu prejudices and superstitions. Any member of their body who hinted a word as to the abolition of child-marriage, re-marriage of widows, intercourse with Europeans, relaxation of inhuman caste rules, was howled down; and the same papers which contained eloquent passages, worthy of Burke, on the rights of the people to liberty, contained also eloquent panegyrics on sati. Western institutions were praised, Western civilization held up as odious and ridiculous. The brotherhood of man and the duty of expelling the foreigner were preached in the columns of the same organ.

The Government were not alarmed. The Congress attracted chiefly the pleader class. It did not seem likely that from among the "practitioners of petty and provincial chicanery" any leader would arise who would attack the citadel of empire. It forgot that, under exactly similar leadership, the people of Paris had stormed the Bastille. True, the Bastille would never have fallen had the garrison been staunch and the Government firm; but was it certain that the garrison of the Indian citadel would always be staunch and the Home Government firm?

The title of Congresswala expressed both among Indians and Europeans a sort of contemptuous dislike, but a similar opprobrium had at one time attached in England to the titles of "Repealer,"

“Teetotaller,” and “Methody.” Empires in difficulties seek strange allies.

It was not, however, to the activities of the Congress that Panditji looked directly for redemption. This party was useful, nay necessary to his purposes, but the British Empire must be shaken by a lever which was not of laths, and the Rulers must be terrified into submission by terrors more formidable than those of a painted mask.

## CHAPTER VI.

## THE REVOLT.

AND now in India the revolt against Western civilization began. That civilization was pressing hard on the East, and it was abhorrent to the Oriental.

Western civilization is compounded of many and diverse ingredients. It derives at three removes from Judæa, at two removes from Hellas, and at one remove or directly from Rome. Mixed with these ingredients are certain other Semitic aliments and traces of barbarism. Hellenism has, however, leavened the whole mass.

The primitive ideas from which this civilization is formed are these :—

The Gods are living things. They are neither metaphysical creations, nor bodiless abstractions. They are and reign.

The relation of the God to man is not that of master to slave. It is that of father to son, or perhaps that of a gracious leader to a free and loyal follower. Man has rights against the God,

and the God has duties towards man. The clemency of God is not the clemency of the prudent slave-owner or the capricious despot, it is the effect of a love resembling that which unites an affectionate father and an affectionate son.

The universe is neither the creation of an evil spirit, nor is it an illusion. It exists outside the consciousness of both the God and man. It is a beautiful place, and the city of God. The beneficence of the God is shown in this, principally, that the phenomenal universe is so full of beauty, and is also so full of things which subserve the happiness of man. Evil exists, no doubt. That we cannot explain. The good much exceeds the evil, and human effort may diminish evil. Very possibly evil merely exists because the God knew that there is a delight in conflict, and therefore made man a fighter, and gave him an antagonist.

The God governs the universe by law, and consequently man is subject to law. But this law is not a crushing necessity. The God has left the will of man free. He can choose the good or choose the evil. If he choose the good he will survive; if he choose the evil he will perish. There is no absolute good and evil: it is for man to find out what is good and what is evil at the moment.

It is to help him to do so that civil governments exist. The God has, of course, therefore decreed

that there should be civil governments, and all such governments are God-appointed. But he has not given over men as slaves to their rulers. Ruler and subject have correlative duties. The God does not will rebellion, but he does not will tyranny. The God has not expressed preference for any form of government. That is the best form which at the moment preserves order while allowing progress. At present, and for the moment, democratical forms of government assure this.

There may be a law antecedent to the laws. With this man is not concerned. Man progresses, and as he progresses he needs new laws. It is the principal duty of man, as a political animal, to ascertain what laws hamper progress, and what new laws are needed to encourage it.

Just, therefore, as man is a slave neither of God nor of the king, so he is not a slave to any divine and immutable law.

Man is therefore a free creature, and mixes in society with other free creatures, subject only to mild restraints. His relation to his brethren, therefore, is not that of status. He is a free agent. He is, therefore, free also to limit his freedom by contract. Having once given his word, he must not break it. That would, in reality, be to surrender his own freedom. If he attempts to do so, both law and religion will restrain him.

Man is provided with senses, and there are in



the universe many objects which please those senses. It is right and proper that he should thus gratify himself. It is for this very reason that things delightful were made. But he must gratify them in accordance with the principle that he is a free man among free men, and that he may damage neither himself nor others. In this respect, therefore, he must obey religion and the laws.

You must so use your own, that you do no harm to others. No man, and no order of man, has the right to monopolise the beauty and pleasure of the universe. There must be equal opportunity for all. It is unfortunately the case that there is among men no equality of faculty.

Art makes permanent that part of the beauty and joy of the universe which is transitory. It interprets this to those who need such interpretation. To the artist is given the vision. It is for him to express that vision in symbols. It is for him to find appropriate symbols. But to us Greek methods of interpretation are at present most intelligible. The artist who expresses his vision in symbols unintelligible to the many is a traitor to his vows.

It is the duty of man to enquire. The universe is full of strange powers and substances, the virtues of which are not yet fully known. It is for man to turn these powers and virtues to his own use. Thus he may become more and more

lord over the phenomenal universe, and ever increase his material wellbeing. The daring mind also finds in exploration a pleasure distinct from the pleasure won from the sensual delights he may discover in the regions explored.

Woman is one of the most excellent creations of God. In her is summed up all the beauty of the universe. But she is not a mere instrument of pleasure. She is highly specialised, no doubt, for the performance of her peculiar functions, but she has other excellencies. Reverence is due to her, and loyalty as a friend, a partner, and a priestess.

On the whole, then, monogamy, productive as it is of grave inconvenience to society and of hardship to individuals, should be the rule. It is to the union of the sexes that we look for future citizens. We desire that man should be free, and it is impossible that free men should be born from unions in which one of the parents is in a condition of marked inferiority to the other.

These are the basic principles of Western civilization. It cannot escape attention that these principles are of the nature of a religion. The religion, and consequently these principles, are not perhaps true, or at any rate not always and everywhere true. The Oriental would deny every one of them.

The Oriental would say :—

The relation of God to man is not that of

father to son. The Gods are probably metaphysical concepts. If they exist they are malignant or, at any rate, unmoral powers, and are very mighty. If there be one God, he is the master of his slaves. He called them into existence by his breath, and by his breath he can annihilate them. He is his own law. Man has no rights against him. There is no appeal against his decree. He can condemn the whole human race to Hell without staining his justice.

The phenomenal universe is either an illusion or the creation of evil, or at least of unmoral, Gods. Man is there just as the star is there and the dung-beetle is there. If there be one God the universe is his slave-pen. Any delights that man may find there are merely the pleasures that a wise slave-master gives to his slaves that they may consent to live. In the world evil is predominant. It is an act of ingratitude to, and rebellion against, God to abstain from the gratification of the senses from mere peevish motives. But wholly to withdraw from the world (if this withdrawal is done in the service of God) is the act of a wise and pious man.

Man has no free will. He is the slave of necessity. He has no choice either of good or evil. Good and evil are absolute. What God commands is good, what he forbids is evil. Good and evil were fixed immutably by divine decree long before the creation of man.

There is law in the universe, but it is an ancient and immutable law. It cannot be changed, and human ordinances must be consistent with it. God has revealed his will; but men are negligent, and the divine ordinances become obscured. Then God sends on earth a messenger to revive the old commandments. The civil ruler is merely the executant of this ancient and immutable law. In this he is the delegate of God, and rebellion against an orthodox and efficient ruler is rebellion against God. On the other hand there is no sanctity in a government. Ruler and ruled are alike the slaves of God, and God gives and takes away kingdoms.

The function of the ruler is merely to administer the divine laws. His own laws are no more than the temporary and occasional edicts of a magistrate, and die with him. Participation by the ruled in the government is, therefore, unnecessary and inadvisable. The duty of the subject is to obey the authority of God, delegated to and vested in the ruler. His only choice is to change rulers when the ruler is clearly incapable of enforcing the divine laws, or is flagrantly in rebellion against them.

Man is not a free agent. He is equal indeed, for all men are the slaves of God. But God can marshal his slaves as he wishes. To some he gives privileges, to others he denies them. It is on the whole more convenient that the relations

of men should be regulated by status and not by contract. Where contracts exist they cannot be allowed to interfere with the immutable law. No man can contract himself out of these antecedent obligations. If he attempts to do so, the laws and religion will restrain him.

It is extremely dangerous to do anything unless the proposed action is one clearly and unmistakably indicated by the precepts of religion as lawful and incumbent. By action you may be infringing the divine ordinances.

In art, the emotions are excited rather by the contemplation of terror or power than by that of beauty. The Hellenic symbols are meaningless. To the man of the West the symbols of the East appear grotesque and offensive.

The spirit of man is no doubt far-reaching and never-tiring. But it turns away from the material universe with disgust. It finds free play in the regions of metaphysics. Physical science is vulgar and blasphemous.

Woman is one of the most excellent creations of God; but she is of value only in relation to men. Her functions are those of daughter, wife, and mother. She has no possible claim to independence. In youth her principal value is as an instrument of pleasure. Her youth is short, and the sexual desires of man die only with him. Monogamy is therefore ridiculous and noxious.

There is clearly great incompatibility between

these ideas and those on which Western civilization rests. They cannot really co-exist. When then the British became rulers of India, and ceased to content themselves with those duties which are the elementary duties of all rulers, and began to introduce their culture, the conflict began.

The two great faiths on which lay the burden of the championship were Hinduism and Islam. Islam did not come forward during this period as an active combatant, but it was preparing to enter the lists, and it will be more convenient to deal with the whole question in one chapter. First, however, I shall deal with the Hindu counter-attack.

It is unnecessary to give any detailed account of the Hindu religious and social system. But it is necessary to emphasise the fact that, like Islam, Hinduism is a "city" in the Greek sense. That is, it not only explains the relation of God to man and provides man with a temporal government; it also regulates the life of the Hindu in its minutest details.

Sooner or later then the British Government was bound to come into conflict with Hinduism. It is not wholly true that Britain conquered India from the Hindus, for neither Plassey nor Buxar were insignificant battles, and the conflict with the God-given Government brought the Empire near to ruin. Nevertheless, one Hindu power had been dethroned by the British arms. The hege-

mony of India was won from the Marathas, and it was particularly among the Marathas that Brahmin ascendancy in political matters had reached its height. Moreover, even in the Mussulman courts the Hindus, and particularly the Brahmins, had much influence. The British conquest, therefore, was a serious set-back to the Brahmins in the material sphere. It soon began to menace them in the spiritual sphere. With some reluctance, and after perhaps excessive delay, the British did put down some Hindu customs which were contrary to civilized practice. They forbade, *e.g.*, ritual murder, human sacrifice, and sati.

These were not necessary parts of Hinduism, but the interference was resented. The British, who had now abandoned their *laissez-faire* theories and were brimming over with the liberalism of the thirties, showed evident signs of wishing to push the process further. Hindu prejudices were treated very summarily. Widow re-marriage was legalised, and a measure was being framed to restrain the wildest excesses of polygamy. The answer to this was the Mutiny.

The result of the Mutiny was to crush the hopes of restoration of Hinduism by force of arms, and the literate classes flung themselves with avidity on to the new culture. Scepticism and irreligion became fashionable, and new religions and philosophies arose which attempted to combine Eastern and Western ideas. The result of this

was fierce reaction, much strengthened by the Ilbert Bill agitation.

The reaction began to organise itself in Poona in the later eighties. Poona was the headquarters of the Maratha Brahmins, the only race in India which combined literacy with some executive ability. They had suffered much from the British. The Maratha Empire had fallen, and the principality of Poona, the ruler of which was a Maratha-Brahmin, had fallen also. So had the little state of Satara, where the Brahmins had much influence. The Bombay Government had also for years carried on a ruthless investigation into titles, and had in many cases confiscated estates, the title to which was doubtful, but whose occupiers were thoroughly convinced that their claim was good. The Brahmins filled all the subordinate posts of Government. Much of the official correspondence was carried on in a script that none but a Brahmin could read. Finally the Konkanasth-Brahmin made up for a somewhat doubtful claim to real Brahminhood by orthodoxy and learning.

It was necessary to put the new movement under the protection of a god. One might have thought that the god Vishnu would have been the national leader. On many previous occasions he had taken form and descended on earth to re-establish the Hindu religion, and to punish those who oppressed it or wronged its votaries. But, for reasons which will appear later, the movement was put under



the protection of Shiva. The assistance of other gods—*e.g.*, Ganesh, who, in our day the amiable, pot-bellied, elephant-headed God of science and material success, was in ancient days an avenging angel, the Michael of the Hindu pantheon—was not refused.

A libellous account of Shiv worship will be found in Dubois, but the real truth of the matter is this. The primal god was perfect and universal. He could therefore do nothing. For to act requires an agent and a material. The god, wishing to become a creator, therefore divided himself into two beings, the being possessed of the male energies being Shiv, and that possessed of the female energies being Devi. The god was now able to create, and did create. The symbol of this pair of deities is the emblem representing the combined male and female organs of generation, the yoni-lingam or lingam. The symbol is to our ideas obscene, but the thought it represents is not necessarily so, nor is there necessarily any peculiar obscenity about Shiv worship. As a matter of fact, this was not the first time that Shiv had come into collision with the West.

A.D. 220 had seen the Baal of Emesa enthroned in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, and the monotheism of the lingam established in the Roman world. The emperor, at once hierophant and god, represented in his own person the bi-sexual deity. This worship proved displeasing to the Romans,

and this premature attempt to introduce an Eastern monotheism failed.

Creation entails destruction, for everything created, being necessarily imperfect, must perish. It is rather to the destructive than to the creative side of the divine pair that the common people look. Thus, as in order to construct the new Hindu state it was necessary to abolish the British state, Shiv might well turn his activities in this direction.

There was a precedent in this very Maratha land. The country had at one time been divided between two Muhammadan kingdoms. The Deccan Muhammadans were few in number, not more than four per cent of the population; they were not supported by their brethren in the north, and were cut off from the vigorous tribes of Central Asia and Persia by great distances. They had an enemy, an active and powerful Hindu kingdom, to the south. Yet their rule endured for centuries. It is not therefore possible that they alienated their Hindu subjects by religious persecution, and accordingly the Hindus are found in great numbers both in the armies and the civil administration. Occasional outbursts of fanaticism and isolated acts of persecution there may have been, but the general policy of these powers was sympathetic to the Hindu. Yet the foreign ruler and the foreign culture had a depressive effect on Hinduism, and there also a reaction had taken place. Saints and sages had arisen who had revived the fading plant

of Hinduism. Then appeared a deliverer in the temporal sphere.

This was the celebrated Shivaji, a son of a high Hindu noble of the Ahmednagar and Bijapur courts, and himself a feudatory of Bijapur. He resolved, and in spite of opposition from friends and kinsmen was constant to his resolve, to free the Deccan from the rule of the Turk. This, by means of a happy combination of craft and audacity, he accomplished. The kingdom soon passed from his family, but the Hindu ascendancy in the greater part of the Deccan was established for ever, and the Muhammadan, if he survived there, survived only as the vassal and mercenary of the Hindu.

The very name of this national hero showed whose agent he was. Might not Shiva again send forth a redeemer, a champion of Hinduism, now threatened by a mightier foe than the diluted Arab culture of Bijapur?

No better model could be found, and those who looked to a violent subversion of the British Empire studied with care the career of Shivaji. His powers were small at the beginning, and he had increased his resources by gang-robbery. Might not the chests of the national party be filled in the same way? When menaced by a great army he had entrapped that army by a feigned negotiation, and had assassinated the general. Such at least was the popular story, though the researches of the historian seem to

show that he merely anticipated a meditated act of treachery on the side of his opponent. It seemed clear then that in the service of religion the patriot must shrink neither from assassination nor from fraud. He had revived the national spirit of the Marathas by means of semi-religious plays and recitations, and the same engines might be applied to create an atmosphere favourable for the new movement.

The new movement tried its strength first against the Mussulman. These were also aliens, and moreover were weak. They were also protégés of the British Government and its officials, and the Government might therefore be forced into coming forward as protectors of the Mussulmans against the Hindus, and consequently appear hostile to the Hindu religion.

Coercive measures were applied against those who broke the law, and the movement was for the moment repressed, but the originators had succeeded in spreading among certain classes the idea that the British Government was inclined to favour the Mussulman as against the Hindu.

Then came the plague, and the measures taken by Government to check the spread of this epidemic were very unpopular. Two officers of Government were assassinated, and other assassinations followed. The assassins were young Brahmins on whom the Shivaji cult had produced a strong effect.

The movement showed little signs of becoming

really popular. The Maratha and Kunbi were rather sceptical of the whole thing. The Brahmins had taken away the kingdom from the heirs of Shivaji, and the Maratha did not see that there was much urgency in replacing the Brahmin in the kingdom which he had first stolen and then lost. The Maratha respects but distrusts the Brahmin. And here was the weakness of the whole movement. The Brahmin forgot that it was by the sword of the Mavli (the hill Maratha), and by the lances of the Kunbi, that the Maratha Empire had been established. Had Shivaji not commanded these, the dagger would have drunk Moslem blood in vain. Meantime the movement spread into Bengal. Bengal was the country where the English culture had bitten most deeply, and where consequently the disillusionment and reaction were greatest. The people of Bengal had never been warriors, and had passed from ruler to ruler with perfect indifference. Owing to the peculiar administrative system of Bengal the European officer did not have much to do with the people. His activities were mostly those of a magistrate or policeman, useful and indeed necessary, but not particularly conciliatory. The literate Bengali was the butt of rather malicious and ill-mannered jests.

Bengal, always fond of asserting its manliness (as to which it had some doubts) by virulent attacks on the wholly indifferent British Govern-

ment, was now particularly agitated owing to the proposed partition of Bengal. The province was very unwieldly, and parts of it were very inaccessible from Calcutta. These very parts were also inhabited largely by Mussulmans, who were neglected by the Government and oppressed by Hindu landlords and usurers. It seemed, therefore, desirable to divide the overgrown province into two, and to make a new province out of the Eastern districts and the small province of Assam. This measure aroused the alarm of the political Bengali. It might lead to the eradication of his power over a large and productive area. The hated Mussulman might come to his own. The power of the High Court of Calcutta might be shaken. The permanent settlement might be endangered. A wild clamour arose. Government despised this clamour and proceeded. Partition is an evil name; it calls to mind partitions of Poland and the like. It also seems to imply the separation into two parts of a living organism. If you picture Bengal as the mother of the Bengali race, then the partition of Bengal may easily be figured as an act of cutting fragments off a living mother, a process of which none can approve. And it so happened that there was a tendency already existing thus to regard Bengal as a divine female creature. Thus a harmless administrative act became connected with the revolting ideas of matricide and deicide.

It will not have been forgotten that the primal god divided into two creatures—Shiv, the representative of the male energies, and Devi, the representative of the female energies. Devi was, par excellence, the goddess of Bengal. She also, in her time, had destroyed many evil monsters, the enemies of the human race and of the Hindus.

It is the custom of Indian ascetics to wander round the whole of India visiting the sacred shrines. The tour takes twelve years. There is still a tendency for these pilgrims to proceed in companies, and of course when the Pax Britannica did not exist, the pilgrim, if wise, attached himself to a large party. Many of these ascetics were fighting men. Like gathered to like, and in the eighteenth century it was not unusual for bodies of thousands of fanatics to move about, well-armed, and under some sort of military discipline. The time being one of disorder, when the assistance of armed men was valuable, such wandering bands were often employed by princes as mercenary soldiers. Sometimes under their own leaders they ravaged the country, and even occasionally erected principalities. One such body had come into conflict with a small British and Muhammadan force in the days of Warren Hastings, and had wiped it out. This produced a great impression at the time, when, as now, the slightest check to the British arms was regarded as heralding the

downfall of the Empire; but nothing further happened. About the middle of the last century a Bengali writer of genius, imitating Walter Scott, wrote a novel on this subject. His novel contained a glorification of the goddess Devi, whose votaries had defeated the British, and the author is undecided whether the goddess he praises is the goddess, or India, or Bengal; and if the goddess, whether the actual goddess or the goddess as she will be when her destructive energies are laid aside, and she comes forward in her benignant form of creator and maintainer. The book itself inculcates the duty of accepting the British Government for the time, that Government being the divinely-appointed teacher of a superior culture; but, as is only natural, the writer hoped that a time would come when—England having fulfilled her divine mission—a renovated India would need her guidance no more. The book also contained a poem, “Bande Mataram”: “Bow to the Mother,” in which the goddess (though which goddess is obscure) is addressed in elevated strains as the protectress, the hope, and the refuge of the Hindus.

The Mother which was thus Bengal, or India, or Devi, or some glorious divinity not yet manifested, was thus menaced by the partition. The body of the mother was to be divided. Her chosen lands were to be handed over to the Mussulman, and the English yoke was to be



riveted more firmly than ever on the Hindus. In Bengal, therefore, the movement started in the Maratha lands found ready acceptance, but was here put under the protection of the consort of Shiv.

And there was no doubt to what goddess the patriotic young Bengali made his appeal. It was to Kali the black, fierce goddess, the chosen deity of the sorcerer, the convener of orgies where votaries, fed with unlawful meats and maddened with unlawful drinks, meet in the darkness and waste places, and give rein to their primal passions; Kali the drinker of blood, who dances maddened on the bodies of the slain; Kali the wearer of the necklace of skulls; Kali the mistress of the pestilence. She would soon manifest herself in all her terrors and avenge herself on her enemies.

The worship of Devi, always popular in Bengal, became now ten times more popular, and it spread to regions where it had indeed been known but despised by the votaries of the bright gods as something only fit for outcastes. The Maratha had indeed always worshipped one particular form of Devi with enthusiasm, for the principal festival of the goddess fell at the end of the rains. Then the rivers became fordable and the plundering hosts could ride abroad. But generally she was not so much of a national goddess as she had been in Bengal, and the Bengal ritual was unknown or unpractised save by the few. Now, however, it

seemed as if, for her temples, all other shrines would be abandoned.

It began to be commonly said that the goddess was athirst and that she required blood, and the blood of her enemies. Goats must be sacrificed, but they were to be white and hornless.

This new religion spread rapidly among certain classes. It had indeed an excessive number of apostles. The press and platform resounded with eloquent addresses to the youth of India urging them to redress the wrongs of the Mother, and to appease her by the shedding of blood. The preaching did not fall on deaf ears. India teemed with failed B.A.'s, young men, that is, of the literate classes, who had been educated in the new culture, but whose industry or ability were not sufficient to enable them to attain the very moderate amount of education considered as qualifying them for positions under Government. Their education fitted them for nothing else. They were poor and discontented, and inclined to hate the system which had rejected them. They had been educated in colleges most of which were seminaries of sedition. This intellectual proletariat was just the soil in which the new doctrines were likely to spread, and, as is usual in such cases, their numbers were reinforced by the presence of superior and able men, who had their own reasons for hating the system.

All over the country, clubs of young literates

sprang up which were frankly seditious and criminal. The organisers took as their model the system of the United Irish, but, as a matter of fact, the isolation of individual member from individual member, and of lodge from lodge, was not practicable in India, where secrets cannot be kept. The neophyte was, however, admitted to the lodge under the veil of darkness, and did not see the persons who dictated to him the unlawful oath, or who performed the unholy ritual. The members of the clubs were frequently united to each other in the same bonds as those that bound together the members of the sacred band of Thebes.

These clubs were everywhere a danger. It is true that, except in Bengal, the movement was not attractive to the mass of the population, and an attempt to spread fanaticism among the people by means of plays, religious recitations and ballads, was a failure. It was likely enough that the continual talk as to assassination might not stop at talk, but the hope of an armed rising was foolish. Still, if the schools, colleges, and press were all poisoned with the spread of these doctrines, what hope was there for the rising generation? It was to these colleges that Government looked for the supply of its subordinate agents, and if all its subordinate agents had been brought up to believe that the Government was the deadly enemy of their religion how was loyalty possible?

In Bengal, where the executive was weak, the movement did assume a popular character. The clubs were able to raise disorderly mobs who could be relied on to terrorise the bazaars, to extract funds by force, and to destroy English goods. The executive was too weak to interfere with effect, even in the case of flagrant disorders.

In Bengal, also, the political dacoity became common. Just as Shivaji had filled his coffers by plundering the caravans that painfully threaded the passes of the Western Ghats, so the devotees of the Mother hoped to raise funds by plundering their compatriots who were wealthy, defenceless, and sufficiently loyal to the Government to object to blackmail.

And now assassinations began. The first victims were European officials, but the Mother was not particular. The blood of Indians was acceptable enough to her, provided those Indians were the loyal servants, or even supporters, of the hostile Government. Assassinations were common everywhere where the movement existed, that is to say in all British India except Oudh, Hindustan, the Panjab and Sind. In these provinces the new doctrines had not spread. In native states there was no attempt to propagate them.

The movement is curious and interesting. In the first place it is clear enough that the reaction must indeed have been violent. That Brahmins should engage in secular affairs was irregular in

itself, and indeed was an effect of that confusion of castes always the symptom of a decaying dharma, and in itself actively called for the manifestation of some liberating and redeeming God. That Hindus should regard the shedding of human blood as religiously incumbent on them was also an innovation, for their religion prohibits the voluntary causing of pain to any sentient creature. The Hindus were thus invoking not Hinduism, but a far fiercer and more primitive religion to their aid in their conflict with the intrusive culture. It is easy enough to evoke the spirits of the abyss. It is not so easy to curb them when evoked.

Again, none could mistake the physical peculiarities of the devotees of this new cult. The Brahmin is, perhaps, the most perfect physical model of a Nordic type which has for ages bred for intelligence. But the cult found its most enthusiastic devotees among youths whose rickety bodies, retreating foreheads, protruding teeth, harelips, oily and clammy skins, were convincing proofs of a physical degeneracy which was associated with a moral degeneracy of which the unnatural practices referred to were also a symptom. Not only was the cult itself an insurrection of the Non-Aryan elements in Hinduism, but it found its chief votaries among those who were themselves representatives of the insurrection of Non-Aryan elements in the Hindu community itself.

It is true that the followers of the new religion did not appeal to the strange scriptures of Sakhti worship. They rested their case on the Gita. But their appeal was not convincing. The Gita does indeed lay down that the duty of the fighting castes is to fight, and that no man can fight in a better cause than against the enemies of his religion; but it, for that very reason, gave no warrant to the Brahmin to appeal to the secular arm. It is to check that very confusion of castes that the Lord incarnates himself. Severe is the wrath of the Lord against those who, in the pursuit of worldly ambition, trample underfoot the ordinances of religion. Moreover, the warfare of Arjuna was waged in the open field of battle, not in the dark shades of private murder. His weapons were the sword and the bow, not the dagger and the bomb.

The Hindu fanatic was not discouraged by all this, nor even by the fact that some of his earliest victims were women. This last circumstance would have been enough in ordinary times to show that the favour of the goddess was not extended to the movement. Every female thing is in some sense the symbol and habitation of Devi, and no act could be more displeasing to the goddess than offering to her blood poured forth by slaughter from the veins of a woman. Regardless of these omens the fanatics pressed forward.

They were hampered in the campaign by the

difficulty of obtaining arms. Government has always, since the days of the Mutiny, prohibited the importation, sale, or possession of firearms (especially of revolvers or pistols), except under very stringent conditions. The Hindu is not an accurate mechanic or a skilful compounder, and he found it extremely difficult to construct a bomb which would work, or to fill it with a mixture which could be relied on to explode. He was in touch with foreign agencies which would have been glad to assist him, but the ports were in the hands of the Government. He had no love for the cold steel.

One outside agency was at first in London, but was afterwards moved to Paris, and carried on the propaganda among the Indian students in England. Another was on the Pacific coast of America, and was there in close touch with the anarchic party which afterwards was the strength of Bolshevism. There were branches both in Berlin and Moscow, and the local governments were not blind to the potentialities of Bande Matarism. But none of these outside agencies could supply the deficit. They helped the cause by local propaganda, by circulation of tendencious literature, and by occasional pecuniary donations; but they were unable to get arms or bombs into the country to any very great extent. They did succeed in providing a sort of Bomb-maker's Manual, but the scientific acquirements of the young, half-educated

Brahmin were not sufficient to enable him to work up the formulas.

All this movement was then able to effect was the creation of a certain amount of disorder in Bengal, a certain amount of unpleasant agitation elsewhere, and some sporadic cases of assassination.

One cannot help feeling a certain pity for the misguided votaries of Shiv and Devi. Civilization had pressed hard on them. One must always feel sorry for those persons who are crushed by the triumphal car of progress. Enthusiasm and a will to die, even in a bad cause, are not things to be despised. The cause of religion and country is holy, and many men sacrificed on these altars all that to the common man makes life endurable. Moreover, if the sheep feed on the insane root, is the shepherd wholly blameless?

This movement was watched with apprehension by the Government, and it found itself in no very good cause to withstand it. In the spiritual sphere it had nothing to oppose to it, but even in the material sphere it was not well armed. Its armoury was inadequate in two respects. In the first place, the substantive, and in the second place, the adjective law was ill-adapted to actual conditions.

Thus, although to publish in a newspaper an article urging the public to assassinate a particular individual might be punishable, yet praise of



assassination in the abstract was hardly a crime. In any case, though the actual writer or editor of the paper might be imprisoned, yet the paper itself could not be suspended. It was found that the more violent a paper was, the greater its sales. Therefore the tendency was for the press to get more and more violent. "Prison editors" were easily procurable from ardent youth, anxious for self-sacrifice, and in no way averse to the glory and profit of wearing for a short time the martyr's crown. The punishment of the editor did not stop the circulation of the paper. Even if it had done so, the mischief would have been done. The vernacular languages of India are not rich in literature. Where such a literature exists, it is written in a literary dialect not intelligible to the people. The papers, therefore, are practically the only reading matter supplied to the masses, and they have for one subscriber ten readers. In very remote villages where no European had penetrated for ages, and where the existence of the Government was hardly known, boys and young men read of the atrocities of the Government, of the wickedness of the Franks, of the insults to, and the thirst of, the goddess; and it was from these very young men that the clubs selected their assassins, and among whom they found enthusiastic and blind support.

Similarly, though a seditious speaker at a public meeting might be punished, yet the continual

convocation of conventions and public meetings for the purpose of making such seditious speeches could not be prevented.

It was no offence to possess a bomb so long as it was not filled, and even the illegal possession of explosives and dangerous arms was not highly penal.

These are merely a few instances of the inadequacy of the substantive law. The defects of the adjective law were also great.

In some provinces the judiciary had long been inimical to the Executive Government, and were sympathetic to nationalistic movements. These courts had also worked out a system which, even in ordinary cases, gave the criminal who could command highly-trained legal advice practical immunity. When the criminal who could command such advice was also a nationalist, it became very hard to obtain a conviction at all. Thus it was possible for a paper to print with perfect impunity a passionate appeal to the public to take to assassination, as long as it was careful to print at the beginning the formula, "We regret to state that the tyranny of the Government has led to the propagation of the following doctrines"; and to add at the end, "Needless to say these are not our views." It was held also that no confession, however elaborate and well supported by outside evidence, and however willingly it was made, could be admitted into evidence if retracted before it

was so admitted. It was held also that accomplice evidence, however obviously true, was insufficient even if believed to justify conviction. It was regarded as an axiom that all evidence collected by the police was presumably false and concocted. The accusatorial methods of English law (never very suited to the East where witnesses are not willing to appear in court in the most unimportant cases) were very ineffective here, where the witness stood a very good chance of being murdered before he could give his evidence in the final stages of the trial. Moreover, the criminal procedure gave ample opportunities for delay, and it often happened that years elapsed between the arrest and the final decision. Government, therefore, reluctantly applied to the Legislatures for amendment of the law, and obtained the powers it asked for. It was extremely reluctant to use them. The movement was checked but not killed. Sporadic crimes occurred and the agitation still went on.

All this was very agreeable to Panditji. Government was now unable to govern, except by the use of "repressive" measures. It was probable that public opinion at home would not approve of these repressive methods, and would think that a Government which could not function except by means of extraordinary powers was a Government which had failed, and that power should be transferred to other hands. The example of Ireland

was not wasted on Panditji. There was clear evidence that the British Government, deaf to supplication, was inclined to yield to crime. The sole question now was whether Panditji could point to any other persons as being fit to wield the power which the Government had proved unfit to possess.

Bande Matarism was not likely to appeal strongly to the British elector. The shamrock is an inoffensive emblem. The Lingam might be considered indecent. The Dark Rosaleen is a gracious creature. Our Lady of Skulls is not. The killing of a few landlords, agents, and politicians was not unpleasing. A movement which would, if unchecked, fill wells, not only at Cawnpore but in a hundred cities, with the mutilated corpses of women and children (even though those women and children were of English race) might not be regarded with the same tolerance. On the whole, the Hindu revival must be kept in the background. It might not appeal to good Liberals and to good Nonconformists. But there was in existence a party which Panditji would be glad to see in power, and whose programme might prove acceptable to the powers that were in England.

This was the moderate party. The true moderates were few in number. They were those who had thoroughly absorbed European culture, and preferred it to their national culture. They therefore approved of the continuance of British

rule, at least for the present, till the new culture could stand without foreign support. Many of these men were members of the Brahmo-Samaj. This is a small body of men (chiefly Bengalis) who had adopted a sort of Unitarian religion based on Hinduism, but who had done away with what they regarded as the objectionable and regressive elements in Hinduism. Like the Unitarians they were a small body, and their doctrines showed no signs of spreading. Like the Unitarians also they numbered among their body a great number of able men. All the real moderates were not, however, members of this sect; some of them were pious enough Hindus. The whole body was very small. They could form no real support for Government, even had they been enthusiastic in its cause. They were thoroughly denationalised, and if they had any weight in the country it was not on account of their politics.

Besides, there were a great number of pseudo-moderates who were crypto-extremists. These were men who wished well to the Hindu reaction, but were not prepared openly to support it; either because they actually disapproved of its methods as immoral, or because they saw that there was a possibility of reaction being met by reaction, or because they did not wish to be martyrs.

Both parties were hostile to the actual Government. The moderate was trained in Whiggery, and had learned that the principal duty of a

loyal subject is to oppose the Government. Thus the efforts of Government to protect itself against the Hindu reaction met with small support. A Press Act? Shades of Milton! Special tribunals? The Star Chamber and the Blood Council! An Arms Act and prohibition of seditious meetings? The Bill of Rights! Internment without trial? The liberty of the subject! The tone of the whole party was: "The Government is well-meaning, but . . . these outrages are very sad, but . . . the killing of So-and-So is a crime against humanity, and brings sore disgrace on India, but . . . law and order must of course be preserved, but . . . no wise and patriotic Hindu can look on this recrudescence of savagery save with disapprobation, but . . . " It was found, too, that many of the extremist war-cries were translatable easily enough into the moderate vocabulary. "Protect cows," says the extremist. The moderate would say, "It is thought that a study of dietetics from the point of view of Hindu science will inevitably point to the conclusion that abstention from heating meats, such as beef, is advisable in India. This being the case, and the utility of bovines, both for the purposes of agriculture and for the supply of milk, being so patent, it is thought that some legislation tending to restrict the free slaughter of cattle might not be unacceptable." "Drive out the foreigners," says the extremist. The moderate says, "In view

of the rapid spread of English ideas and of English culture in India, it would appear that a cheap and indigenous agency might with advantage both to economy and efficiency be substituted for the costly foreign agency. The retention of the European soldier might, for the present, be advisable; but if the foreign trader or capitalist is still necessary, that is due not to the lack of real commercial ability among the people of this great country, but to the patronage and support of the English administrator."

Although, therefore, some of the more violent of the young extremists talked of assassinating some leaders of the moderates as being traitors sold to the foreigner, the two parties understood one another well enough.

The moderate regarded the extremist as a sort of forlorn hope, the menace of which might induce the garrison of the inexpugnable fortress to make terms; and such terms would, no doubt, provide for the satisfaction of the moderate's natural desire for place and power. The extremist, on the other hand, was confident that no citadel so manned could long maintain itself against an enemy which was numerous and determined, and fighting for the very gods.

It is necessary to mention two other religious movements of very different origin to Bande Matarism, but also due to the impact of the West on the East.

The first of these was a revival of Sikhism of the fighting type. Sikhism had always strong Hindu sympathies, and it was not unaffected by the Hindu revival. The assistance of Shiv or of Devi was, of course, not there invoked, but the "sacred sword" might sometime be drawn against the enemies of the "khalsa." The dangers of this Sikh movement had not yet become apparent, but the loyalty to the British which had proved itself in '57 was rapidly vanishing; and it did not need much intelligence to foresee that the warrior Sikh, if entirely alienated from England, would be a far more formidable foe in the material sphere than the degenerate Konkanasth or the unwarlike Bengali. Efforts were therefore lavished in the attempt to win him over to the national cause, and these efforts were later to win a full meed of success. The second movement was that known as the Arya-Samaj. This began as an eclectic religion based on Hinduism. The founder was well versed in the doctrines of Islam and Christianity, and developed his creed so as to oppose antagonists whose arms he adopted. The Arya-Samajist was a Hindu; but he laid aside as obsolete a great deal of the ritual and the caste system of Hinduism, and thus, while preserving the essence of Hinduism, made that faith more acceptable to the lax. The orthodox regarded the movement with suspicion, but it soon proved its value. There were many Hindus on whom



orthodoxy had weighed heavily. These might have become unbelievers, or worse still, Christians or Brahmo-Samajists. The Arya-Samaj allowed them a reasonable laxity, and thus kept them in the Hindu fold. Then there were a great number of people who had abandoned Hinduism, either for Islam or Christianity. For such, even in the case of a forced or capricious conversion, the orthodox religion gave no loophole of repentance. Outcasts they had become, and outcasts they must remain. The Arya-Samaj sought out these people, purified and readmitted them to Hinduism. Then there were numerous races on the verge of Hinduism, but excluded from it. These regarded admission to Hinduism as a step up in the social scale. They were excluded from it and showed a tendency to accept Islam or Christianity. The Samaj extended its ministrations to these races, and if it did not make them very good Hindus, at least prevented them from joining either of the missionary religions which competed with Hinduism. The Samaj was thus a sort of free-company, fighting on the side of a power which regarded it with some mistrust, but which was nevertheless glad of its assistance. It soon developed an aggressive, crusading, proselytising spirit, which rendered it equally dangerous to Christian and Muhammadan. The Samaj is, therefore, typical of the whole Hindu reaction. It was the product of the impregnation of the

East by the West, but the offspring of this irregular union, like the offspring of all such unions, despised indeed the race of its mother, but hated the race of its father.

At this time Islam was still torpid, and it needed severe shocks to arouse it from its long sleep, force it to don its old armour, and sally forth against the ancient foe. In India, long association and co-operation with Hindus had robbed Islam of much of its fanaticism. The religion was much affected by Hinduism. Many of the Indian Moslems were descended from local converts, more or less unwilling. All nearly were descended from Hindu women. There had been some learned and pious men, and even some great saints in India, but the atmosphere was to the last that of a camp; and there were not, save in Sindh, any of those great saintly families which do so much in some parts of Islam to maintain the practice of the faith among the ignorant. The Moslem of Turkey or Persia looked on the Hindi Moslem as little better than a Kaffir. The Mussulmans had not, therefore, opposed on religious grounds the extension of the British Raj, and had indeed rather welcomed it. The Hindus were pagans, and, strictly speaking, the slaughter of them was incumbent on the pious Moslem. The Christians were the followers of a revealed religion, and therefore by no means as abominable as the Hindus. The Christianity of the servants of the Company in the beginning of

things was hardly perceptible. Later on some earnest Christians were to be found among the officials; but these were mostly Calvinists, and there is not, between Islam and Calvinism, any very radical difference. There was nothing, therefore, to arouse the alarm of the Moslem.

The English did not find any social custom existing among the Moslems which they felt bound to suppress in the interests of humanity. Slavery existed, but it was mild, and its legal abolition was not perceived by the few people affected by it. The Englishman generally liked the Mussulman better than the Hindu, and, in cases where the two races were in conflict, leaned towards the side of the Moslem. Nevertheless, the material interests of the Moslems did not thrive under the British Government. The Hindi is primarily a soldier. The orthodox Moslem is not a trader; he is a shocking agriculturist; his reliance on Allah makes him thriftless and improvident; the nobles, in their anxiety not to derogate, are spendthrifts. The race refused the foreign culture altogether and were therefore ineligible for posts in Government service, in which a knowledge of English was essential. They did not know or wish to know the vernacular languages of the Hindus, and were therefore excluded from the very humblest posts. Thus the inferior grades of the police and the army were all that were open to them. They thus had little power in the civil administration, and that administration was much in the hands of the

despised Hindus. The race sank back, and it seemed as if a very few generations would reduce it to a miserable population of coolies. Not having tasted even of the foreign culture it underwent no reaction against it.

There had indeed been some outbreaks by the Moslems against the British dominion which was ruining them, and as usual in the East these outbreaks took the form of religious movements. The Mutiny, as far as it was Moslem, was one such; and there was a curious development of Wahhabism which led to the foundation of a rebel camp in the borderland hills, recruits for which were levied as far east as Bengal, and forwarded to their destination by an elaborate organisation. The British Government discovered the plot and extirpated such of the local lodges as they could discover. This led to a temporary outbreak of fanaticism and to a few assassinations. The movement was, however, very insignificant, and though the *murábita* are still to be found in the neighbourhood of Sawwád, their numbers are few and their power negligible.

The unorthodox Mussulmans, the *Mutazilis*, had no objection to English culture, and took to it fairly freely. They were, however, mostly traders, and profited much by the general peace and prosperity, and the wide markets thrown open to them by their connection with England. No hostility was to be apprehended from them.

As time went on some of the leaders of the

community saw that they must move with the times, and did their best to spread English culture among their co-religionists. The movement was fairly successful to a limited extent. The disciples of the new learning certainly did not escape the fate of the Oriental who drinks the forbidden draught. He began rather to dislike and despise the Christian, but he still more disliked and despised the Hindu.

There seemed no likelihood of a Mussulman kingdom being set up in India, and there were several Mussulman states where he could, if necessary, take refuge. If he must be ruled by Kaffirs, let him be ruled rather by the Christian than the Pagan. The Hindu reaction was aimed at him quite as much as at the British, and indeed in its earlier stages was directed against him exclusively. He therefore had no liking for it, nor did he welcome the prospect of the peaceful penetration of the directorate and superior agency by the Hindus. The result of that would leave him poor, uneducated, and few in numbers, at the mercy of a Hindu Government wielding all the powers of the Empire. This was a prospect not at all attractive to him. He, therefore, as far as he could, supported the autocracy of the British, and regarded as traitors to Islam such of his co-religionists as showed any sympathy with the congress, or the moderate propaganda.

So matters stood through the whole of this

period and the greater part of the next. It has now to be told how the course of events alienated the entire body of the Mussulmans, and turned them into the bitter enemies of England; and as such made them for a season formidable allies of the Hindu reaction.

In the districts of Bengal afterwards known as the province of eastern Bengal, the Moslems were an oppressed majority. The bulk of the population consisted of local converts, and were peasants. There were also many great landholders, the descendants of foreign nobles. All alike suffered from the connection with Bengal. The partition was effected, and a new province with, of course, its headquarters in this area was constituted. In this province Moslem influence would be strong. At present there were excellent laws protecting the tenants from the greed of Hindu landlords and usurers, but the subordinate officials, both in the judicial and administrative departments, were Bengali Hindus; so was the *amla*, and so the bar. Consequently the law was not administered in a sense very favourable to the Moslem. Appeals lay to the High Court at Calcutta, which was much under the influence of the upper-class Bengali Hindu.

It was hoped that now there would be a change in these respects, and that the oppressive Hindu official class would either be kept under due control, or would be replaced by Muhammadans.

At present the educational department was wholly in the hands of Hindus, who took care that the Moslem was not encouraged to seek education even in the vernacular. He was thus not qualified even for subordinate posts in the administration. This would, no doubt, be remedied, and the Moslem who sought education would be befriended rather than regarded as an enemy.

Calcutta was remote and inaccessible. The authorities there knew and cared little about eastern Bengal. The country was rich, and paid a great sum yearly in revenue. It got little back in return. Communications, for instance, with the outer world were poor, and it was impossible to move bulky staples to the ports. The jealousy of Calcutta also prevented the creation of any oceanic ports on the littoral. No one took any interest in local problems; and if the interests of the west and east sections of Bengal came into conflict, the dispute was always settled in favour of the part of the province nearer the capital.

The nobles had a special grievance. They were sinking more and more hopelessly into debt. In other provinces the Government had found it possible, by state loans and the introduction of laws restricting credit, and by the creation of a special department for the administration of embarrassed estates, to protect this class. Nothing of the sort was done in eastern Bengal, and it was clear that in a generation or two the old

families would be sold up, and their places taken by new men—usurers and Hindus.

Crime was prevalent and little checked. There was, for instance, for years a system of organised robbery and murder on the great rivers which formed the chief means of communication with the outer world. Government was for a long time quite unaware of these practices, and did little to discourage them when discovered. A Government situated at Dacca would redress all these grievances. The Moslems of Eastern Bengal were therefore highly in favour of the partition; and the general Moslem community of India saw with pleasure the prospect of the creation of a new province in which men of their faith would have great influence. The Muhammadans, therefore, supported the Government against the furious Bengali agitation, and committed themselves deeply on the side of the Sirkar.

The Home Government, having decided to “come down on the side of the Congress,” and to placate the Hindu reactionaries, cancelled the partition of Bengal; and relegated the Moslems of Eastern Bengal to their old condition of slavery to the Hindus, and their old isolation and neglect. The condition of the Moslems was thus worse than before, for they had supported the Government against the now reinstated Hindu oligarchy. Men who had made themselves conspicuous on the side of the Government were now marked



out for official displeasure, and some were the victims of pogroms.

It is an old policy of England to sacrifice her friends to her enemies. The idea is that your friend is your friend, and will support you anyhow. Your enemy will be so pleased at being allowed to punish your friend that he will forget his old grudge against you, and perhaps himself become friendly. And the policy is often successful enough, especially when the friend is helpless and the enemy placable. It would be possible to give a long list of cases where the lesson, "that it is better to be the enemy than the friend of England," has been thoroughly driven home. It is, however, only necessary to refer to the leading cases of the Catalans in the days of Queen Anne; the Tories in the revolted American colonies; the French Royalists in the Revolutionary War; the loyal Irish; and the rallied Boers. The case of Frederick the Great is perhaps hardly in point, as it was not successful.

Frederick was in a position to give effect to his views on the situation, and, convinced of the temperamental treachery of the English, exacted a full revenge.

Other victims of English policy were crushed, and though they may have talked of perfidy, their complaints were soon stifled by the gallows or rifle. If they escaped these, their total ruin made them unimportant. We, of course, know that the

accusation of treason is absurd, the Englishman, both individually and publicly, being a man of his word. But the victims of "this revision of contracts rendered necessary by the coming into existence of new and unforeseen conditions, and by the fresh orientation of policy due to a growing sense in the electorate of the sinfulness and obscurantism of the old policy," were no more pleased with the results than is the sporting man who finds his bookmaker is also "revising his contracts." In the present case great indignation was aroused all through the Moslem community of India by the surrender of the British Government. The policy was not even successful, for the Moslems were not so weak as was supposed, and the Hindus were not placated. As in the case of the wolves who pursued the sledge of Mrs Ivan, the sacrifice of Johnny only whetted their appetite for Jimmy.

The Moslems were by no means reconciled by the creation of the new capital at Delhi. In fact this was rather an added grievance. Here is a parable: The Master of Ravenswood was now driven to the wall. His ancestral lands were in the hands of his enemies. He could not dig. To beg he was ashamed. No one would hire his sword. A gleam of hope appeared. Lord A was induced to promise him the lease of a small and fertile farm for three lives at a low rent. The Master occupied the policies and began to plan

improvements. Lord A now writes and informs the Master that he is rather doubtful as to his moral title to the farm. He cannot, therefore, in conscience, transfer it to the Master, but must retain it (and its profits) in his own hands till the true owner, if any, appears. "But I will do this for you: I will take over your old manor-house and turn it into an up-to-date hydro. You shall have the lodge, and I have no doubt you will find my guests (who are mostly Jews and tradesmen) fairly liberal in the matter of tips."

The Moslems said, "We were loyal, and are sacrificed. The Hindus were disloyal, and they have got all they wanted. Let us also be disloyal, or at least oppose the Government. If we continue to support the Government, and that Government eventually yields wholly to the Hindus, what will be our position? Shall we not fear the vengeance of the conquerors? Whereas if we join in with the Hindu reaction, the Hindus and we may perhaps upset the Government. There will then be just the chance that we who are fighting men and have considerable executive ability, and among whom there is a certain solidarity lacking among the Hindus, may put down the Hindus under our feet."

Such was, therefore, the new policy of Islam, and the Moslems were fortified in it by external events.

The Indian Moslem had been long cut off from

the general body of the Islamic world. As I have said, his peculiarities were such that he was regarded as little better than a pagan by the Moslems of the Near East. But the world was now smaller than it was, and the whole Moslem world was more sensitive: thus an impact delivered at any part of the Moslem world was likely to be felt in every part thereof. Moreover, everywhere the Moslems, menaced now in their own home lands by the invading and restless Frank, showed signs of drawing together into one body and appealing to the new doctrine of nationality. The Hindi Moslem was therefore, perhaps, not solely dependent on the perjured British for protection against the pagan—he might find a protector among his own brethren. The city of Islam was great. Its rule extended from farthest Morocco to the bounds of China. At present it was decrepit and suffering from domestic factions and the incompetence of its rulers, but might not there be a renaissance? God had only to speak. For many years God, for some inscrutable reason, had favoured the Frank; but now it looked as if there was to be a change. The Greeks were beaten, and their Christian brethren were helpless. Menelik had broken the Italians. The Japanese had broken the Russians. The predominance of the man in the hat was passing.

Abdul Hamid had seen the potentialities of the new spirit in Islam, and while keeping up to the

best of his ability his power as Sultan of Turkey, also patronised a movement directed to the exploitation of his position as Khalifa. His title to this office was extremely doubtful, and the Khilafat of the Sultan had never been recognised by the Mogul emperors. Since the extirpation of the house of Timur, the Indian Moslems had indeed paid homage to the Khilafat; but this acknowledgment meant very little more than the acknowledgment in the sixteenth century by the subjects of Henry and Francis, that the Emperor was the temporal head of the Christian world.

But the movement might grow. There is not in the orthodox sects of Islam a distinction between the spiritual and secular headship of the world. The Khalifa is the deputy, not of Allah who is always and everywhere present, but of the Prophet, and Muhammad was both Prophet and King. Till the recent revolution in Angora, therefore, it was impossible to confine the Khalifa to a sort of spiritual headship. Moreover, a member of the house of Othman would hardly be likely to possess the qualities of a true head of the Islamic Church, if the qualifications were piety, learning, and general acceptance. True it was that in the days of the Abbassids the Khalifas had for long been relieved of the burden of secular rule; but by a fiction familiar to the East the Turk or Mameluke who performed the actual duties of sovereignty was supposed to be the mere delegate

of the Khalifa, who might, theoretically, at any time revoke his mandate, and either himself exercise the temporal authority or delegate it to some other person. That there could be a permanent and *de jure* separation between the spiritual and temporal headship of Islam was among orthodox Muhammadans inconceivable.

Islam postulates that the temporal sovereignty should be in orthodox hands. There was not in India an orthodox ruler, or a ruler holding by legal delegation from such a ruler. Therefore, theoretically, the actual rulers were usurpers. This did not at present produce any practical difficulties, as there was no claimant to the vacant throne of the Moguls, and the *de facto* rulers did not set aside the ordinances of Islam. But if the Khilafat movement grew; and if an idea sprung up that the Sultan of the Turks must come forward as the head of a Mussulman conspiracy to re-establish the temporal rule of the Mussulmans over the lands which were inhabited by the people of that faith, then the position of the Indian Moslem might be altered, and he might be bound religiously to rally round the sacred banners.

The propaganda of the Yildiz Kiosk was therefore not without effect. It did, at any rate, make the Indian Moslem feel that he had friends outside the British Empire, and that he had power not only as an Indian but also as a Moslem. During the reign of Victoria matters did not go much

further. The Tory party was in power, and the Tory party, though regrettably inclined to interfere on the side of the rayyah, was yet on the whole pro-Turk. It hoped that Turkey would reform itself, and so become a civilized and progressive Power, capable of forming a check to Russian ambitions. The hope seemed vain, as the Ottoman Government appeared to be hopelessly corrupt and inefficient, and its attempts to reform itself ended generally in a revolting massacre of hostile elements.

Then came the revolution of Salonika and the fall of the Sultan. The orthodox Moslems of India at first regarded the party of Union and Progress as little better than atheists, and considered them as rebels and usurpers. They did not acknowledge the successor of Abdul Hamid as a lawful Khalifa, and dropped his name from the public prayers. Still, no Moslem could be indifferent to the fate of Turkey under whatsoever rulers it might happen to be, and there was a hope that the new Government, irregular as it was, might renovate Turkey. This hope was frustrated partly by the ineptitude of the dominant party, but still more by the hostility of Europe. Europe was divided into two camps, under the leadership of Russia on the one hand and Germany on the other, and England was clearly throwing in her lot with Russia. The policy of Russia for many decades had been to keep the Moslem countries independent but weak,

and to set her face against reforms which might embarrass her policy. With this policy England was now forced to concur, and the sad story of Persia was not unknown in India. Russian policy was thus hostile to the Committee of Union and Progress in so far as it seemed likely to be an agency of reform, and the official policy of England became therefore itself hostile to a reforming Turkey. The Treaty of Berlin was trampled under foot, with nothing more than a formal protest on the part of the signatories thereto; and every movement in Turkey itself hostile to the new Government, whether that movement proceeded from the Christian races or the old corrupt camarilla, was sure of diplomatic support.

In the meanwhile the Young Turk party, though also dabbling in odd movements like Pan-Turanianism, were actively carrying on the Khilafat propaganda. "Islam was really a democratic religion, and the Moslems form one nation. Let them therefore lay claim to a separate nationality; and who can the temporal sovereign of that nation be but the Sultan of the Turks, no longer a despot but the chief of a free nation, ruling through the leaders of the nation chosen by the nation itself?"

The Indian Moslems began with some hesitation to accept these attractive doctrines. Might not the new Islamic nation, if given a little time, rally round a regenerated Turkey? The Turks



had for ages been the sword and shield of Islam. Some new Alp Arslan, some new Zanghi, some new Murad might rule over a united Islam. The Hindi would then have no need to fear the dominant Hindu, or to rely for protection on the broken word of the perfidious Christian.

Great was the disappointment when these hopes proved vain. No breathing-space was given. The Christians had, it seemed, sworn that no pact with Islam should be sacred. The Italians, with no regard to the public law of Europe, seized on Tripoli. The Balkan States, with the open sympathy of the Entente Powers, annihilated the Turkish rule in Europe. Both events were accompanied with stories of Turkish heroism and of inhuman cruelty on the part of the victors, which could not but deeply stir the hearts of all Moslems. It was from the date of the Tripoli expedition that the Indian Moslem became convinced that the Christians were still the deadly foes of his faith, and that they were merely biding their time to wipe out from the world the very name and memory of Islam. One hope remained. The Christians are disunited. Let us band ourselves together. Away with distinctions of race and creed; away with the accursed culture of the Frank. Let the people of the Unity be again a united people, and to the prayers of a purified and a united people God will assuredly grant His speedy relief.

Then came the war, and the Christian peoples began, with their own hands, to pull down their faith and kingdom.

Thus, under the banners of Hinduism and Islam, the East began again the secular war with the West.

## CHAPTER VII.

## DECAY.

THE policy of Panditji seemed thus likely to bear fruit. It seemed difficult for the Government of India to preserve a merely passive rôle. Some positive measure must be taken in respect of an agitation which, negligible enough in the material sphere, seemed likely to become extremely dangerous in the moral.

The Government of India had, in theory, several policies open to it.

It might have said boldly :—

Our mission is a high and holy mission. We are here to govern India as delegates of a Christian and a civilized Power. We are here as representatives of Christ and Cæsar to maintain this land against Shiva and the Khalifa. In that task we shall not falter, we will oppose ideal to ideal, force to force, constancy to assassination. We shall maintain the directorate and the chief executive in our own hands, for the workman must have confidence in his tools. If you agitate,

you will be punished; if you preach sedition, you will be imprisoned; if you assassinate, you will be hanged; if you rise, you will be shot down. And know that in this we shall receive the support of your own countrymen, for our path is the path of peace and prosperity, and your path is the path of ruin and anarchy.

It might have said this, and, supported by its principal, the Home Government, might have acted accordingly. It might have secured to itself the organs of public opinion, and firmly controlled the colleges and the courts. It could have armed itself with the necessary laws. It might have considered the commission or advocacy of crime as a disqualification for office and reward. It might have reserved its favour exclusively for those who were loyal to it.

It might also have come down from its Olympian heights and mixed with the people. It should have regarded its subjects, not as "food-units," or taxpayers, or algebraical expressions, but as men. It should have abandoned its arrogant contempt for Oriental culture. It should have conciliated public opinion—not the public opinion of intellectual hybrids, but the real genuine inarticulate public opinion of the masses. Its agents should have been taught that cold aloofness, even when coupled with austere and pure impartiality, is a vice in a ruler. The qualities it should have required from its district officers should have been,

not so much efficiency and ability as geniality, sympathy (in its true and not in its debauched sense), and courtesy. The district officers should have been relieved of a mass of routine work, and given real leisure. Free intercourse with the people should have been the principal duty of such an officer. Freed from the excessive tyranny of the secretariat, he should have been vested with, and encouraged to use, far wider powers than those which he in practice exercised. English might well have been deposed from its privileged position as the official language, and Hindustani substituted. The English official would thus necessarily have become perfectly acquainted with one great vernacular, and from that to the study of the classical languages of the East would have been a short step.

The Government of India having thus clearly declared its intention, and there being no chance of a change of policy, either by control from England or by change of views in India, would, I think, soon have crushed opposition. The Oriental is very pertinacious. As long as there is any hope of upsetting a decision he will appeal from court to court, and leave no possible avenue of success, however foul, unexplored. But he is also a fatalist, and when a decree is final and irrevocable he will accept it with marvellous resignation. In an agitation clearly hopeless and extremely dangerous few Orientals, except crazed

fanatics, will long indulge; and a strong and well-served Government, confident in itself, can afford to despise crazed fanatics.

Such a policy, however, was not likely to be adopted by the Government of India. That Government had not that fervid faith in itself which could alone justify such an attitude. It was not in the least likely to come down from the rarefied air of the hills into the hot, brown plains of the peasant, or the crowded and fetid bazaars of the trader and artisan. It was still attempting to turn its local representatives into functionaries, and would still continue to value in those representatives rather ability, punctuality, discipline, and despatch than personality, which was always inconvenient, and might sometimes be dangerous.

Moreover, such a policy would at once be repudiated at home. After twenty years the Liberal party was coming to its own—a party exasperated by a series of events, and one which for the first time possessed an extreme left wing tinged with sympathy for the subversives. The Liberal party had shown itself on occasion by no means disinclined to use coercion, and is of course in a far stronger position so to do than the Tory party; but no Englishman, whether Tory or Liberal, was at all likely to endorse a policy which might clearly be represented as contrary to all that England stood for.

It is right and proper that England should hate tyranny. All beneficent organisations assuredly have their repressive side. Pity there may be for the noble leaders of lost causes, but Aske must go to the gibbet. To crush out, however, a strong nationality; to force on it a loathed dominion; to continue for centuries to eliminate the noblest and best by the police spy, the gaoler, and the hangman—this is sorry work for the vicegerent of God.

It is to be observed that the current dictum, "you can do anything with bayonets but sit on them," is, as regards the last clause of the sentence, not universally true. Provided the bayonets are sufficient in number; provided also that they are driven well home, so that the victim is incapable of writhing; and provided that they are neatly and symmetrically arranged in any convenient form; it is possible to erect thereon some sort of framework which, covered with a cloth of state sewn with stars or lilies or bees, will provide a permanent enough consular chair or imperial throne. But such a throne is by no means agreeable to a free prince, however delightful to a Vitellius. The British people, at any rate, showed no anxiety to occupy it.

So the problem arose which ever confronts the statesman, When does agitation cease to be factious? When may it be crushed? When is abdication no longer a great refusal, but an act of tardy justice? The Empire has the right to

call on its servants to be its loyal agents. It has no right to call on them to be the slaughter-slaves of a tyranny.

A policy of constructive repression would have borne the appearance of tyranny. In my own opinion, this would have been a false appearance. In my own opinion, therefore, that policy as it would have been effective, so it would have been laudable. But I am not arrogant enough to assert that my views are right. In any case, in order to carry out a policy so alien to British ideas there would have to have been great unanimity among the British people. There was no chance of such unanimity. The reasons have been given. Moreover, to enforce it would have needed resolution and the strong faith of a believing people. But in England there was no faith in anything much, except in the doctrine that two and two make four, and that four thousand a year is better than three thousand a year. This article of faith is held strongly. It has the merits of truth and evident demonstrability, but it is not a faith which enables men to withstand gods.

Another possible policy was devolution. The hostility expressed to the Government was justifiable only on the grounds that it was the Government of foreigners; that it was, therefore, ignorant or negligent of the wellbeing of its subjects; that it gave no opportunity to Indians to exercise the functions of Government in their



own country ; that it was contemptuous of Oriental culture, and the apostle of a foreign culture. Many of these objections would be removed if Government withdrew from direct administration. It might constitute all over India vassal states. There was no lack of persons qualified to be native princes. India was full of representatives of deposed or mediatised houses who were looked on with considerable veneration by the people. There were precedents, such as the case of Mysore, which had been eminently successful. In selected areas free states might be erected, and there on a small and safe scale it could be tried whether the Indian of the literate classes was capable of self-government. There would be much lack of efficiency, and the ryot and trader might have reason to complain, but it is impossible to satisfy all classes. The states would be restrained from grievous oppression by the control of a Resident.

The details of administration in respect of finance, control, and residuary jurisdiction would not be difficult to settle. The directorate and the agents would remain European, and would retain in their hands Imperial administration. The local governments, being themselves Oriental, would make short work of an agitation which is actually that of Orientals against the West. It was significant enough that even in the worst governed Native State, agitation and disloyalty were unknown. If agitation persisted, both

agitators and princes would look to the Imperial Government for support.

This system, which was that of the Dutch in Java, had many merits, and of course some disadvantages. Possibly in India, with its liability to invasion, and the consequent impossibility there of limiting the expenditure to a fixed and known sum, the necessary limitation and stabilisation of the revenue might have rendered the scheme unworkable. In any case, it was never even discussed.

After mature deliberation and hesitation the English Government decided "to come down on the side of the Congress." As already explained, it is a habit of the English Government to "come down" on the side of its late enemies. Little official opposition was to be expected in India. India had just undergone the régime of a masterful and autocratic Governor-General, who had concentrated all powers in the Viceroy. He had surrounded himself with able and pliant functionaries, and crushed out all opposition.

He had just come into collision with an even more masterful personality, and though on the question at issue he was indubitably right, he had undergone a defeat which led to his resignation. The new Viceroy inherited the administrative machine as left by his predecessor, but was content himself to be the mere agent of the Home Government.

Thus there was in India no opposition to the proposed revolution. Here was the opportunity of Panditji, long sought and at last realised.

The actual agent of the revolution was a most laudable Indian politician, who, after a chequered career, had now settled down as leader of the moderates. The arguments which his party used were plausible and specious.

The English statesman to whom the affairs of India were at the moment entrusted was a Liberal by training and predilection. But he was a man of autocratic character, and by no means a sentimentalist or a humanitarian. He had no love for disorder. He was well-versed in the history of the French Revolution and of the American Civil War, and knew with what swift ruthlessness a democracy can crush dissidents. The installation of a democracy was undesirable and indeed impossible in India, and even representative Government might not be advisable. Order must be restored, but this work could not safely be entrusted to a Government which he knew to be a despotism and suspected of being a bureaucracy. It was desirable to find for the necessary measures some amount of popular support. The proposals laid before him seemed to promise it.

"Listen to us," said his advisers; "there is something radically wrong with the Government of India. It is both feeble and tyrannical. It is

perpetually calling out for extraordinary powers which it dares not use except spasmodically. The subject loves a sympathetic and beneficent Government, he respects a strong and masterful Government. He has nothing but contempt for a timid despotism. The Government of India can neither wage war nor preserve peace. The whole country is full of simmering discontent, due to the habitual violation by the Government of its duty of respecting the prejudices of its subjects. These prejudices are perhaps foolish; but no wise Government will disregard prejudices which, however foolish, are deep-seated and widespread. The policy of the Government is no policy: it consists of a succession of disconnected and irrelevant pranks. The reason of the trouble is obvious. The system is bureaucratic, and is therefore divorced from real statesmanship. It is also divorced from public opinion.

“We see this with regret, as we are devoted to the Crown of England and to the British Parliament, especially now that the Home Government is in Liberal hands. We desire that British control should continue, and even be increased, because we are aware that the masses of the population are still very far from being true Liberals. We deplore this disorder, and see with alarm the growth of movements which are dangerous to the very existence of the British connection. We would gladly do what we can

to support the British interest. But what is our position? We are mistrusted by our ignorant fellow-countrymen because we are friends of England, and repulsed and insulted by the Indian Government because we are Indians.

“We are really the natural leaders of the Indian people. We belong to castes and races which are the object of universal respect. We have, as far as any Indian in the present circumstances can have such temporal power, a monopoly of it. We have absorbed European culture, and at the same time we have not given up our Orientalism. Many of us, indeed, are respected by the most orthodox. We should surely form the most suitable connecting-link between the Government and the people. We can convey the sentiments of the ignorant and inarticulate masses to the ears of the rulers, and we can explain in terms intelligible to the people the reasons for the measures of the administration. But to enable us to do this with effect we must be given an official position. So long as we are not admitted to the administration, we shall not have in the country that weight which we must possess. So long as we are excluded from office Government will continue deaf to our remonstrances. For many years we have now been humbly supplicating for a very few mild measures of reform. Our failure to obtain these has made us ridiculous in the eyes of our fellow-countrymen as being mere

spiritless sycophants. To the Government we appear merely shameless and importunate mendicants. If things continue as they are, too many of us may be tempted to throw the weight of our influence and ability on to the side of the revolution.

“ We do not ask for much. A few posts, a little patronage, an official position which will enable us constitutionally to press our view upon Government. The whole political situation will then change like magic. Government will be humanised. It wishes to be beneficent; that we acknowledge, but with our help it will be really so. It will know what the exact grievances are, and will be able to apply the remedy—not the remedy worked out in the recesses of the secretariat, a remedy which is often worse than the disease, but a remedy suitable to the actual condition of the patient. Our erring compatriots, who are rapidly being driven into rebellion by misgovernment and oppression—which are no less misgovernment and oppression because they are practised by earnest and conscientious men with the best of motives,—seeing their grievances removed and their countrymen in whom they have confidence in power, will cease from factious opposition; and again display that fidelity to Government, particularly to the Liberal Government and the person of the King, which is really natural to the Oriental.

“A Government so constituted, so controlled, and so supported will be in a far stronger position to suppress overt disorder than the present weak tyranny. Opposition will die away. What remains will be merely the residuum of race-hatred in a few cankered and malignant breasts. These fanatics can be rightly suppressed by the temporal sword. Such suppression would be eagerly welcomed in India, where the best people are tired of disorder; and the arm of the Government of India would be much strengthened by the knowledge that its measures were approved of in England. So long as it is a bureaucratic despotism it will be mistrusted there. Once admit the popular element, and its measure will now be that of a people which, not perhaps wholly free, has been made a partaker in and responsible therefore for the administration. Such measures are not likely to be criticised with over-great strictness, even by the most radical of politicians. Trust us.”

Such arguments seemed sound enough, and were certain to have much weight with a statesman accustomed for years to the play of a free constitution, who knew well how factions can be bridled and their energies turned to facilitating the triumphal march of Government, and who had for years hardly concealed his dislike of the Indian system—a dislike which was only increased by a recognition of its efficiency.

Thus the first set of reforms were devised and

carried into effect with all the determination to be expected from that vigorous, narrow, and resolute intellect.

The concessions to the Congress were considerable. Indians were appointed to the executive councils of the Government of India and of the presidencies. Bengal was turned into the province of a Governor, an English statesman was appointed Governor, and a council created there. It was contemplated that the presidency system should be extended gradually to the other Lieutenant-Governorships. The province of Eastern Bengal was abolished, and its territories distributed between Bengal and Assam. At the same time territories were removed from Bengal and constituted into a new province of Behar.

The legislature still remained a mere legislative council, the members of which had no absolute right of initiating legislation, and which had small control directly over the acts of the executive or over finance. But the legislative councils were largely increased, and a strong minority of the members was appointed by election. The franchise was restricted, and the author of the reforms was compelled, much against his will, to recognise the principle of communal representation. This principle he regarded as noxious, but it was clearly not safe further to exasperate Mussulman opinion. The members were given increased powers of interpellation and interference. Political criminals were



excluded. The official members were in a minority, but it was secured by the appointment of unofficial nominated members that Government should always be able to secure a majority.

It was determined to cut down the European agency to a minimum. It was not, however, considered desirable to do this at once, and it was recognised that there was an irreducible minimum below which the European staff could not be reduced. The whole subject was referred to a Commission, the operations of which revealed and encouraged a vast amount of racial ill-feeling. In the meantime the claims of Indians to high office were sympathetically considered.

There was thus no attempt to set up a national Government in India. The Government of India was to continue to be the agent of the Home Government, in fact more so than ever. It would not, however, be a purely European body. It was expected that such a mixed body would be a more suitable instrument for European domination than the old Government. It was expected to command considerable popular support both by its composition and by the distribution of patronage as by its greater knowledge of and sympathy with local difficulties.

The India Office also underwent some modification. Two Indians were added to the Council of the Secretary of State, representatives of each of the great communities of India. This measure did

not add very much to the power of the moderate party, for the Council of the Secretary of State possessed few functions, and the actual Secretary was the last person likely to pay much regard to his Council. They, however, introduced "an aroma of the Hooghli and Abdurrahman Street" into the musty precincts of the India Office—an aroma which some found delightful,—and they no doubt furnished the Secretary with valuable unofficial advisers.

It is unnecessary to criticise this constitution at length. It was greeted with howls of joy, both by the moderate party and by the extremists, and was a subject of panegyric of the venal orators of the Press and the platform. It was, however, born with the *facies Hippocratica*, and possessed no elements of vitality.

To the present writer this seems to have been a blessing. As I understand the system introduced, it would, if it had endured, have laid India under a most grievous yoke. In order that it should endure it was necessary and sufficient that there should have been hearty co-operation between the Government and the political Indians. Had this taken place the Government would indeed have been unshakable. It would have been in effect, if not in name, the domination of the literate Brahmins over India. They were in possession of the Bar, the Press, and the schools. They already filled the subordinate executive posts. Their

relations and friends directed the consciences of the Hindus. They were now to occupy the principal superior executive posts, and would soon command a majority in the directorate. They had control of the legislature, which would indeed be their creature. They were to occupy the courts. This formidable Government, which would really be a bureaucracy, and an Indian bureaucracy, would be supported by a powerful army of Indian and European mercenaries, and rebellion against it would be rebellion against the King.

An Oriental despotism is a grievous thing. It is tolerable because it is not efficient, and because therefore liberty, though theoretically forbidden, actually flourishes. European despotism is also a grievous thing, and the more grievous because it is efficient. But that despotism functions in the political sphere only; it never controlled the private lives of the subjects, and has now ceased to interfere with their opinions. Moreover, in Europe the free functioning of the despotism is controlled by many checks, which are not the less powerful because they are not imposed by the constitution. But an Oriental despotism imbued with the authoritative ideas of the East, possessing the administrative machinery of France, and instructed in the political arts which derive from the Italy of the renaissance, would, if it could have endured, have been indeed a terrible portent.

From this doom India was saved by the natural defects of the machine, by the folly of the political Indians, and by the march of events.

The machine was really surprisingly defective—surprisingly because its originator was particularly well-versed in the history of the French Revolution,—and the new constitution bore a considerable resemblance to that of France under the Directory. In that constitution also there was no link between the executive and the legislature, and in that constitution also the supreme directorate was a committee of men who held very strongly opposing ideas on most vital questions. In France a solution was found in continual *coups d'état*, by purging the representative body, and by deportation of dissenting directors. Thus the Government was enabled to carry on for a while until “the same Directory, after having intimidated all Europe, and destroyed at its pleasure several governments, knowing neither how to make peace nor war nor how to establish itself, was overturned by a breath.” India could look forward to no Fructidor, to no Prairial, and could only await a Brumaire.

All practical politicians are agreed that an executive must be strong. To secure this it is desirable that the executive should be vested in one man. If it is necessary that there should be a board, that board should be small in numbers, dominated by one commanding personality, and composed of members who agree in essentials.

“You cannot wage war with a Sanhedrin.” The ingenuity of the constitution-maker is devoted nowadays solely to the device of precautions which may prevent this powerful executive from using its powers for selfish, illegal, and personal ends. In India particularly, with its authoritarian traditions, a strong executive was essential. Nor was the authority of the executive strengthened by the practice of “setting up the Viceroy against the Governor-General,” nor indeed by the quality of the persons selected for that office.

As for the relations between the legislature and the executive, I shall not discuss that now at length, reserving this topic for later. It is merely to be noted here that experience shows that harmony between an irresponsible legislature and an irremovable executive is rare, and certainly did not in the case before us exist.

The extended employment of Indians in high office merely irritated those who were not fortunate to obtain lucrative and dignified posts. The Government for every such appointment made “ten enemies and one ungrate.” The Indians appointed were certainly many of them men of high attainments, great ability, and excellent character, and loyal as far as possible. But it is difficult for any man to free himself from the influences of caste, religion, family connections, early education, and political association. Government was served loyally, but without zeal or con-

viction. High office was not yet regarded as the reward of factious or criminal opposition, but it could not be denied that the whole scheme was a concession to an illegal agitation.

The moderate party having thus received the price were asked to deliver the goods. This they were unable to do. The real moderate party was small in numbers, and possessed of no weight in the country. Supported by the extremists as long as they were hostile to Government, its leaders were abandoned by them as soon as it appeared that they were inclined to support the Mlechha. The extremists had, by their appeal to religion, a certain following in the country at large, though their operations were regarded with a vague dislike and mistrust, even by the orthodox. But the moderate programme was wholly unintelligible to the ordinary Indian, and if he had been able to understand it, he would have exceedingly disliked it. The moderates were many of them timid men, frightened of losing what little influence they possessed, frightened of assassination, and by no means inclined to run risk of losing life—or, what is perhaps dearer to the Indian, *abru*—by advocating policies distasteful to the extremists and their bands of hooligans. Far, therefore, from supporting the Government, they continued, now that they had an official position, the same course of captious and negative criticism, evidencing a vague and temperamental hostility which they

had followed in their unofficial congresses and conventions. The Government, therefore, finding after vain efforts that it was impossible to conciliate this party either by concessions or by distribution of largess, or by flattery and lobbying; and seeing clearly that its policy must lead, not to the strengthening of the executive, but to the annihilation of the power of the Government; continued after some hesitation and with somewhat faltering footsteps on its predestined march.

For the second part of the programme remained unaffected by the failure of the first. In fact, it had become more necessary than ever. Assassination had now ceased, but a very dangerous agitation was still progressing, and strenuous attempts were being made to tamper with the loyalty of the troops. The extremists, after a short period of exultation at the fall of the despotism, were now convinced that the reforms were a mere sham, and that they were as far as ever from the realisation of their policy. They were in no way conciliated by the rewards and privileges lavished on their moderate brethren, whom they regarded as sycophants and traitors to the cause of religion.

Very far-reaching repressive legislation, therefore, was introduced. The moderates generally opposed it with bitter violence, or, if they supported it, attacked the Government whose misgovernment had rendered such legislation necessary. The laws

were, however, forced through the legislative bodies by the help of the nominated majority. This legislation gave Government ample powers. It controlled the Press; it prevented the open advocacy of assassination and rebellion; it restricted the right of public meetings and the calling of conventions; it set up special tribunals which would be impartial and dignified, and by no means slaves of the executive, but whose proceedings would be summary. Repression is justifiable when, and only when, it is necessary. If the emergency does not exist repression is inadmissible. When it does exist, and repression is decided on, repression should be carried out coldly, calmly, and ruthlessly till the emergency has passed. Repression fitfully applied is a wanton and capricious tyranny.

The policy of "spanking the baby at one end while feeding it at the other" was not likely to produce a soothing effect. Still less was it likely to be effective when the castigation was administered casually and capriciously. The Government of India, having armed itself and the provincial governments with these repressive laws, was reluctant to use them. It was provided that the laws should not come into force unless applied to a particular area by executive decree, and the Government of India was very unwilling to issue such a decree. Even when the law was brought into force, action by the responsible officials was not permitted without the special sanction of the



Government, and that sanction was granted and refused on no ascertainable principles.

The truth is that the Government was very enfeebled. There was dissidence in the directorate. The councillors were not men who had been selected for their independence. The Viceroy had little respect for their opinion. There were always advocates for a policy of drift, and this policy might well seem to be the most expedient. "The people are suffering from delusions which will pass. The ebullitions of ill-feeling are merely temporary. Let us not excite hostility. Let us particularly give no handle for agitation in the country or opposition in the legislative councils. We owe it to the people of Great Britain and the responsible statesmen to attempt, at any rate, to pretend that the new constitution is a success." It is always the case in such circumstances that a policy of inaction is pursued. "Things will last my time. Let me have the next few years in peace. If I am severe, I shall be hated by the people and not thanked by my employers. If I am lenient, I shall receive as much adulation as is good for me, and shall earn the reputation of a 'sympathetic' and tactful ruler. And after all who knows whether leniency is not the best policy? I have the authority of my council to support me, and if anything goes wrong blame cannot be imputed to me."

The results were as might be expected. Enough

was done to irritate and not enough to crush. The unfortunate agitator who was punished felt a sense of injustice, as he knew that many far worse agitations had passed unpunished. He was also sure of being extolled as a martyr by the clamours of the clique of seditionists. The other agitators who were not punished thought that Government was afraid of them, and were of course encouraged in their agitation. This belief spread among the masses, and people began to think that the Government would soon fall. There is no country where the rising sun is worshipped with more enthusiasm than in India, and no country where the public is more inclined to trample on the fallen. A Government impotent to punish its enemies and impotent to reward its friends is not an object of veneration anywhere, and in India the Government showed signs of losing all authority.

There would now assuredly have been a revolution had it not been for the war.

India was in no good case to wage war. No country with a thoroughly enfeebled executive can be. The army had been sadly mishandled. The masterful Commander-in-Chief who had put down the civil government under his feet was gone. He had concentrated the military administration in the Commander-in-Chief, and the civil government could now take its revenge. The army had now one instead of two votes in

the directorate, and the person who made that one vote more decisive than a thousand was not there. On the contrary, in consequence of the conflict, particular care had been taken to select Commanders-in-Chief who had many virtues, no doubt, but whose principal virtue was subservience to the civil government. Consequently the army had suffered and was discontented. Moreover, the reform policy was expensive, and imposition of fresh taxation was clearly inadvisable. The city of Delhi (that remarkable monument) consumed the pay of fifty battalions. Economies were necessary, and the readiest road of economy is to cut down, not the personnel of the forces, for that would attract attention, but the stores. India was therefore without the means of equipping the most modest force for the shortest expedition. The Member for Finance was, even when the war broke out, extremely reluctant to supply deficiencies. The consequence was that, when the Viceroy and his associates were reluctantly forced to carry on a campaign, the blunders were such as to imperil the whole Empire, and they had to be relieved of a task for which they were obviously incompetent. The blame fell on the Secretary of State, who was wholly innocent, and on the Government of India, whose sins were merely those of omission.

In spite of the reluctance of the Government,

India, though it now ceased to be responsible for any warlike operations, was dragged into the war. Indian troops served in all theatres, as did Indian Labour Corps. India proved a useful source of supply for some necessary munitions. She made (somewhat ungraciously) a donation of a hundred million sterling towards the costs, and many private individuals made voluntary contributions to war work.

The European community did not display a fevered interest in the war, which seemed remote enough. They were used to soldiers and to war. Indeed, every European was in some sense a mobilised soldier. It did not, therefore, display the rather objectionable hysteria which was manifested by some classes in England. It could take little interest in events which were either studiously concealed from it, or reached it only through the medium of mendacious communiques or tendencious telegrams. It was, therefore, suspected of disloyalty, as though it were an easy thing to carry on the dull duties of necessary routine when the whole world was open to the adventurous; to preserve a cheerful serenity when disaster followed disaster; to oppose a passive calm to the continual eager and malignant scrutiny of those who hoped to read in your face early tidings of the fall of the Empire; to express, nay, to feel, no doubt of ultimate victory though the very gods seemed to fight

against England, and while her destinies seemed irrevocably committed to the guidance of duodecimo Catilinas and Borgias.

The Indians did after their kind. The political Indian never ceased from his agitation—an agitation which was the more insolent as the chances grew worse for England. The moderates professed loyalty, but played the extremist game. The duty of the official was clearly to minimise or excuse this tendency, indulgence in which in a democratic state would have led the ardent patriot to the barrack-wall and the firing-squad, and which even in England would hardly have been tolerated. Great was the horror when a tactless official declared the open truth in full Assembly. The Muhammadans were much affected by the war against Turkey, and many of them now plunged into an agitation similar to, but far more dangerous than, that of the Hindus.

If hostile money is circulated among some members of these classes it is a matter of no surprise. Indian political bodies have never been very frank about the origin of their funds. They regard audit as an unnecessary formality, and from the very early days of the Congress there had been much speculation as to the source whence its revenues were derived. The official organisations of the various anti-governmental factions no doubt abstained from the accursed thing, and the considerable sums that were spent on the

propaganda of race-hatred and sedition were no doubt derived from pure sources; but it is not to be supposed that all individual members were so chaste. The Indian princes rallied round the Government. Some of them served personally on the staff, and all of them lavished the blood and treasure of their subjects.

To the mercantile and manufacturing classes the war was a godsend. Manufacturer and contractor made gigantic profits, a small portion of which, with a little gentle pressure, he was induced to invest in the various highly remunerative war loans. His brethren abroad were not always so fortunate. Many of them engaged in war-treason, and not a few were shot by unsympathetic colonial or foreign administrations for their misdirected efforts.

The Indian army expanded enormously. The Indian peasant of the fighting castes has no objection to military service, and flocked to the standards which promised him excitement and high pay. The net of the military organisation was flung very wide, and brought up some very strange material. It was discovered that some of the castes which had been supposed to be worthless were really capable of being turned into valuable soldiers, and here pressure, hardly to be distinguished from compulsion, was freely applied. The forces of India were swollen on paper by the inclusion in the active lists of units of no military

value whatever. The results were what might have been expected. Some regiments were inferior to none, and bore a noble part in the hardest fighting under the most terrible conditions. Many regiments did very well under proper leading in suitable areas. Many were valuable enough for police work or on the lines of communication. Some were a mere menace to any army of which they formed one of the components, and others were hopelessly disloyal. In brief, there was nothing very remarkable about the efforts of India in the war. Everybody had always known that the Indian peasant in certain regions made an excellent soldier if he was properly treated and led by European officers in whom he had confidence. The soldiers and their relatives, and the castes from which they were drawn, had certainly earned the gratitude of the Empire, and might perhaps have looked for some special reward. How they were rewarded will presently appear.

It is to be remembered that vast provinces and numerous castes furnished not a man to the Imperial standards, nor a penny other than that extracted by the tax-gatherer; but the abuse of the loose expression "India" attributed to the Bengali and Guzerathi, the Marwari and the Brahmin, the merits of the Punjabi Mussulman, the Rajput, and the Parsi. Nay more, to "India" was attributed the cheerful and gay valour of the Gurkha and the erratic energy of the Pathan.

It is not in accordance with the scheme of this work to attempt any appreciation of the statesman who was responsible for the next step in advance. He was, no doubt, actuated by the purest and most selfless of motives. Nor is it proper to criticise the methods whereby the reforms were commended to the people of England. They were sanctioned, no doubt advisedly, in accordance with a wise discretion after full and free inquiry. No false atmosphere favourable to the reforms was created in India by toleration of disorder, or in England by tendencious communiques or the perversion of the Press. There was a general feeling that "India" was very loyal and yet very discontented. To reward loyalty is proper enough, and how could loyalty be better rewarded than by the removal of the grievances which had caused the discontent? The war was waged "to make the world safe for democracy" and in the sacred name of "self-determination." Obviously, therefore, all grievances would be removed by an extension of democratic government in India. This would enable it really to use "self-determination," and as all democracies are wise, and as wisdom pointed clearly towards a frank acceptance of the hegemony of England, the same measure which rewarded India would also strengthen the bonds which united her to the Empire.

Nor do I propose to give any detailed account



of the new constitution. The framing of constitutions is an amusing occupation. In this occupation many very intelligent people engaged for some months. But as no paper constitution ever worked in the manner its framers contemplated; and as a constitution to be effective must develop naturally from institutions already existing, a paper constitution can, at best, do no more than form a starting-point for evolutionary processes. What, therefore, the framers of the constitution intended is interesting from an archæological point of view, but historically unimportant. What the constitution is, is unimportant. The vital question is, How is the country governed under it? It is to this that I propose to direct my attention.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## THE DEATH AGONY.

IF ever there was a time when India needed wise government it was now. For six years the political Indian had been watching the nations of Europe tearing each other to pieces. Christianity had not availed to prevent the Christian commonwealth from plunging into the most desperate of civil wars. It merely furnished the legions of hell with watchword and war-cry. All the promises of Western civilization were lies. The master of the legions was still the master of the world, and civilization only armed him with more formidable spiritual and material weapons than those wielded by Hulagu and Napoleon. The victors had during the struggle been profuse in noble phrases, but after the victory these were reduced to two words, *vae victis!* It is not to be wondered at that the Indian, long since sceptical of the value of Western civilization, was now convinced of its real nullity. By what authority, then, did the men of the West presume

to lord it in Eastern lands? By the sword? But the sword was falling from their hands.

The war was obviously merely a truce. In the peace settlements there were no elements of permanence. The nations of Europe were divided by many bitter hatreds, but in one sentiment they were united — hatred of England. And what armour had England against this hatred? India, not being a nation, could know nothing of national spirit. She could not tell that in England that spirit burned with a flame which, murky indeed and intermittent, was no less consuming than the pure unwavering radiance of France. England had indeed made a great effort in the war, but her force, ill-organised and often ill-applied, had effected less than it should. Indian troops had figured in many theatres, but Indian memories dwelt particularly on the trench warfare of the dismal Flanders campaign of '15, on the brilliant disaster of Gallipoli, and on the scandals of Irak. War propaganda had led them to believe that it was by Indian arms and Indian treasure that the Empire had been preserved. Those who arrogated to themselves the right to speak for India might surely make their own terms?

In Europe it was the great day of the Helot and Gibeonite. The Lord had indeed put down the mighty from his seat, and had exalted the humble and meek. Never again, the victors had decreed,

should any great Power arise in Europe capable of standing up against the predominance of France. All Eastern Europe was Balkanised. This "gerry-mandering in excelsis" was carried out in the names of liberty and the new god "self-determination." Were not those who spoke in the name of India also entitled to liberty and to self-determination?

Europe, and particularly England, was war-weary. So much ardent youth squandered, so much human effort flung away — to prove and effect nothing. From the Vistula to the Atlantic, from the North Cape to Matapan, were nothing but furious and impotent hatreds, ruin, madness, and despair. To the East reared itself the dreadful spectre of Bolshevism. The distracted nations of Europe cowered before it. The warring Christian Powers had invoked strange allies. The Berber horse and the Senegalese were on the Rhine. Might not the Letts and Chinese of Lenin soon be on the Elbe?

Against a Europe so shattered, so demoralised, the East began to marshal itself. Colour against colour, religion against religion, the man in the turban against the man with the hat, the veiled woman against the suffragette, the races were falling into line. Was India alone of all the East to be deaf to the assembly?

In any circumstances, then, India must have been shaken by the war. But there were special

reasons why she was agitated. There had been years of great scarcity, and prices of necessities had soared. There had been frantic commercial speculation, and to many the day of the armistice was a day of despair and bankruptcy. A new pestilence had swept off, in a few weeks, more victims than fell among all the warring nations throughout the whole war. There had been an Afghan War. The invasion had been easily repelled by the Imperial forces, but the enfeebled Indian Government was in no case to punish the aggressor or to demand guarantees for the future. It was glad, after long negotiations and humble supplication, to extract from the defeated Government the grant of a shameful treaty.

It was intended that this invasion should synchronise with a rising in India, but, as usual, the rising broke out prematurely in two provinces. On one province the war had pressed heavily. On the other it had rested not at all. In both the rising was put down by the local officers with severity. The rioters in the Panjab were shot in great numbers; the leaders of the rebellion were pardoned and rewarded. The local officers were censured or neglected.

There had been much uneasiness among the Muhammadans on account of the war with Turkey. Into the dark and dismal abysses of our negotiations with the Arabs, our promises to France, our promises to the Mussulmans, our promises to

Greece, I have no wish to plunge; but Mussulman opinion did not approve of the settlement with Turkey. The Moslems regarded the princelings of the Hejjaz and Irak as renegades sold to the infidel. They did not see how the establishment of a Greek Empire in Turkish lands was in accordance with the principles of self-determination, and they considered themselves deceived, deluded, and betrayed. The Khilafatist agitation became more intense and more openly seditious. It was not regarded with disfavour by some great ones both in India and in England, for over the ruins of Turkey was being waged a foul and obscure struggle; and in the game of financial and diplomatic intrigue "Indian public opinion" might prove a valuable card.

Among the Hindus the worship of the "Mother" was giving place to the worship of Gandhi. Gandhi was a Guzerathi, a Bunnia, and a barrister. He had originally come into prominence in South Africa, where he had headed the resistance of the Indian settlers to the measure enforced by the various Governments of that country on those Indian settlers in pursuance of their policy of a White Africa. In South Africa armed resistance, or even the menace of such, would have been ludicrous, for the settlers were few in numbers and unwarlike. He had therefore taught the doctrines of passive resistance, and this policy had had a certain amount of success. A compromise had

been reached, and existing rights were recognised. The arms of the spirit, thought Gandhi, are more potent than the arms of the flesh. He was strengthened in this idea by his readings in Tolstoi and his followers and intellectual congeners.

He himself was a saintly man. He was chaste, temperate, and pious. There was in him no trace of worldly ambition and no love for lucre. The Indian extremist politician is apt to oscillate between insolence and fawning according to his appreciation of the character of his opponent. Gandhi was always dignified and urbane. He had, I think, banished wholly from his soul the evil passions of fear and hatred. One flaw there was in him, but that was enough. He was vain. He must have popular applause.

The system he worked out was this. Modern Western civilization is a delusion of Satan. Have nothing to do with it. The appliances of civilization are, therefore, of satanic origin, and so are its economic developments. Discard them. Cotton mills, for example, are an invention of the evil one, and their products are polluted : use hand-woven cloth. Railways are also of diabolic origin (a doctrine which as regards the Indian railways is not wholly absurd) : walk on foot.

Mankind is naturally good. There is no need of coercive appliances. Leave him to himself and he will soon attain perfection. It is civilization that at once makes and punishes crime. It is

false religion that at once makes and punishes sin. The rule of physical force in the administrative world is based on a delusion. Physical force can do nothing, soul force is all. The British Government is peculiarly the vicegerent of Satan. It is owing to the false ideas propagated by the agents of this Government that we see mills springing up all over the country and the ever-spreading network of railways. Under it the handicraftsman, and particularly the handloom worker, is perishing out, and even the bullock is regarded rather as a supplementary means of locomotion than as a serious rival to the railway. But it is particularly the use of force that indicates the satanic origin of all governments, and particularly of the British Government. As Austin points out, all governments rest ultimately on force. The whole apparatus of armies, police, courts, and magistrates is satanic. This is particularly the case with the British Government, which is not a national government, but is founded on violent usurpation.

But the Government, and particularly the British Government, should not be violently opposed. The use of physical force is illegal. To use it to oppose or to turn out the Government would be casting out Satan by Beelzebub, and any organisation that came into existence in such circumstances would itself be satanic.

Against Satan the human soul must oppose itself. Cultivate a pure heart and quiet mind.



Cast away all ideas of violence. Refuse to obey the Government. Pay no taxes. Plead in no courts. Do not break, merely disobey the laws. The pure parent will not send his child to schools infected with Satanism. The warrior in this spiritual conflict will not dress himself or his family in the product of satanic looms. He will wear the khaddar, the product of the handloom.

Before this exhibition of soul force the Government will be helpless. At first, no doubt, it will try to persecute you. If you do not pay your taxes, it will confiscate and sell your property. Let it. It may apply its repressive laws to the soul warriors. Let it. Do not plead to its jurisdiction. Let it send you to jail. In a short time the weapons of the spirit will triumph. Government will be ashamed of persecuting unresisting people. It will break off its connection with Satan, and become a merely voluntary association depending for its existence and the performance of its duties on the voluntary assent of the people. Should it be obdurate and persist in its evil courses, be constant, and the victory is yours. No government can continue to function if all its subjects and agents refuse to obey it or to carry out its commands. It must lapse out of mere impotence.

There was nothing new in these doctrines. They trace back to Rousseau, and through him to a long line of anarchic speculators. Though Christ repudiated them and Paul discountenanced them,

they are there, in germ at least, in Christianity. They will always appeal to the citizens of a highly civilized community. They call man back to the forests from the cities. In all men there still survives the anthropoid. He regrets his tail and longs for his arboreal home. Indeed, the history of civilization is the history of the gradual suppression of the anthropoid, and it is because the anthropoid survives in the best and noblest of us that civilization has never wholly succeeded.

But the anthropoid is a brute, and it is useless to talk to him of soul force. While, therefore, he listens with pleased and pointed ears to the teacher who tells him that civilization (which exists only for the purpose of restraining him) is wholly evil, that part of the doctrine which tells him that the use of force is improper falls on the deaf. There is probably less of the anthropoid in the Indian than in the European, but he exists, particularly in the lower strata of the population, which, in accordance with the caste system, represents backward stocks which never whole-heartedly accepted civilization.

Everywhere, therefore, where these doctrines have spread events have followed the same course. There has been a revolt against civilization. This the government or the superior classes attempt to crush. If they succeed, well and good. If they fail, there is a rising of the pariahs. The old government falls, and for a time there is a blissful

interregnum in which the anthropoid indulges his primal passions. But the forest is far off, and it is not the season of nuts. The anthropoid can build up nothing *ex hypothesi*. The superior men resume control, and the anthropoid is forced back into his slum.

The result, then, of the teaching of Gandhi was merely a series of anarchic riots. Gandhi himself was horrified at the results, and for a moment thought of ceasing his propaganda and devoting himself to the culture of his own soul. He could not, however, bear to deprive himself of popular applause, and soon emerged from his cell to carry on his agitation far and wide. The satanic railways enabled him or his disciples to reach the farthest parts of India with ease and despatch, and the prosperity created by the satanic government and the satanic mills provided him with ample funds.

For a time the Gandhi party and the Khilafatist party combined. This by no means strengthened either party, but for a moment the two principal movements hostile to England presented a united front. The sole bond was the common hatred of England as an infidel Government, which was now a persecuting infidel Government, and there was no likelihood of the alliance remaining permanent. The superficial amalgamation, however, gave an excuse to those who were seeking to justify themselves in their own eyes for asserting that India was now a united nation, and was as such entitled

to all the privileges of liberty, self-determination, and the other inalienable rights of nationalities. The result of all this was a strange displacement of sedition. The two fortalices of sedition had been the Deccan and Bengal. Both had been quiet during the war. Both Bengal and Bombay had during the war been under able and vigorous Governors, who had firmly suppressed war treason. Neither the Deccan nor Bengal showed any enthusiasm for Gandhism. The shrewd politic Deccani Brahmin, the one race in India which combines political and military ability, had little taste for sentimental anarchy. They knew how usurping foreigners were to be dealt with—not by prayer or fasting, but by the *waghruk*. Moreover, the idea of a Bunnia Mahatma was grotesque. They laughed at Gandhi, flattered him, and used him.

In Bengal these anarchic doctrines were not so likely to be so unacceptable. But the Bengali was in mortal terror of the Mussulman. He had just put down beneath his feet his own Mussulman, and he saw the dangers of the alliance between an anarchic religion which might upset the Government and a fighting religion which might replace it. Moreover, Gandhism had developed in some provinces into an agrarian agitation, and many of the politicians of Bengal were zemindars.

The admirers of Gandhi are fond of comparing their master to Christ. Gandhi was not unwilling to testify by suffering to the firmness with which

he held the doctrines he taught. He probably imagined that some mild persecution would confirm his personal ascendancy. In this he was in error, as the very example to which his followers referred showed, and of which a more conclusive proof was the fate of Sabbathhai.

On the day on which a Messiah is arrested by the temporal Government and sentenced to temporal punishment, on that day the temporal power of the Messiah vanishes, though his spiritual influence may continue. The people will not really believe that a supernatural creature will submit to scourging and the cross at the hands of a satanic government. If he does not call down the thirty legions, it is because he cannot.

And it was time that something was done to disillusion the people. India, with the exception of the Deccan and Bengal, was thoroughly convinced of the divinity of the Mahatma. The peasants knew nothing of soul force, but they had been told that the payment of taxes was illegal, and they looked forward to the sudden manifestation of a redeeming god in the person of Gandhi. This deity would reign on earth. The foreign Government would abdicate. Should it resist, it could not stand against the legions of Heaven. The millenium would then come, and no one need pay taxes to the Government, rent to the landlord, or debts to the bunnia.

In the present instance, however, Pilate or

the Sanhedrin refused to act. Partly this was due to a failure to appreciate the dangerous nature of the agitation. Partly there was a fear that the courts might find some loophole of escape for the accused. Partly there was the physical fear of assassination. Like the Ismailis of old, the followers of Gandhi might number among their ranks some one who possessed a *burhan kati*'. Assassination would be repudiated by Gandhi, and was not in accordance with his doctrines. If some high officer was assassinated, the Master would probably grieve sincerely, and might even fast for six days, but that would not heal a hole in the thorax. Partly it was the old fault of a weak Government. "Do nothing, and we cannot be blamed. Give the agitation time to wear itself out. Do not encourage it by persecution." Partly, also, there was the fear that Gandhism might have strong support in influential quarters at home. Gandhism has much in common with Bolshevism, and Moscow was the Mecca of Labour. There were many powerful parties tinged with subversive doctrines. Jews had great influence both in England and India, and the Jew, though not a subversive, is not a great admirer of the civilization of the mystical Babylon. The Secretary of State was proud to call Gandhi his friend. Indeed, for many months a very injudicious policy had been adopted of fawning on and appealing to Gandhi to repress the disorders which naturally

followed from his teaching. This he was generally ready to attempt, but the position in which he was thus placed merely increased his opinion of his own importance, and magnified that importance in the eyes of his followers.

An insurrection now broke out in Malabar. Malabar was in old days the first part of India to which the adventurous merchant sailing before the monsoon arrived. The people of Malabar practised polyandry—that is to say, the women did not marry, but contracted alliances more or less permanent with such persons as they thought proper. Among the visitors to Malabar were the Arabs. These formed unions with the local women, and a mixed breed sprang up. Islam was thus firmly established in Malabar long before Mahmud of Ghazni came through the passes of Afghanistan. The religion spread largely among the depressed classes, who in the system of Malabar were treated by the superior castes as hardly human. The religion still spreads. The Mopilla is ignorant, but extremely attached to his “pearl-like faith”; and the Ghazi, unknown elsewhere in India proper, was common enough in Malabar. He is also extremely oppressed by the Hindu landlord, usurer, and official. The Government had never done much to protect him. Hindu influence has always been very strong in Madras. Government had attempted to turn him into a soldier, but the experiment had been abandoned with undue pre-

cipitancy. He was thus poor and oppressed, and oppressed by infidels. He had occasionally risen in arms, seeking a paradise which was denied on earth. Many a time had large bodies of troops been compelled to operate against small bands of desperate fanatics. Ten Mopillas or so would break out and kill the enemies of the faith. Then they would take post in some strong building, and sell their lives dearly, neither giving nor asking quarter. The troops respected these brave men, and shot them down like mad dogs.

Madras was at this time ruled by the most amiable of Governors. He obtained the love and loyalty which only a high-bred English gentleman can win in India. But his defect was that of Pegasus of old. So great had been the triumphs of his tact and diplomacy, that he thought these weapons would always and everywhere suffice. With impunity the emissaries of Gandhiism preached through Malabar the diabolic nature of the Government. With impunity the leaders of the Khilafat party expatiated on the persecution of Islam and the profanation of the holy places. Local fanatics drew the conclusion, and there was a universal rising. Outlying Europeans were killed. But the wrath of the Khilafat kingdom fell mainly on the Hindu oppressors, and there was a general massacre and forced conversion of persons, who may have been useless and oppressive but were at any rate British subjects, and entitled



to protection. The Government was forced to pour troops into Malabar. The Mopillas had no arms, but the country was difficult and unhealthy, and the rebellion lingered on for months till the whole country was laid waste and famine compelled surrender. The Mopillas were such an isolated community that these events produced no serious impression on India in general, and the outbreak remained isolated; but it added much to the horror felt for the Government which could neither prevent its subjects from being misled nor protect them from massacre, but could only kill.

In the Panjab no actual insurrection took place again. But the country has really lapsed into anarchy. Closely allied to Gandhism was the Akali movement. The Sikhs had for a long time been a mere religious sect which attempted to combine Hinduism and Islam. They attracted persecution from the Muhammadans, and rose in arms. The fighting Sikhs, who had devoted themselves to death in the service of the Guru, were Akalis. When Ranjit Singh introduced regular battalions, and when the khalsa went down at the crowning victory of Sobraon, the Akalis had no functions left. Recently there had been a spread of disloyalty among Sikhs, and various members of that community began to take the Akali vows and assume the Akali dress; and wandered about the country, nominally for the purpose of collecting alms and visiting the holy

shrines, but actually seeking occasions of disorder. Many of the Sikh shrines were in the possession of Mohunts, who belonged to the early form of Sikhism. These shrines were rich, and the Mohunts were many of them worldly men. The Akalis tried forcibly to eject these Mohunts from what was their freehold for life. The Mohunts applied to Government, but got no assistance. "This," said Government, "is a religious question, and we cannot interfere." In the same way, if a gang of Sinn Feiners were to seize on Westminster Abbey and the chapter property as improperly alienated from Catholic hands, no doubt the Government would not interfere on similar grounds. The Mohunts now hired Pathan mercenaries and resisted spoliation. The results were that a terrible massacre of Akalis took place. The Government now did intervene, and arrested, tried, and condemned the guilty Mohunt. People were now helpless before the Akalis. "If we do not resist them, we are robbed. If we do resist, we are hanged. What functions does this Government fulfil?"

All over the country there were minor risings and tumults, which in less enlightened days would have been considered serious enough, but now attracted a mere passing notice. In fact allusion to them was considered bad form and the mark of a reactionary. The local rioters or rebels were shot down, the subordinate engineers of rebellion

were tried and convicted, but soon released and rewarded; the main agitators were left to enjoy the most perfect impunity. "What," said the people, "is the use of a Government which cannot protect its friends or punish its enemies"?

A movement began to corrupt the army. The Sikhs had gone far on an evil path. To the Mussulman soldier was depicted the sinfulness of supporting a Government which had laid waste the holy places and was the sworn enemy of the Turks. Both these classes, as also the Hindu, were drawn from the peasants, and the Khilafat movement among the Moslem peasantry, and the agrarian agitation which formed part of the Gandhi propaganda, has bitten deep into the village life. With this movement Gandhi himself and his principal lieutenants formally associated themselves, and indeed the sacred duty of mutiny was a necessary part of the teachings of the Master, as it is of course on the fidelity of the troops that the power of the satanic government ultimately rests. The army was disorganised after the war, and many of the regiments were cantoned in the revolting fastnesses of Waziristan. In the meantime the soldier on furlough, and his relations when he was on duty, were exposed to continual insult and molestation. The soldier applied for protection to his officers, but no assistance was afforded.

Eventually pressure almost amounting to com-

pulsion was put on Simla, and the leaders of the Khilafat party were arrested. Simla was reluctant to prosecute Gandhi, and was therefore compelled to bring against these leaders charges of offences which Gandhi had not *prima facie* committed. This ruled out sedition and treason, and the prisoners were indicted for minor charges, and received a short term of imprisonment. The trial had one advantage, because the aggressively Moslem tone taken up by the prisoners alarmed the Hindus, who were already perturbed by events in Malabar; and even the political Indian thought this dwelling on the theocracy inadvisable, and likely to alarm public opinion in England. From this trial, then, begins the parting between Khilafatism and Gandhism. Indeed, Khilafatism has been rendered rather ridiculous by recent events in Turkey, and is therefore at present of little use as an ally.

Gandhi was also eventually brought to trial, and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment, or rather of detention. By this time he had lost much of his influence, the movement having passed beyond him, and his fate caused little excitement.

Those optimists are, however, in a manifest error that think that all is well. Khilafatism and Gandhism may not be so formidable as they were, but they represent living principles, and those principles subsist and are indeed active as ever. Agitators have learned the lesson that

they may agitate with perfect impunity, and indeed with fair hopes of honour and reward. They expect toleration from Government and support in the legislature. It is their dupes who suffer. If some prominent rebel is unlucky enough to get into jail, Government is almost apologetic, and he and his friends may soon expect that by "a noble gesture" he will soon be released and enabled to carry on his vocation with energies refreshed by a temporary rest-cure.

Clemency is an excellent thing, but weakness is not so admirable. It is an insult to a court immediately to release a rebel duly tried and convicted by that court. The preservation of order is not a matter between the Government and the rebel only. The loyal and peaceful subject has his rights also. The laws prohibit sedition and rebellion, and the executive government who refuses to prosecute criminals, or prosecutes and then pardons them, is exercising a dangerous dispensing power, and is abusing the prerogatives vested in it by law. And such a government will soon find that its agents become disheartened. "Why should we trouble to search for and arrest these criminals? They will only be released in a month or two, and we shall have earned their dislike. It is not to the Government that we can look for support against their enmity." Thus when Government is eventually forced to act with vigour it finds its arm paralysed.

All these transactions passed unnoticed in England. The English people had given the Government full powers to settle the affairs of India, and did not desire to embarrass it by criticism. A powerful interest was enlisted on the side of the reforms, and this interest had almost complete control of the English Press. The few papers which were not so tied were regarded with suspicion as ultra-Tory, and were ridiculed as the organs of the "Die-hard." In India part of the Press was clamorous in its praise of the existing system, and the remainder had still traditions of loyalty to the Government, which was still in a way supposed to be representative of England. All might have gone well had not the people in power called on the Prince of Wales to visit India.

The visit of this young Prince was the excuse for a series of political strikes and riots. He himself was the delight of the human race, so that these insults were not levelled at himself personally. They were therefore directed against the Crown of England. But his house reigns but does not govern. Therefore these events were not protests against any acts of the administration. But his house *does* stand for England. The insults were directed, therefore, against England. The movement was too widespread to be the mere breaking loose of the passions of hooligans. And if it were, what sort of Government is this which cannot keep order in a city for a day or two

when the Heir-Apparent is there? It is, therefore, the action of members of a widespread and well-organised conspiracy which is deeply hostile to England. This hostility cannot be due to any acts of the Indian Government, because that Government is now really the Indian Government, and no longer the mere agent of England. England, therefore, is not responsible for anything amiss in India. The remedy now lies in the hands of the Indians themselves. The ill-feeling, therefore, is purely racial. On what sort of lies have you been feeding us all this time? If you knew that this display of ill-manners was probable, why did you expose the representative of the royal house to it? If you did not, you must be singularly ill-informed." From this visit, then, dates the beginning in England of an uneasy feeling that all was not well in India. Circumstances also led to the removal of the unofficial censorship, and the news which came from India tended to increase that uneasiness.

And this uneasiness was well justified, because in spite of vociferous assertions to the contrary the reforms were not working, or at least not working in the way presumably contemplated by their originators.

In the provinces a feeble and irremovable executive was confronted by an irresponsible legislature over which it had no control. At Delhi a feeble and irremovable executive was confronted

by a legislature over one House of which it had no control. In both cases the Governor was armed with latent dictatorial powers. This was not the intention of the framers of the constitution. It had been intended that certain subjects in the provinces should be administered by a responsible ministry, while certain other subjects were dealt with by the irremovable executive. This preposterous scheme, which was affectingly called dyarchy, was still-born. No minister thought of resigning because he could not command a majority in the House. And this was well, as there would have been no means of replacing him. If he resigned, it was on personal and factious grounds, and his successor was appointed, not from the leader of the opposition, for there was none, or rather there was nothing else, but according to the whim of the Government. Even the framers of the constitution did not suppose that the Government would be able to keep, say, the financial administration and education in entirely separate and water-tight compartments. The executive Government was therefore required to work in harmony with the ministers. The natural result of all this was that the Government became one body, and the ministers were little better than executive councillors. Their dignity, pay, and estimation was, however, less than that of the real councillors, and they were chosen from active politicians; in some cases they were selected from men who had



gone very far in opposition to the Government. One man was made a minister who had been unfortunate enough to have been condemned for waging war against the king or for other alleged treasonable conduct. The executive councils were created where they did not exist, and were (even without counting in the ministers) enlarged. There was nothing in the constitution as to the race of the councillors; but it was postulated that appointments would be made on racial grounds, and that European blood would be regarded as a disqualification. The monopoly of the Civil Service had, of course, quite vanished, and even Indian members of that service were not regarded as possible candidates. It was intended also that, as far as possible, all the provinces should be put under the control of Governors who were also "English statesmen." The Home Government were fortunate enough to find for one important province a Governor who was at once an Indian and an English statesman. At Simla there were no ministers, but the council was increased, and there also Indians who were members of the "moderate" opposition were appointed.

An executive of this kind—namely, a board comprised of a large number of men who are by birth, training, and antecedents antagonistic, and who are not even held together by the common bond of a mutual desire to repulse an opposition which desires to turn them out and take their

places—is always a weak and ineffective executive; more so even when such a board is presided over by a person totally ignorant of the country he is to administer. The stronger the personality of the members, the more upright, honest, and loyal they are, the greater the chance of disagreement. It is for this reason that England hates coalitions. I do not intend to expatiate on this topic; it is axiomatic in politics.

It is also axiomatic in politics that where there is an irremovable executive and an irresponsible legislature, the executive cannot function freely, except in certain peculiar circumstances. The imperium is one and indivisible, and equal and independent powers cannot exist in the same state. The functions of government may be roughly divided into the exercise of executive, legislative, and judicial powers, and these may no doubt be vested in separate organs; but these organs must necessarily be subordinate to the ruler.

Shallow eighteenth-century writers, considering merely the apparent constitution of England, imagined that they had discovered the secret of good government in the radical separation of these functions, and constitutions framed on that erroneous doctrine have cursed humanity for four generations. Any such radical separation is either noxious or impossible.

It is true, say, that judges ought to be impartial. They should not hold their posts at the whim of

the executive. They are to judge according to the laws without regard to the temporary requirements of state policy. But it is the legislature that passes the laws. It is the executive that appoints the judges. It is from the electors who appoint the legislature, and thereby the executive, that juries are drawn. The legislature and executive can in grave cases remove the judges. In grave cases the executive can refuse to carry out decrees or sentences. It is impossible, therefore, that the judiciary should ever form a corporation permanently hostile to the executive and legislature. If it were possible for it so to do, it would probably bring the state to ruin; for the judicial power, if exercised without any control, can paralyse the Government. Still more deleterious is any real separation of legislative and executive functions. The executive can do nothing without legal sanction and without money, and it is in the hands of the legislature to give the Government the powers which that Government thinks necessary, and to raise and assign funds. On the other hand, the executive is to carry out the laws passed by the legislature, though it may think them noxious. England is well acquainted with the advantages of this form of government. She suffered from it for about a hundred years. Under it one king went to the scaffold and another to St Germain's. There were three civil wars. The corpses of the brave, the loyal, and the patriotic polluted every

market-place and every cross-road. The slums of Amsterdam and of Paris were filled with men who might have been the glory of the kingdom. England, at one time and soon to be again the arbiter of the destinies of Europe, ranked in the scale of nations below Portugal and Venice. It was this system which made Ireland what it is. It was this system which lost the American colonies. It was the abandonment of this system which preserved Canada. It is now an axiom of British politics that there must be the closest union between the executive and the legislature.

In pre-Stuart days this union was preserved by the reluctance of the legislature to come to a struggle with the Crown. The Tudors were not dependent on pecuniary grants for the conduct of the Government in normal times; their royal revenues sufficed. They knew the country perfectly, and did not undertake any policy likely to lead to expense without well knowing that the country would approve of it. Having this support in the country, and the king's name still being a tower of strength, they were enabled to master their legislatures; and never hesitated to use coercive process towards individual members who set themselves against the royal, which was also the national, will. At a later period corruption was tried with remarkable success. At a still later period a combination of corruption and indirect nomination made the legislatures

docile enough. But since 1832 none of these means have been possible.

The executive Government of England is therefore a committee of the legislature. If the legislature seriously disapproves of the actions of any one of the members of the managing committee, it turns the whole body out of office and proceeds to indicate the persons who it thinks should be appointed in its place. Thus there can never be long a lack of harmony between the legislature and the executive. This system has its disadvantages, both theoretical and practical; but the existence of a feeble executive is not generally one of them. The executive, while it is in power, is perhaps too strong and uncontrolled.

The Indian legislatures did not perhaps purposely embarrass the Government. Probably they wished to make the reforms a success. A certain amount of wise legislation was carried through; a certain amount of wise advice was given; but the radical vices of the system did not fail to show themselves, and the deadlock, always certain, became more and more imminent. The Houses could not abstain from captious and destructive criticism, from interference with individual administrative acts, from the introduction and passing of deleterious and *ad captandum* resolutions, and from an attempt by means of such resolutions and by the power of the purse to transfer the executive power to themselves.

The Government, confronted by this attitude and anxious to avoid a deadlock, showed a very conciliatory spirit. The House did not like repression. The Government repealed all the repressive laws on which it would ultimately have to rely for its very existence, threw open the jails, and censured too active officers. The House showed a taste for protection. Government raised funds by a tariff which hit hard the European and the peasant. The House disliked militarism. Government cut down its establishments, entered into a shameful treaty with Afghanistan, and abandoned its frontier policy. The House showed a dislike of the European agency. The Government lost no opportunity of praising and rebuffing the services. It started on a process of Indianisation of the army, which was not greeted with much enthusiasm by the said army. And it showed evident signs of a desire to stop the recruitment of the services from England. It considered with sympathy suggestions for the confiscation of the rights of the Sikh Mohunts, and for the "regulation" of other religious establishments. It largely reduced its own religious establishments. It cut down to the bone certain heads of expenditure, and lavished money on other departments, the application of funds being regulated, not by the utility, but by the popularity of the department.

One very remarkable instance may here be

given of the new and conciliatory attitude of Government. We heard much of a change in the "angle of vision," but such a change, if it causes the percipient to imagine that what is really a snake is a rope, is dangerous.

Certain persons, Indians and Europeans, were suspected of being guilty of conspiracy to defraud Government in respect of munitions. An elaborate inquiry was held, and it was decided to prosecute. The principal European accused was in England, but proceedings were taken to obtain his extradition, and meanwhile a case was launched against the Indians. At the first hearing the Crown counsel rose and said that he was instructed to withdraw the case under orders of the Government of India. He added that this was not to be taken as an admission that there was no *prima facie* case, or that the prosecution was unjustifiable. Here, then, was a strange position. Either the Indians accused were guilty, in which case enormous offenders were to escape scot-free, or they were innocent, but their reputation was blasted. Meantime proceedings were to continue against the European accused. This case excited comment. It then appeared that one of the members of council had thought that the prosecution was unadvisable for political reasons—as it might lead to financial troubles, and consequent discontent in a certain important city,—and had therefore, after informal consultation with two of his friends, quashed it.

The Government of India hastened to repudiate its action, and the member was forced to resign. Nothing was heard of the friends who had tendered him unofficial advice. But this by no means was a satisfactory solution of the difficulty. In the first case the theory of corporate responsibility is strong in the case of the Indian Government, and up to that time there had been no shirking of it. An official act of one member was the official act of all. This constitutional innovation threw open "a serious door" to all sorts of unpleasant political developments. How can the responsibility of the whole board be enforced if it is not responsible for the acts of each of its members? And if the board is not so responsible, how can it check the activities of its individual members?

Further, what must have been the atmosphere of Simla when an experienced and able officer, who had been living in and absorbing that atmosphere all his official life, could make such an error? In those high places it was clear strange idols were adored with rituals unfamiliar to the common herd, and on their altars were being laid very strange offerings.

This, though a striking, was by no means an isolated case; and such cases, coupled with the obvious reluctance of Government to prosecute the leaders of sedition, while the jails and graveyards were full of the bodies of their dupes, led the public to suppose that any person, so long as he



was powerful and had influence with any of the persons now in power, could commit offences with impunity. Also, there seemed no guarantee for the honour of the innocent. Thus people were led to mistrust British justice. But it was on justice that the Empire rested. Empire may last if the administration is weak. It cannot endure if justice is denied.

And for the agents of the Government a dismal horizon was opened. They are responsible for law and order. The courts are already somewhat hostile to them. Now the executive Government appears also to have decided on a policy of sympathy to crime. "How long will administration be possible, and what guarantee is there even for our lives and honours?" And in no long time there was evident proof of the reality of this danger. An eminent officer was accused of foul corruption. He wished to prosecute his slanderers. He did so without obtaining the permission of his departmental head, being under the impression that no sanction was required. His departmental head attempted to burk the prosecution, and that failing, resigned.

This may have been all very right and proper, but the point is that these measures were not the measures of Government. Some of these things they would not have done willingly, and others they would have done in a different way. The policy was the policy of the legislatures, not of

the Government ; but the Government was responsible and the legislatures were not. It would have been better, therefore, had the Government been responsible to the legislatures. And the Government felt this, because it accepted a resolution calling for an immediate revision of the constitution (which had now been working for one whole year) with the object of giving the legislatures more direct control.

The Government was still nominally the representative and agent of England. It was actually as much a creature of the Indian legislature as if it had been composed of Indian ministers selected from the Houses, and giving advice to the Viceroy or Governor on the Dominion model.

The Government went very far in the path of conciliation, but one thing it was not yet prepared to do openly. It was reluctant to break its word passed to a set of persons who might resent such breach of faith. It had promised the Indian princes to protect them against blackmail by the vernacular Press ; but it was in such haste to expose its own policy and the reputation of its own officers to "enlightened criticism" that it had neglected, when freeing the Press from repressive statutes, to make an exception in case of wanton attacks on the princes. The legislature refused to pass the necessary Act to punish such offences, and the Viceroy was obliged to use his latent dictatorial powers. Then the Houses, wishful to eradicate

the British services, had seen with regret and dismay a proposal to appoint a Commission to investigate the actual condition of the services. It refused the necessary funds, and the Viceroy was compelled again to use these extraordinary powers. Finally, the deficit still persisting, and the appetite of the House for protection being still unabated, it refused to grant funds except in the form of increased tariffs. When it was demonstrated that this measure would merely check imports without increasing revenue, it suggested further economies, particularly in army expenditure, or a policy of tampering with the currency or other financial jugglery. Government proposed an increase of the tax on salt—a disagreeable tax, no doubt, but one not oppressive to the people, productive, and easily levied. The House rejected this Bill, and Government was faced with a deficit. Government explored all other possible sources of revenue, and made certain suggestions, but the House proved unaccommodating.

Fortified with the favourable opinion of the Council of State (the Second Chamber), the Viceroy now certified the Bill, and it became law. This excited much ill-feeling in the House, and the legality of the action of the Viceroy was challenged, some persons being fatuous enough to maintain that the power of certification did not extend to money bills. If it did not, the power would be

useless, as it is by the power of the purse that legislature controls the executive. Attempts at agitation were made, but the country was perfectly indifferent; and the well-wishers of Government were not displeased at seeing that there actually was a point beyond which conciliation could not go. But those who saw in this action of the Viceroy the doom of the reforms, were not far wrong. Government cannot be carried on by the occasional intervention of a *deus ex machina*, especially an apologetic and explanatory *deus ex machina*; and it was clear that the attempts to carry on the Government by conciliation and by a policy of perpetual concession had failed. A deadlock was therefore imminent, and could only be averted by a change in the constitution. That change could only be in the direction of making the executive responsible to the legislature on the Dominion principle. It would then not be enough for a tribune of the people to thunder against the salt tax or the army which made that tax necessary. He would know that if the House accepted his views, he would have to carry on the Government either without an army or without funds to pay for it.

For the lack of harmony between the executive and the legislature was functional, and could not be avoided. If any one could have avoided it, it was the present Viceroy. Some Viceroys of the prancing proconsul type would have come

into conflict with their legislatures at once. The House might earlier have engaged in conflict with a weak and squeezable Viceroy. Lord Reading was neither. Wise, prudent, equitable, temperate, and equally removed from vanity or lack of self-confidence, he for three years had carried on the administration under unheard-of difficulties; and if he failed in the long-run, if, in fact, he could not build up a strong English party where the materials for which did not exist, he is not to be blamed. It is difficult to make bricks without straw. It is impossible to make them without clay.

Panditji had thus succeeded. He had brought matters to such a condition that the only solution was the grant of Dominion Government. That meant that the executive Government of India would now be selected from the literate castes, who formed the bulk of the Houses. There was no possible opposition except from factious members of his own party, and though the administration would be carried on in the name of the Crown of England, the English Government would have no rights of interference. The English had thus lost the dominion of India.

It remains now to gather up a few loose threads, and in particular to see how this new state of things was likely to be accepted in the country. Almost any constitution will work well if those responsible are anxious to make it function. Probably of all constitutions that of the Roman

Republic in ancient days and that of the American Republic in the present age are most obnoxious to criticism. Yet inefficiency cannot be predicated of either, because the citizens of those republics were determined to make the constitution march, and it did march. In India, outside official circles, the constitution had no friends. It was a constitution which, given certain conditions, might have been effective enough, and which might have developed organically into something worth having, but these conditions did not exist.

The form of the constitution was not that approved of officially by the Government of India, nor that originally devised by the ingenious architect. There had been a great orgy of constitution-making, and some very remarkable productions had resulted—a sort of pathological museum of abortive empires which would have gladdened the heart of Sieyès. But nothing like the scheme actually settled on is there to be found. However, Simla was soon converted to the new evangel, and adopted it with the zeal of converts. To this day, to express any doubt of the success of the reforms is little better than treason: “They must work; therefore they do work.” Certain of the English papers, particularly those which were not altogether free from official or other influence, joined in the official doxology. But with the exception of these two classes, the reforms met with small approval.

Perhaps the opinion of the chiefs is irrelevant, as they are not directly affected by the reforms. They were loyal to the Crown, and were sorry to see the English abdicate. "Still, if they are bent on doing so, that is their own affair. Who knows? Perhaps the old days are returning? The man with the army and the man with money—may there not be an opening for him? Why should not one of us be Viceroy or Vicar-General of the Empire? It is not for ever that the Bunnia and Brahmin, or the nominee of the Bunnia and Brahmin, will sit on the Peacock Throne. Meanwhile, admirable is the sympathy and beneficence of the Wazir-i-Hind. Now for the first time we are masters in our own states." Such were the varying thoughts of some of the chiefs. Many of them carried their admiration into practice, and set up in their own states institutions fashioned on the new model. There was *there* perfect harmony between the executive and the legislature.

India is a land of nobles. Many of them are idle, sensual, and improvident enough, but with the vices of an unemployed aristocracy they possess many of the virtues of a landholding nobility. Illiterate, and contemptuous of literacy as an art only suitable for Brahmins, Kayasths, and Bunnias, they looked to the army for their career, and it was from this race that came the best of the cavalry and the best of the Indian

officers. They regarded the literate classes as their hereditary enemies. The British Government, after shaking off the influence of Turgot, had always been their friend, and had done its best to save them from the results of their own improvidence. Consequently they were, as a class, loyal to the Government. This class got on extremely well with the English civil and military officers, and had no respect for one of their own countrymen, however high his official position was, unless he was, which was very rarely the case, one of themselves.

This nobility regarded the abdication of the British with incredulous horror. In most provinces they were in a hopeless minority, and they saw themselves given over, bound hand and foot, to their ancient and despised enemies. The argument, "You are Indians, your valour and loyalty in the war is therefore to be imputed to India. The Bunnias and Brahmins are also Indians. Therefore, a reward given to them is a reward given to India. Therefore, the introduction of this constitution is a reward given to *you*," proved too subtle for these somewhat childlike minds.

The whole of India is divided into villages. There are hundreds of thousands of them. A cluster of mud huts, a temple or two, some old trees, a well; an open space in the centre is the nucleus. Round about lie the arable, pasture, and



waste of the village. Here lives and dies the peasant. The real Indian nation is here, that hardy patient folk whose labour pays the taxes, and whose blood has built up the Empire and kept the gates.

He has his defects, for he is a man, and a peasant, and ignorant. But he is on the whole honest, and temperate, and pious. He is a good son, and a kind father, and an affectionate husband. No poor rate is needed. The poor, the old, the infirm, the mendicant are all welcome to share his pittance. Loyal he is to those who know how to command his loyalty. Dignified, too, and courteous in his way to such as merit such treatment. Possessed also of a rather acrid rustic humour. The reforms that this class would have liked would have been the sweeping away of the elaborate mechanism of Government, and the installation in each small subdivision of an experienced English officer vested with all functions of Government. It is this class that had profited most under the old régime, under which cultivation had spread over the whole Empire; except in such areas as, having been totally ruined by predatory war, had relapsed to the malarious jungle, where none may live save the man and beast of the forest. The peasant was perhaps not vocally grateful, for he was a peasant and inarticulate, but to him the sirkar was a great and beneficent, though

somewhat incomprehensible, creature. In that organisation, and in its European agents, he had a childlike faith, which was rarely disappointed. This class, which was the most meritorious of all the classes of India, was to get nothing by the reforms, hardly even a vote. Indeed, the pious hope of the authors of the reforms was that he would now be misgoverned and oppressed. He would thus be inclined to take an interest in politics, and might end up as a good democrat. The Indian peasant has often been oppressed, but he has never become a good democrat. He prefers to redress his grievance by a process more summary than ours.

The peasant did not understand these beneficent intentions, and I do not suppose would have been very pleased if he had. He knew and cared nothing about the reforms. He did not look much further than the district officer, and the district officer was still an Englishman.

He did find, however, agitators going about the country inciting him to violence. Sometimes he listened. They told him that the Government had fallen, and that now was the time to pay off old scores. Sometimes, then, the quiet orderly law-abiding cultivator was turned into a unit of a shrieking fanatical mob bent on murder and arson. Then he was shot down or hanged. Sometimes he was the victim of these outrages because he had paid his taxes, or because his

brother was a soldier. The sarkar seemed unable to protect him. A great horror sprung up in the minds of the people. The sarkar is not dead. It is alive and as omnipotent as ever, but it is mad.

Below these were the low castes. Many millions of them. The old régime had not been able to do much for them. Hinduism had been too strong. But it had done something. It had given them equal rights before the law, though it was not always able to enforce those rights. It had tried to give them education. It had found a small place for them in the administration. It had restrained the worst excesses of Hinduism against them. It had, to a certain extent, propagated its own humanitarian ideas among the masses. It had provided them with wells and rest-houses, from which they were excluded by the Hindu system. It had fed them in famines and given them medicines in sickness. They knew nothing of politics, and if they had grasped the meaning of the reforms, they would not have been over-delighted at the knowledge that their champions had abdicated, and that they were to go back body and soul under the old grievous sovereignty and command.

As for the political Indian, the moderate at first joined in the chorus of praise of the reforms, but he soon found them inadequate. His true policy was loyally to co-operate with the Government,

demonstrate that he was capable of working the machine, and then he might reasonably enough be given control. He was, however, impatient, and pushed matters to the deadlock. He now joined in the clamour that the reforms were a hollow sham, and that nothing short of immediate Dominion Government would "meet the aspirations of the Indian people." As for the crypto-extremist, playing the game of the enemies of the constitution under the guise of a loyal but disappointed friend, he of course was only too anxious to see the whole system crash.

The extremists, who now included in their ranks the far greater part of the political Indians, had displayed an unexampled fatuity, completely proving the "Die-hard" position that, whatever abilities this class may have, real political ability is not one. "The reforms are the invention of Satan," they said. "We will not participate in the accursed thing. We will be neither electors nor elected." They, therefore, abstained from standing, and contented themselves with intimidating candidates and electors. The moderates, therefore, had the field to themselves, and, with the exception of crypto-extremists, the extremists were not represented either in the imperial or the provincial assemblies. Had they stood for election they would have swept the board in eight out of ten open constituencies, and would have commanded a majority in all legislatures. They might then

have taken up an obstructive attitude, throwing out all Government measures and refusing all supplies. Had they done this, then, probably in any case, but certainly under the then existing régime, Dominion self-government would at once have been granted; and they could then with perfect freedom have carried out the extremist programme. Or, and this would perhaps have been wiser, they might, by bargaining with Government, have extracted from it such concessions that they might have forced it itself to carry out, in substance if not in name, the greater part of the said programme. Their folly threw away this chance, and they are now trying to retrace their steps; but they are by no means so well-organised as they were three years ago, and the Hindu-Moslem split may lead to difficulties in their way. Still, in so sympathetic an atmosphere as that of the legislative assemblies (for the moderate, whether a real moderate or a crypto-extremist, is not in the least likely to display much anxiety to support the Government) a well-organised minority can do great things. What it does, however, will not be on the lines of "making the reforms a success."

The mercantile community had passed through a series of storms. There had been four years of gigantic war profits, followed by a fearful collapse. Then there had been the sudden rise and equally sudden fall of exchange. During the war many of the wholesale merchants had entered into direct

relations with the British manufacturer, who thus saved the profit of the European importing firms, and gave very large credit facilities. The wholesale merchant now found it impossible to fulfil his contracts, and thousands of Indian firms who a year or two before had been opulent were now trembling on the verge of bankruptcy. These men were bitterly resentful of what they thought was the foolish and dishonest policy of Government in respect of the exchange, and were not undesirous of new things. They were thus not disinclined to the programme of the extremists. For the reforms they cared nothing. Some of the small class interested in cotton-mills were supporters of the reforms, as they would have been of any system which, by imposing protection, held out fair promise that the industry in which they held shares would continue to pay dividends at 200 per cent. The vast bulk of the community was, however, perfectly indifferent to politics. The British Government suited them: it kept order, improved communications, enforced contracts somewhat ruthlessly. Its elaborate series of courts was an oppression no doubt, but it was an oppression which suited the merchant. In that arena the conflict between him and an illiterate peasant or a spendthrift noble was rarely in doubt. The reforms in no way menaced this machine. On the contrary, the men of the new régime were lawyers, the friend and accomplice of the Bunnia.

One feature of the new scheme was, however, not so agreeable. There was much disorder. In the small market-towns, whether it is the national army which is attacking the officials of a satanic Government; or the warriors of the Khalifa who are making a demonstration of soul force; or Satyagrahis who are enforcing a general strike; one of the most popular items on the programme is the looting of the bazaar, and the consequent robbing of the Bunnia and, if possible, the destruction of his accounts. The mercantile classes were therefore somewhat divided in opinion. They took little interest in politics and none in democracy. If they favoured the new scheme, it was with the reservation that they would cease so to do if it cut down their profits. Provided that their profits were kept up and order maintained, they would rally round any government in possession.

The artisans took no interest in politics, and stood to make very little from the reforms, which they did not understand. They had profited much by the British régime, and had little sympathy with the literate classes, whom they respected and mistrusted. Certain features of the extremist agitation appealed to them; but they, like the mercantile community, would support any government which could keep the peace and increase prosperity.

Taking India as a whole, I should say that

about 349,000,000 of the population were indifferent or hostile to the revolution, and indeed were quite ignorant as to what was happening. Of the remaining million about 800,000 were more or less in open sympathy with the extremists, and therefore regarded the reforms as the work of Satan. Of the remaining 200,000 (the so-called moderate party), about 150,000 were crypto-extremists, whether they knew it or not, and about 40,000 of the balance were openly proclaiming that the reforms were inadequate and that further constitutional changes were immediately necessary. This leaves about 10,000 persons (half of them women) who were actually in favour of the reforms as they stood, including, of course, the promise to progress. Now, a body of 10,000 in a population of 350,000,000 is not very considerable. It might, however, carry out its policy. Revolutions are generally the work of minorities, and very small minorities. I doubt if the really genuine Whigs at the time of the British revolution were more than a small part of the British electorate, and of course the electorate was a very small part of the population. The revolutionary party in America in 1776 was not composed of a majority of the colonists. In France the Jacobins were a small and insignificant clique. But all these parties came to power, and were able to carry out their policy because they received support in the country. The mass of the people, though perhaps not very



clearly understanding the policy of the party, and not altogether approving of what they did understand, nevertheless recognised that these men had the root of the matter in them.

The Indian reformist was apparently in a commanding position. He, or his ally the crypto-extremist, abounded at the Bar, and had control of the more respectable part of the Press. He could speak English well, and was versed in all the latest political ideas. He therefore could pose before the British people as the proper spokesman of India. The Government of India was apparently ignorant that there were any other Indians. But what he lacked, and lacking that he lacked all, was any real and genuine support in the country. The mass of the people, if they felt anything one way or the other, felt he was a hybrid, and that his policy was anti-national. "If the direct rule of the British must go, we will not choose as our leaders men whose only claim to leadership is that they are half-British in customs, ideas, and policy. Let us revert to national ideals and national leaders." It was this consciousness on the part of the moderates—namely, that they were lacking in real support in the country, that, in fact, they "could not deliver the goods" under the contract with the British—which made them inclined to maintain that the British had not kept their part of the contract; and to seek support by coquetting with extremist movements which

they knew to be dangerous, and with which they had no real sympathy. It was not with such help or such defenders that the city could repulse the attacks of the hosts of darkness. It was more probable that one day the garrison would *en masse* swear allegiance to the enemy, hang out the rebellious standards on the wall, and fling open the gates to the victorious besiegers.

Meantime, what of the agents of Great Britain? They had loyally accepted the reforms. Many of them had uneasy suspicions, and some felt that even tacit approval was in a way a betrayal of their trust, for it was to them only that the unpolitical Indian could look for protection and the preservation of his interests. But there was really no means by which without insubordination or disloyalty to the directorate they could openly express their views. Matters of general policy were not their business. The statesmen responsible for the reforms were lavish in praise of the services. It was pretty openly hinted that loyal support of the new scheme would meet its due reward. It was recognised that the reform scheme would lead to a large increase of the Indian element in the administration, both in the directorate and the agency; but there were numerous assurances that this change would be gradual, and that all vested interests would therefore be unaffected, and all responsible parties admitted that it was on the help and co-operation of the services that the

success of the reforms must depend. It was laid down as an axiom that there must always be a large British element in the administration. Most of the members of the services actually believed these representations. This was perhaps convincing proof that they were not very fitted for new conditions; for it showed a sad lack of knowledge of the nature of that crafty animal the politician, and, what is more surprising, of human nature, and particularly of Indian human nature.

It soon became obvious that there was no place for Europeans in the agency under the constitution as it stood.

Indeed, their existence was obviously incompatible with the theory on which the whole scheme rested. A European directory and a European agency; a European directory and an Indian agency; an Indian directory and an Indian agency; all these are logical enough; but an Indian directory and a European agency was obviously preposterous. If the Indians are capable of providing the directorate, they must surely be capable of providing the agents. If they are incapable of properly performing these minor and less important administrative functions, how can they be capable of performing the more important and more complicated directorial functions? The party now in power was conscious of this. Moreover, it is not in accordance with human nature to admit inferiority. It was hardly likely, therefore, that Indians would

admit that there was any necessity for the employment of Europeans. Further, it is not usual for any class of men to see with pleasure emoluments and power, which might be vested in men of their own class or in close relations, in the hands of foreigners. That the Europeans, being "kinless loons," were likely to be impartial was no particular recommendation. That they were not corrupt was admitted, but there are qualities which are more valuable than financial purity (which is an austere and arid virtue). There was a lack of sympathy (which in the language of the Indian politician means an absence of weakness) and a consequent lack of flexibility. Moreover, the crypto-extremist looked on the European official much as the Syrian Moslem looked on the Templars or Hospitallers. "We should make short work of the Baldwins and Amalrics and the Pullani in general if we could only get rid of these Frankish devils." The European official was no doubt employed in India, and under the orders of the Indian Government; but at the time when he entered into his contract with the Crown of England the Indian Government was the delegate and agent of the Crown, and he regarded himself, not as a mere functionary of an Oriental Government, but as the representative of the foreign culture. Such a body of men might prove a serious obstacle to the ulterior designs of the party. Such a body were no very fit agents for an administration which was already

becoming tinged with Orientalism. Thus there was not likely to be much good feeling in exalted circles towards the Indian services. Moreover, it was only about fourteen years since the Home Government, and consequently the Indian Government, had decided to "come down on the side of the Congress." Up to that time the Congress had been in a state of hostility to the Government. Collisions had occurred, and Government was occasionally forced to use coercion of a mild type. It was their agents who in the exercise of their duty had applied this coercion. Many men now in power, therefore, were men who had trembled before some European magistrate or policeman, or had begged (not in vain) for the pardon or protection of some European officer.

The Indian has a queer sense of fairness, and he rarely had any personal grudge against an individual officer who, in the exercise of his duty, had punished him or his friends justly and humanely; but naturally he rather disliked the system, and was therefore not likely to be very enthusiastic about the men who worked it.

The Government, therefore, early discovered that there was no surer way of conciliating public opinion, of earning applause, as showing "real breadth of view and sound statesmanship," and acquiring momentary popularity than by damning and mortifying its European agents.

Wherever it was possible posts were conferred

on any Indian available; where the law reserved certain appointments for the members of the services, Government "accepted in principle" resolutions calling either for the abolition of the posts or the modification of the law. It was the evident intention of the legislatures to reduce the services to bodies of mere functionaries, and badly paid and ill-treated functionaries at that. It was quite clear that with the progress of the reforms, and the consequent complete domination of the legislature over the executive, there would be no place for the European. Finally, the Government issued a circular which showed clearly enough that they intended to put an end to recruitment of Europeans for the Indian services. There was hardly any need for such a circular, as it was getting very difficult to obtain recruits in England. The Indian services had once been attractive enough, and there had always been a great number of competitors at the examinations held to fill up the annual vacancies. But now there were more vacancies than candidates. The Secretary of State was obliged to have recourse to the power of nomination conferred on him as a war measure. There was at present no lack of demobilised officers who would accept any post rather than starve.

No officer had any confidence in the directorate. They believed that it would be only too willing to sacrifice any officer to earn a little temporary popularity. And even if the directorate *did*

support its officers, there was no certainty that it would be able to protect them. The law, for instance, directed you to arrest a thief. You imagined a person to be a thief. You arrested him. He had friends, and you immediately found your action made a state question, and resolutions passed in the legislature, in spite of Government opposition, calling for your dismissal or prosecution. Or you grievously suspected some influential person of abetting assassins. You took legal process against him, and you found your action reversed, and your victim petted and flattered by persons who had much weight in the Government. In such circumstances the wisest thing to do is to draw your salary, fill up your forms, and let things drift, doing nothing without distinct orders in writing. But this kind of service is not attractive to able and conscientious officers.

Moreover, it was not even lucrative. Except in the Civil Service, Indian pay had never been over-generous, and pensions were very inadequate. And now even the Civil Service was feeling the pinch. The condition of many officers was deplorable. Bankruptcy impended over all, especially over those who had been criminal enough to marry, and foolish enough to have children.

Certain increases of pay had been sanctioned to compensate officers for the rise of the cost of living between 1860 and 1913. But as usual in

the case of Indian financial concessions, the benefit was more apparent than real, and of course conditions had changed since 1913. There had been a great increase in prices since that year. All departments clamoured for a living wage. To the members of the purely Indian services great concessions were made. For the Europeans nothing was done. Allowances on the Whitley model the Government could not grant, because such allowances, in accordance with a "sympathetic" interpretation of the statute and rules thereunder, were votable by the legislature, and the legislature had no intention of voting any such items. To increase pay would have excited clamour. The Government, therefore, said, "In the abstract, no doubt, you are entitled to a living wage. We are not, however, bound to give you more than we agreed. We shall, therefore, hold you strictly to the terms of your contract. If you do not like it, that is your affair."

The younger and more active members of the services who were not encumbered with family claims now thought they might, without imputation of disloyalty, leave the service of a Government which apparently did not value their services, and they applied to be allowed to retire on a proportionate pension. Government at last permitted this on somewhat shabby terms, but they made it a condition to their even considering the request that the officer should make a solemn declaration



that he considered himself unfit for service under the new conditions. Having got this admission, Government would then consider whether his request to be allowed to retire should be granted. If they refused it, the position of an officer who had admitted on paper that he was unfit for employment would hardly be dignified or agreeable.

These proceedings of the Government of India at last revolted the sense of justice never very long absent from the minds of Englishmen; and the Home authorities, in spite of the bitter protests of Indian politicians and the opposition of the Government of India, decided to intervene, and resolved on the appointment of a Commission to go into the whole question.

I do not wish to prejudge the findings of the Commission. But my belief is that the maintenance of the European element in the services is impossible and undesirable. If India is to be free and to have Dominion status, she must be entitled to employ her own servants; and she has clearly indicated that she has no wish for the continuance of a European agency. To force such on her would only be exasperating. She could not be compelled to treat them properly or to support them. If she finds it necessary to employ Europeans at all (which is most improbable), let her enter into direct contracts with her future employees. There is thus much more likeli-

hood of her keeping faith, and if faith is broken, then the shame will not fall on the Crown of England.

In no long time, therefore, I think that the programme of Panditji will be fully carried out. Both the alien directorate and the alien agency will be things of the past, and all the instruments of power will be firmly grasped in hands favourable to him. I do not think myself that he will long retain power. We have moved a long way from the days of the Rishis, and the world is to the master of the legions. But with the future destinies of India England can have no concern.

## CHAPTER IX.

## DISSOLUTION.

WHAT are the lessons of the past? Many, I think, and trite. Mechanisms wear out. Organisms carry in themselves the seeds of death. If there be no faith the will falters, and if the will falter the workman works in vain. Before the clarions of the spirit fall the most mighty ramparts. The British Dominion fell because it was opposed by a strong faith and an unfaltering though evil will. To this faith and will the British had nothing to oppose save tepid preferences and material force. They could not oppose will to will, faith to faith, God to God. Therefore their Dominion passed. But would it had gone down in some great day of disastrous battle rather than perished beneath furtive hands in the darkness of the night and the dungeon! Better the fate of the Cæsars of the East than that of the Cæsars of the West.

As for him who perishes in the light of day, concerning him there are no doubts. *Mortuus est et sepultus est et descendit ad inferos!* The

King is dead, long live the King! But the phantom of the prince slain secretly is unquiet in the tomb. It returns and infects the temples of the living with the contagion of the grave. Mighty and malignant are the manes of the dead Cæsars. Bring out the corpse of Julius into the forum, and let all men see that it is really dead. May over this dead Dominion also some Antonius pronounce the final panegyric. Then, perhaps, we may have done with lies. For in politics fictions have their uses, no doubt, but are on the whole noxious. It may be right to retain and augment the imperium. It may be right to abdicate it. It cannot be right while abdicating the duties to retain the title and attempt to retain the profits.

These views are unorthodox, and to those who hold them is attributed the character of die-hard. This is in modern England among a certain class a term of opprobrium. !I lay no claim to the title. I should make a very pusillanimous martyr. To me the stake of Ridley, the block of Campion, appear extremely unattractive. Honour, constancy, loyalty, and valour I know are but names. I know that no wise man would hesitate to commit a baseness profitable to himself or his party. I know how ungracious a thing is obduracy, and how pliancy is the whole duty of man. Lucretia? A peevish chit. Cato of Utica? The gods themselves have given the whole of mankind to be

slaves to Cæsar. Joan, the good Lorraine? Your age and sex makes you apt for love. The dungeon is dark. There is the agony of the fire. Poor bewildered Tippoo! What has led you to this last blind and blood-stained breach? Here is ignominious death. There are palaces and the peculiar treasure of kings.

That venal publicists should not admire these men and women is not a matter for surprise. But that they should go on to add insult is hard to be borne. But from the beginning it was known that prostitutes are also impudent.

But to this conflict I am not called. He who never lays on His servants a burden more grievous than they can bear led me early forth from the dust, and the slaughter of men, and the clash of arms, and set me in this place of green meadows and quiet streams. Here the thunder of the captains and the shouting comes not at all. Here the crash of empires seems less than the song of the thrush or the cheerful fireside call of the cricket.

But what of the future? My object in writing this treatise is merely to give an account of the fall of the British Dominion in India. I am not to recommend or dissuade from a policy. I do not pretend to be a prophet, and political prognostication is a singularly inept form of prophecy, as any one who will scan the pages of the Annual Register from its inception will find

it easy to admit. As long as it is regarded merely as a parlour game, it has its value; but I have neither time, money, nor spirits to engage in idle amusement. Still, it may be rather of interest to put down the opinions of representatives of various schools of political thought.

To clear the ground it will, I think, be admitted that the maintenance, or rather re-establishment, of direct British control over the destinies of India is now impossible. This vast Empire, with its three hundred and fifty million inhabitants, must now continue with ever-increasing momentum to follow the course on which it has been launched. Kings who abdicate may be wise or foolish, but there can be no question as to the folly of a king who, having abdicated, wishes to resume the sceptre. For him there remains nothing but the halter of Maximian or the dungeon of Victor.

The ultimate goal of all organisations is annihilation; but the question is, what developments will India pass through in the next century or so, and what will be the consequences of such developments to the British Empire?

John Collins, the official optimist, writes as follows:—

“The grant of full responsible government can now no longer be delayed. India will be free to make her own destinies. Protected by the arms and diplomacy of the Empire, she will have

nothing to fear from the foreign foe. An equal partner in the Empire, and no longer a mere possession, she also will develop that exuberant loyalty which is the characteristic of the Dominions. She will require no foreign troops, no foreign officers, no foreign officials. That is not to say that she will not be glad to employ certain experts, but such experts will be her own servants, and will not be forced on her by aliens. The foreign culture, no longer thrust on her, will be welcomed. Free institutions will bring about a passion for democracy, and that love will in turn confirm free institutions. Both together must lead to social reform, and in a very few generations the Indian (except that he is slightly darker and wears different clothes) will be indistinguishable from an Englishman.

"The benefits to the Empire will be incalculable. India will be a vast storehouse of wealth on which the Empire can draw. Its citizens, who cannot long be denied those freedoms which are the right of every Briton, will be welcomed as immigrants into the tropical and sub-tropical parts of the Empire. Kenya, Northern Australia, Natal, vast areas calling out for settlement and exploitation, and at present useless to the white man, will be populated by these new Britons. With freedom must go a great increase in the production of industry. There will be a readjustment and rearrangement of Imperial industries. Each

dominion will devote itself to the manufacture of such raw products as are natural to its soil. Thus we may expect the cotton-mills of Bombay to supply the Empire and the East with all the apparel it needs. It is unthinkable that a free and enlightened India should put a prohibitive export duty on cotton and jute, and a prohibitive import duty on piece goods and gunnies. If India were so ill-advised, the Imperial Government would not act improperly if it remonstrated. Should India be deaf to such remonstrances, it would be left to its folly, and a few years' experience of the evils of protection would cause it to adopt a less reactionary financial policy.

"It is unthinkable that India should repudiate her sterling or contractual obligations; and here again, if she did, the Imperial Government might well remonstrate, or, better still, leave it to time and experience to teach a great and intelligent nation that theft is poor economy.

"That any Imperial inconveniences could arise from the connection of the Empire and a free India is improbable. India has no dangerous foreign neighbours. Afghanistan, before a free India, is negligible. The whole population would rise as one man to protect hearth and home from barbarous invaders. Russia is in decrepitude, and it is thought that the progress of enlightenment in the great powers of the earth will deter them from wanton aggression. It is true that there



may be unpleasant incidents in connection with isolated foreigners, for it is possible that Indian legislation might bear hardly on certain communities. But foreigners must observe the laws and respect the prejudices of the countries where they happen to be, and in the exercise of her legal rights India would, if necessary, be supported by the whole force of the Empire. In serious cases, no doubt, the League of Nations would intervene to protect one of its members from unjust pressure."

Thus the official optimist, and it is to be hoped that he is right. The amateur vaticinator can compare the cases of Haiti, China, Persia, and Turkey at one extreme, Venezuela and Nicaragua as a medium, and Japan and the United States at the farthest extreme. Or he may, if he prefer it, use the deductive method.

Jan Disselboom, the eminent Afrikaner, writes:—

"I do not know much about India and the Indians, except that there is a certain number of Indians in this dominion, and that we find them a nuisance. Whether they are British citizens or not, we have no intention of allowing any more to enter our territories. But as regards the Empire I have this to say. There is no British Empire, or if there is it is an Empire of opinion only. We are in no way subjects of Great Britain. Great Britain is merely a partner in the concern, and will soon cease to be the

predominant partner. The other partners in the concern are the Great Dominions. Their bond of union with each other and with Great Britain is merely this *quod idem sentiunt*. It is the common sentiment and general agreement on vital points which is natural among men who are all descended from the same closely allied stocks; whose ancestors were exposed to common influences; whose culture was the same; who had memories of common struggles, common victories and defeats; whose institutions in Church and State had developed from the same common origins by reason of the same laws of evolution. It is this—namely, Western civilization—which is *communis patria*. The individual is domiciled indeed in England or in Africa, or in Canada or in the Southern lands, but he is for all that a citizen of a wider and transcendental Empire which has no local situation.

“Those parts of the Empire which are not inhabited by races of which this is true were never partners in the concern. They were the private property of the predominant partner, and their revenues and profits were applicable to partnership purpose.

“With us the bond of Empire was the consent of free men. With them the bond was in the last resort force. They were in theory and practice subject to the Crown and Parliament of Great Britain: our subjection is to the Crown alone.

“To attempt to introduce into this partner-

ship an alien, and thus to expose the whole concern to risks and losses which it did not contemplate, and which it is not inclined to bear, can only lead to the speedy dissolution of the partnership. You can have the white dominions, or you can have the Dominion of India, but you cannot have both.

“To put it shortly, do you think that South Africa is going to war with France because some Russian pilgrim has been clubbed to death in Amritsar?”

So Jan, and there will be many who will agree with him. I think it not impossible that even the British people might say, “India is now free. We cannot therefore control her. She must guide her own destinies without interference from us. That being so, we cannot reasonably be expected to shed a drop of blood or spend a single guinea in her defence.”

Professor Athanasius Giggleswick, the eminent mugwump, writes as follows:—

“The great and beneficent act of the emancipation of India, known loosely as the Reforms, seems to me the noblest act of statesmanship effected since the abandonment of Britain by Honorius. And it is in some ways more laudable an act, because Honorius was in a measure compelled to withdraw the legions, whereas, in the case of India, the British people made a volun-

tary act of abdication of a prized but maleficent superiority. A juster parallel would be the emancipation of the slaves.

“The Indian Empire as it existed before the Reforms was the negation of God erected into a system. In the first place, it was an engine by which one race dominated another. There are facts that show that India was the happy hunting-ground of the Jingo and the Financier, and that the tariffs were manipulated in the interests of British trade. There are facts also that show that vast revenues, wrung from the suffering peasantry, were wasted in providing sinecures for young Englishmen of the upper middle-class. But it is unnecessary to quote facts. By the *a priori* method it is easy to demonstrate that if one race has complete control of another race, the dominant race will convert the subject race into Helots and Gibeonites. The British must therefore have exploited ruthlessly the subjects of the Indian Empire.

“And, as may well be expected, the individual Englishman in India rapidly degenerated from the low standards which his class in Europe have adopted. Here again we have facts. We have the reports of the Reverend Septimius Howler, whose promising little settlement was broken up by the tyranny of some petty local official on a false accusation of illicit distilling; we have the trenchant articles of that great publicist Sitaram

Dikshit; we have the personal observation of Pagett, M.P., on his recent six weeks' tour in India. But here again facts are unnecessary. It may be demonstrated easily and satisfactorily by the *a priori* method that the European, whether official or unofficial, must have been arrogant, cruel, rapacious, and lecherous. Individual man has his passions and is inclined to gratify them (I myself have occasionally cast an eye of concupiscence on a housemaid). And what check can there be to the Englishman in India? There is no public opinion. The people are incapable of resistance. To appeal for redress from the actions of an individual Englishman to the Government or the Courts, is merely to appeal from Cæsar to Cæsar. All the engines of power are in the hands of Englishmen or of renegade Indians.

"The Government of India being autocratic must have suppressed free speech and free printing. The cold, hard despotism covers the country like a sheet of ice. But this sheet occasionally cracks, and it is then possible to see what an ocean of misery lies beneath the bright and stainless surface.

"But even had the Government of India been all that it and its venal apologists pretended, the hegemony of the English must still have lain as a blight on the Indian lands. The Government set formally before itself as the *summum bonum* of all Government merely this, to increase material prosperity. That it did so is denied. Witness

the wars, famines, pestilences unknown to former ages. Witness the ruralisation of a land once pre-eminently the land of cities. Witness the wenlike growth of parasitic centres like Bombay, Karachi, and Cawnpore. But even had the Government carried out its much-vaunted programme; had every man between the Himalayas and Cape Comorin been really assured in normal times of food, clothing, and shelter for himself and his family—what then? Does man live by bread alone? Is man to sacrifice, for the hopes of a bit of dry bread, honour and patriotism, the sense of nationality, the claims of religion? The Indians, I am informed, are a very spiritual race. Look at Tagore. They are very religious. Look at their three hundred and fifty million gods. They were great artists—though perhaps their art does not appeal to us, soaked as we are in the unideal Greek tradition. The soul of the nation expressed itself in magnificent buildings like the pagoda of Shri Rangan, the caves of Ellora, the Taj Mahal, and Sikandar Bagh. They had great warriors and statesmen when our ancestors were robbing the nests of seagulls near the mouth of the Elbe. India was the seat of mighty and civilized Empires ere ever the Dorians sailed from Naupactus. All this great, if alien, civilization went down on the day of Plassey. The first day of servitude takes from a man half his manliness. What of six generations? What an agony it must have been

to so great a race to watch the slow wasting of national ideals; to see its warriors turned into spiritless husbandmen; its saints and sages die off without successors; to find a substitute for temple, mosque, and palace in railway-stations, docks, and municipal markets; to wear the products of the mills of Lancashire instead of those of the looms of Dacca; to study alien codes written in alien languages under the guidance of alien teachers. Man cannot live by bread alone. Better would it have been for the inhabitants of Aryavarta had they perished utterly through domestic faction than that they should have survived a crushed and spiritless race, seeking and hoping merely for the primary requisites of existence—the peck of spelt, the portion of the slave—at the hands of a cold and austere dominion of foreigners from the far Outer Seas.

“It could not and cannot last, and the Reforms are the first and a very important step towards the ultimate goal.

“The three branches of the Upas Tree which at present blasts with its shadow the nation of India, and poisons the first tender shoots of all national endeavours, are European Government, European culture, and European finance. The Reform Scheme will enable the Indian nation in no short time first to lop, then to fell, and then to eradicate this evil growth.

“Some think the struggle will be long and

arduous. There are always worshippers of things as they are. Man is mistrustful of the teachings of pure reason. He looks on all change, however slight, however superficial, with mistrust. Still more uneasy is he at the prospect of deep-reaching and organic change. Again, the English are unreasonably proud of their Indian Empire. It gratifies Bert Smith, the elector of Battersea, to feel that he possesses in his vote the ten-millionth part of a power which keeps three hundred and fifty million fellow-men in subjection. Then there is the party of material interests. There is the militarist gang at Whitehall; there are the bondholders; there is Lancashire and Birmingham and Dundee; there are the thousands of pensioners who, not content with robbing the country while in active service, are now, even in their old age, battening like elderly vampires on the prostrate and almost exanimate body of the victim. These classes, which are numerous and powerful, might, if they had been organised, easily have crushed the Reform Scheme before it was passed into law; and wise was the statesman who moved towards his end, like Siegfried towards the chamber of Chriemhilda, wrapped in a cloak of darkness. But those classes are now impotent, and the destiny of India lies in her own hands. Her total and final emancipation is nearer at hand than men think. In a very few years the rule of the British in India will be as much a thing



of the past as the Continental Dominion of the Plantagenets.

“There may be small difficulties at first, but it is to these very difficulties that I look to furnish an incentive to India to press forward on the road which leads to emancipation. The constitution as at present devised affords numerous opportunities of friction and deadlock. These difficulties can only be surmounted by one party giving way. If it is the Government (which represents the Alien Domination) which gives way, this means abdication by that Alien Domination. If, on the other hand, the Government uses its extraordinary powers to carry on the administration, it is obvious that the Reforms are inadequate, and that in order to secure peace and contentment in India it is necessary to extend them. Indian patriots have only to band together and ruthlessly to refuse all legislation that the bureaucracy demands, and to veto all supplies, to force the Government into surrender either voluntary or imposed from home. It was expected that the political Indians would co-operate with the British, but what co-operation is there possible between two races of such different ideals? I think better of the Indian politician than to suppose that for a little adulation, a few high posts, a little dirty patronage, he will conspire to maintain the loathed dominion of foreigners.

“Both inductively and deductively it may be shown that, even under the most favourable circum-

stances, there is always friction and the chance of a deadlock between an irremovable executive and an irresponsible legislature. Far more difficult is the position of the executive when the legislature intends and plots to bring about deadlock after deadlock.

“It is to be expected, therefore, that in a much shorter time than that ostensibly contemplated by the drafters of the Reform Scheme, the policy of the political Indian will be put into effect either by the tacit permission of the Government or, better, by a Government constituted under a new and more liberal Reform Scheme, rendered necessary by the discovery that the present scheme is unworkable—that is to say, by the grant of full responsible Government, or of Swaraj, as I prefer to call it.

“The first thing will be to get rid of the alien. The foreign bureaucracy must go, and their places be taken by a permanent band of ardent young salaried patriots. Already India is losing its attractiveness to the youth of Britain. These arrogant young people are not satisfied to be put under the control of men who are, as they assert, persons of inferior race. They humorously enough declare that their fortunes, lives, and honour are not safe in such hands. Yet they never considered that the fortunes, lives, and honours of the same race were in any way imperilled under their own régime. Is the Indian more likely to be unjust

to the Briton than the Briton to the Indian? Obviously not. There is no such a thing as race, and I personally would as soon black the boots of a negro from the Gambia as those of a Scotch Duke. Honourable service is honourable to whomever rendered. Therefore, the number of recruits for the services is already much diminished, and many of the new applicants are men of desperate fortunes, the wastage of the great war. But the reluctance or willingness of the youth of Great Britain is really immaterial. India intends to be mistress in her own house, and will not employ servants of alien nationality and doubtful loyalty.

“Still more important is the Indianisation of the Indian army. Surely the mere collocation of the words shows the reasonableness of the idea. It may be the case that there are not many men of the fighting castes who have sufficient education to be appointed officers. But there are many young men of the literate castes only too anxious to serve their country in the barrack-room and on the parade-ground. If the result of the substitution of such officers for the present staff is to make the army less efficient—which by no means is capable of demonstration, for there is no such thing as hereditary aptitude—so much the better. The Government of India will thus be compelled to be pacific. Its revenues will no longer be lavished on Jingo expeditions beyond

the frontier. As regards foreign invasion, a contented country with a strong national army cantoned along the line of the Indus or Sutlej, or, better, the Jumna, can have no fear of mere raiders. Against calculated aggression by a civilized race India will be protected at first by her membership of the Empire, but ultimately by the spread of the democratic idea among the peoples of the earth and the growing abhorrence of militarism among all the great powers.

“With the foreign officials must go also the foreign culture. India must look back to the beautiful calm days of the Vedas, and forget what she has learned from Athens or Rome or London. The democratic idea is implicit in the humane intelligence, and may be deduced from the Shastras as much as from Aristotle. I have never read either, but I know this to be the case. Be just to your fellow-man. That is the Law and the Gospels. From that follows all culture. The rest is vanity, the rest is crime. With the culture must go also the foreign language.

“But I hear you say — ‘But what about the educated Indian?’ (Using education in the arrogant sense of English-knowing.) ‘The reforms were introduced chiefly in order to placate him, and were intended to give him the power which he craved for, and which we thought he ought to possess.’ You are fond of the inductive method. I will give you a few instances. Where

are the Hellenised Jews of the days of the Macedonians? What befell the Hellenism of Parthia? What the Herodians and Libertines? Where is the East-Roman culture? Culture which has no roots in the national existence — culture which is and remains alien, being never adopted by the masses and being never absorbed and transformed by the national vital processes,—such a culture is rejected as soon as the external influence which forced it on the nation is removed. Such a culture is like the gardens of Adonis. It comes to bright bloom, and produces fruits of a kind. The next day it withers and is cast into the sea. Numerous as are the Indians who have some slight smattering of European culture, they are few relatively to the masses of the population. Do you remember the story of Oge and the grains of pepper and the grains of rice? Just as the *gens-de-couleur* succumbed to the negro, just as Voltaire gave way to Voodoo, so we may expect in India a rapid reversion to the indigenous type of culture, and the sudden and total elimination of those who obstinately cling to the poisonous doctrines of foreigners. The educated Indian will have done his part. Just as Haidar and Ranjit Singh attempted to banish the foreigner from the shores of India with the help of arms and tactics taken from those very foreigners, so the enlightened Indians have, by the use of political arts learned from the

foreigner, succeeded in manœuvring those same foreigners out of their dominion. And just as the God-given Government (had it succeeded in its attempts) would with a sigh of relief have abandoned the ordered battalion and the flintlock, and returned to the risala and the lance; so with a sigh of relief will India fling away text-book and manual, code and digest, Wordsworth and Mill, Shakespeare and Burke, and return to the simple and noble culture of the days of its greatness. Already the process has begun. None can mistake the meaning of the demand for sectional and national universities, the encouragement of Ayurvedic medicine, the continual attacks on the use of English as the official language of administration and education, the rise of the vernaculars, and the — I fear — grotesque attempt to make Hindi the *lingua franca* of the country.

“My own books will of course always be studied in India. They contain the truth, and mankind is always anxious to listen to the truth,

“As for the incubus of the British financial system, a vigorous nation arising from the drugged sleep of servility will have no difficulty in throwing it off. The whole gang of parasitic pensioners must be stripped of their ill-gotten privileges. The nation recovering its independence will not acknowledge as due any payments for so-called services rendered not to it but to

its tyrants. It is not necessary to resort to wholesale confiscation, a measure which is abhorrent to the pure-souled democrat. It will be found sufficient by a due adjustment of taxation, especially in the form of enhanced taxation of incomes of absentees, to recover for the country that part of its revenues which are improperly and collusively alienated.

“The same process would naturally apply to that part of the public debt which is held in England. This debt was not contracted for any national Indian purpose. It represents either the infamous claims of the East India Company or the capital spent on lawless wars waged in the interest of the Jingo autocracy; or even for the purpose of extending and confirming the reign of servitude in India herself, or at best the cost of providing India with railways and docks intended merely to facilitate the carrying off of the national wealth or the depression of national manufactures. The true democrat, while careful to uphold the sacred rights of legitimate property, will for that very reason never admit the legitimacy of claims based on fraud and violence. Nor will he regard efflux of time as perfecting a title which is in itself null. *Populo nullum tempus occurrit.*

“Thus a great part of the tribute now paid to England by the Indian peoples will automatically cease. No longer will the miserable peasant of the Punjab see himself forced to set aside half of

his exiguous harvest of rice in order to gratify the greed of some obscure resident of Cheltenham or Hampstead.

“But political freedom is of little avail unless there be economic freedom. The statesmen of India are well aware of this, and they by no means intend to allow the country to become the economic vassal of the foreigner. By a proper manipulation of the tariffs, manufactured goods can be excluded from the country, and raw materials kept within it. No longer will the husbandman of Bengal toil in pestilential marshes in order to provide the Dundee jute-worker with a wage fund. No longer will the vitiated taste of the townsman be allowed to prevail. A free people will be clothed, not in the product of the looms of Manchester, but in that of the handloom—in the simple and beautiful Khaddar which connotes such noble ideals.

“It cannot escape the observer that the same evil might recur in a subtler form. India might in vain exclude the products of foreign factories, and retain in her own limits her own valuable raw products, if at the same time she permitted the flow of foreign capital into her own territories. The foreigner would now draw from the blood and sweat of the Indian artisan working in factories—situated in India, no doubt, but the property of foreign shareholders—those profits which in the form of dividends or debenture interest would be



remitted to the homes of such shareholders. Thus he would again reimpose the foreign tribute to pay which so much of the wealth of the country has been wrung from it. But there are several remedies which may be applied. Such remittal of profits may be prohibited by the legislature, or the profits may be exposed to penal taxation. It is thought even that in accordance with democratic ideals the operations of joint-stock companies, the majority of the shareholders in which are foreigners, might be prohibited. But I would prefer to rely on the patriotism of the people, which would prevent, by a salutary display of violence, the extension of these foreign methods of exploitation to a country which has already suffered from the rapacity of the West. That the local administration or local courts should interfere to protect the foreign robber from the wild justice of the indignant people is unthinkable. Equally unthinkable is it that the Imperial Government would interfere to protect the private speculator.

“Let us raise our eyes from the dust of the present conflict and fix them on the bright vision of a renascent India. A vision, moreover, which is not of remote things, not of the distant realisation of the dream of the poet or prophet, but a vision which will descend to the Earth, and take form and flesh, if not to-day nor to-morrow, yet in the very near future.”

Thus Athanasius, and he has hit off, I think, very happily what may be called the programme of the moderate extremist, if that is not a contradiction in terms.

But, as I say, political vaticination is a mere parlour game. The statesman, and particularly the British statesman, does not care to cross bridges before he comes to them. And in this he is perhaps wise, for in politics some factor is always overlooked, and that factor may prove the most important of all. Thus does Fate banter us. But in that case the official optimist would be well-advised himself to abstain from any forecast of the future. Let him say frankly, "The actual situation was impossible. According to our lights we did the best we could. The issue is with God."

Without, however, assuming the robe of camel's hair, the curious citizen might be excused if he asked just a few questions.

In the first place, is there any guarantee that India will long remain under one Government, provided, that is, that the coercive power of the Empire is removed?

No other power ever succeeded in combining the races of the sub-continent into one political unit for more than a moment. No ruler before Victoria could, without immediate challenge, have turned loose the white horse. Against geography the statesman will fight in vain, but there is nothing

in the geographical history of India to make this unity a necessity. The sub-continent has always suffered from this very thing—namely, that there is and can be no common centre, no nodal point.

The sub-continent is naturally divisible into four great areas. I omit minor enclaves. These are the basin of the Indus, the basin of the Ganges, the central plateau, and the far South, and these geographical divisions correspond roughly to divisions of race, religion, and language. Add to this that each of these divisions was recently (as history goes) under separate governments, and it would appear, *a priori*, that natural centrifugal tendencies might triumph; and that the artificial political entity known as India, in the absence of a strong, external, compulsive force, might cease to exist.

In the next place, what will be the duties of the Empire as regards the maintenance of internal order? The Empire does not usually take this burden on itself in the case of the Dominions. From the other white Dominions the Imperial troops were early withdrawn, and the maintenance of a British garrison in South Africa up to the beginning of the war was attended with great inconvenience. Panditji might welcome the presence of British troops, and might even be willing to contribute to their pay and other expenses, but the position would, I think, soon become impossible.

The Indian Government would, therefore, be compelled to make its own arrangements for maintaining internal order, and for suppressing frontier raids and meeting the first brunt of an invasion from the North. It could not, therefore, rely on a national militia. It must necessarily keep up an army. What is to be the relation of this army to other imperial forces?

Again, what is to be the composition and quality of this army, and how is it to be controlled? How is it likely to get on with the civil government? The eagles do not anywhere accept with much enthusiasm the rule of the parrots, and in India there must ever be reasons why the army would mistrust the rule of the literate Indian.

In a country where intrigue, and the appeal from order to order, and the playing off of power against power, has for long been regarded as the great secret of statesmanship it would seem difficult to keep the army out of politics. An army which is not kept out of politics is at first the tool, but soon the master, of the contending factions. Democracies have short memories, but few have forgotten the abyss which suddenly yawned before us in the early months of 1914. A strong well-disciplined effective army is formidable to its masters, unless the soldier is first and foremost a citizen. A weak and tumultuous army is formidable in another but no less dangerous way. The

circumstances which led to the interference of Britain in Egyptian affairs are well known.

Cognate with this question is the question of minorities. It has been recognised that minorities are, in India, entitled to special protection. How is that protection to be afforded to them in the new India? It clearly cannot be. But it is from these very minorities that the bulk of the army is recruited, and from which necessarily the bulk of the corps of officers must be constituted. Will the soldier in such circumstances always remember that he is a citizen first and a soldier afterwards?

Again, and not very remote from this topic is the question of the Native Chiefs. They are of very varying castes, races, and religions. Some of them are negligible enough owing to defects of character, others are negligible owing to the smallness of their dominions. But there are many who are both men of character and of large resources. What will the relations of these chiefs be to the Indian Government? Will they long be content to be vassals?

It is not to the name and shadow of Empire or the metaphor of the Crown that India can look for long for the preservation of internal peace. It is on the character of the rulers, the strength they possess, and on the assent of the subjects that here, as elsewhere, a dominion to be stable must rest as on pillars.

These and other problems will require solution.

So far I see no recognition even of the fact that these problems exist.

It is to the future that we must look for such solution, and it is by the events of the future that the British Empire must be judged. If that event turn out well for India and for England, then we shall be called wise, but if otherwise, cowards.

Perhaps the gods are athirst. Perhaps to us, our sons, or our grandsons is reserved a great and curious spectacle. Those who are dead care nothing for human joys and sorrows, and to the memory of the great dead history will pay her meed of praise. To us who have lived to see that all our labour has come to nought this is given as a consolation, that it is the God which assigns the task and the reward of the task. We labour blindly, not knowing the event. That knowledge the God has kept to himself, and none can fathom his purposes. If we have worked well and faithfully, then it is well with us.

The God it is who gives and takes away kingdoms. For us, the wise and the foolish, the coward and the valiant, the slave and the free man, for empires and anarchies, there is all one end, the grave and ultimate oblivion. But praise be to Him, the Living, the Eternal, who never dies.

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